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This dissertation analyzes recovery efforts in the town of Bhuj in the State of 
Gujarat in western India after a devastating earthquake of magnitude Mw 7.7 on 
January 26, 2001. It provides a nuanced description of the technical, administrative, 
and political complexities associated with long-term recovery, specifically those 
related to post-disaster planning and the reconstruction of public infrastructure and 
private homes. The dissertation explores how post-disaster interventions that focus on 
physical rebuilding interact with existing patterns of vulnerability to influence the 
recovery of affected populations, especially the most socially and economically 
marginalized. 
 
The inherently political nature of the urban planning process, compounded in this 
case by systemic administrative vulnerabilities (lack of resources, previous 
unregulated growth, lax enforcement of building regulations, and dated records some 
of which were lost in the earthquake), complicated the process of rehabilitating a 
badly damaged town. At the same time, an event as momentous as an earthquake 
offered an opportunity for renewal that would not have taken place otherwise. 
 
In Bhuj, where the urban rehabilitation program heavily emphasized infrastructure 
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development and the reconstruction of houses, long-term disaster management relied 
on several regulatory mechanisms: a Development Plan (DP), Town Planning 
Schemes (TPSs), Development Control Regulations (DCR), and building codes to 
reduce vulnerability in case of future incidents. These governmental efforts were 
accompanied by the creation of new institutions for short-term rehabilitation, long-
term urban planning, and land management. In the aftermath of the earthquake, the 
city of Bhuj was able to transform its dense, medieval urban core into a disaster-
resistant center city with modern amenities. Bhuj‘s transformation is one of the focal 
points of this study. 
   
The dissertation considers the complexities of disaster recovery—its humanitarian 
aspects, the resiliencies of affected populations, and pressure to produce results in a 
short time span. It explores how policies and plans formulated at higher levels of 
government were made to work in Bhuj, where those who lacked resources required 
socio-technical support. The analysis aims to understand both the challenges and the 
opportunities in urban planning initiatives for long-term disaster recovery.  
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CHAPTER 1 
DISASTER RECOVERY IN URBAN AREAS 
 
Introduction 
  
An earthquake of magnitude Mw 7.7 devastated the western Indian state of 
Gujarat on January 26, 2001. Beginning at 8:46 am, the earth shook for nearly two 
minutes, and subsequently, 14,000 people were dead, 167,000 injured, and 150,000 
homes were damaged or destroyed. After the government‘s immediate response to the 
crisis, its long-term disaster management response consisted of several regulatory 
mechanisms: a Development Plan (DP), Town Planning Schemes (TPSs), 
Development Control Regulations (DCR), and building codes to reduce vulnerability 
in the case of future incidents.  After the earthquake, the dense, walled, medieval city 
of Bhuj in Kachchh district was transformed into a disaster-resistant city center with 
modern amenities. The process of Bhuj‘s transformation is one of the focal points of 
this study. 
 
In large measure, this dissertation describes the highly political nature of the post-
disaster management process in Kachchh. The process had many facets: immediate 
needs versus long-term goals; concerns shared by everyone in affected areas and the 
particular concerns of the wealthy, the ordinary, and the disenfranchised; interactions 
among local, state, national, and also international institutions—public, private, and 
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nongovernmental; and the tension between official, public participation in the 
rebuilding process and the way that residents of the city experienced that 
transformation. The complicated activity of earthquake rehabilitation and rebuilding in 
an urban area required extensive negotiation among a great many actors, and this 
dissertation attempts to provide a nuanced understanding of the complexities 
associated with such a process in the aftermath of the Gujarat Earthquake of 2001. 
 
Among the key questions addressed here is this: How did planning as an 
institutional mechanism of governance operate through a multitude of institutional as 
well as non-institutional actors? By examining specific urban planning techniques 
used in Bhuj, such as the Development Plan (DP) and Town Planning Scheme (TPS), 
this analysis explores whether the specific context of disaster rehabilitation presented a 
proverbial ―window of opportunity‖ to planners, disaster managers, and/or 
development practitioners to undertake otherwise-difficult-to-adopt-and-implement 
rational physical planning measures and institutional changes to reduce vulnerabilities 
of urban residents in case of future disasters. 
 
Beyond simplistic interpretations that would characterize post-earthquake urban 
planning and rehabilitation measures as mere instruments of power camouflaged as 
technocratic interventions—and beyond idealistic notions of urban form that pose 
haphazard or unregulated growth as ―organic‖ while considering ―planned‖ 
development to be imposed or top-down—this dissertation explores the implications 
of spatial restructuring using rational urban planning measures. It examines the 
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combined effects of the application of such measures, along with the tendency of 
planners and implementers to distance themselves from the sociocultural, economic, 
and political realities of local populations, especially the most socially and 
economically marginalized. 
 
This dissertation also interrogates claims of public participation in post-disaster 
urban planning processes, and it explores how processes of formulation and 
implementation of post-disaster policies and plans could most effectively involve 
affected communities. In Gujarat, while specific actors (government officials, 
community leaders or civil society members) were able to influence the formulation of 
policies and plans (and subsequent modifications to them during their implementation) 
to reflect the needs of those affected, such ―informal‖ spaces of deliberation were 
largely born out of the state‘s need for validation and public acceptance; participation 
in them was dependent on understanding the technical aspects of planning processes 
as well as having bargaining power vis-à-vis the state. By analyzing the multiple 
forms of the articulation of public demands related to urban planning and 
reconstruction in Bhuj, this dissertation seeks to underscore the need for formal 
participation with a legal mandate to represent public needs and grievances in order to 
facilitate faster recovery of those affected.  
 
Consideration is given to the establishment of mechanisms for the provision of 
socio-technical support to those who lack the necessary resources (financial, 
organizational, political, and/or technical) to participate in planning processes.  In the 
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immediate aftermath of an earthquake or similar catastrophic event and in the long-
range planning opportunities it affords, state-approved forms of public participation do 
not necessarily account for the sum of activity that takes place for survival and 
renewal. Therefore, post-disaster urban planning processes for vulnerability reduction 
in any context can learn from the particular experience of Bhuj and its residents how 
things truly happen on the ground.  
 
 This dissertation‘s account of the post-earthquake re-articulation of urban Bhuj 
through town planning processes is divided into eight chapters.  The remainder of this 
chapter reviews the literature of disaster recovery in urban areas and then describes the 
dissertation‘s methodology. 
 
Chapter 2, ―Bhuj, near the Epicenter‖ begins with a discussion of the earthquake 
and its impacts and the immediate responses to the earthquake.  It surveys the damage 
throughout Kachchh, including three other important towns besides Bhuj that were 
affected by the earthquake—Anjar, Bhachau, and Rapar. The chapter introduces post-
earthquake rebuilding strategies under the rubric of Gujarat Earthquake Rehabilitation 
and Reconstruction Program (GERRP), primarily through the narratives of various 
state actors engaged in the rehabilitation of Bhuj. Finally, it details the policy and 
institutional framework for GERRP.  
 
Chapter 3, ―Institutional Responses to Rebuilding of Kachchh,‖ examines the 
details of the regulatory town planning mechanisms used to rebuild urban areas of 
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Kachchh along with the institutional mechanisms to facilitate their translation into 
action. Chapter 4, ―Making Town Planning Work in Bhuj,‖ examines processes of 
preparation and implementation of planning mechanisms, such as the Development 
Plan and Town Planning Schemes. Chapter 5, ―Political Process of Urban Planning in 
Bhuj,‖ discusses various challenges faced by the implementers of the program and 
strategies adopted to overcome them in an effort to make the program work.  
 
Chapter 6, ―Participatory Planning in Bhuj‖ interrogates the claim of GERRP as a 
successful case of participatory rehabilitation. It examines the state approved forms of 
participation and asks how the specific context of post-earthquake urban planning for 
vulnerability reduction interacts with the socioeconomic and political context shaping 
the notion of participation as well as the forms of it.  
 
Chapter 7, ―Resilience and the Re-articulation of Bhuj,‖ examines the multiple 
resiliencies of residents of Bhuj using the officially established categories of 
ownership and legality to understand how residents experienced the processes of town 
planning. It discusses how changes to the physical city intersected with social, 
economic, and political lives of its residents and their processes of recovery, especially 
that of socially and economically marginalized groups.   
 
Finally, Chapter 8, ―Disaster as Opportunity for Vulnerability Reduction,‖ 
discusses the institutional changes in urban governance and disaster rehabilitation 
brought about by GERRP and situates them in the larger context of techno-legal 
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regime of disaster management in India. It suggests ways in which post-disaster urban 
planning processes intended for long-term vulnerability reduction could do so while 
enhancing the inherent coping capacities of those affected. A discussion of the 
limitations of this study is followed by recommendations for future research. 
    
Literature Review 
 
This dissertation draws heavily on Michael Lipsky‘s 1980 formulation that 
policies are essentially made in the street: that policy really comes down to the street-
level bureaucrats who implement it, or don‘t. In discussing how policies and plans 
were realized in the city of Bhuj, Lipsky‘s ideas inform thoughts about how policies 
and plans related to earthquake recovery formulated at high levels of government were 
―made to work‖ at the local level in urban areas such as Bhuj by the plans‘ 
implementers, thereby emphasizing the dynamic nature of policy-making. If policy-
making is indeed an ongoing process, then it warrants sustained attention to the 
implementation processes as well as establishment of mechanisms for the provision of 
socio-technical support to those who lack the necessary resources (financial, 
organizational, political, or technical) to participate in these processes.   
   
In terms of theoretical discourse on disasters, discussion has shifted from an 
earlier emphasis on post-disaster responses (Dynes, De Marchi, and Pelanda, 1987) to 
a new emphasis on pre-disaster conditions and the processes that lead to disasters 
(Tobin and Montz, 1997; Blaikie, Cannon, Davis, and Wisner, 2004). The literature 
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also differentiates between hazards (―phenomena which may pose a threat to humans, 
their welfare and livelihoods . . .  [and] may be natural, such as floods, earthquakes, 
hurricanes/cyclones and drought, or induced by human processes, such as industrial 
accident‖) and disasters (―the impact of a natural or human-made hazard on a group of 
people, causing widespread human, material or environmental losses which exceed its 
capacity to cope using its own resources‖) (Palakudiyil and Todd, 2003).1 
 
The naturalist or physicalist approach looked at ―violent forces of nature‖ or 
nature on rampage (Frazier, 1979; Maybury, 1986; Ebert, 1993; de Blij, 1994). Others 
have emphasized the trigger role of geotectonics/climate/biological factors or the 
hazards (Bryant, 1991; Alexander, 1993; Tobin and Montz, 1997; Smith, 1992). 
Unlike man-made disasters, these ―natural events‖ were considered to be the 
geophysical causal mechanisms beyond human control.   
 
Beyond these earlier categorizations of events by type (natural and ―man-made‖) 
and by scale, the term ―disaster‖ now invokes a wide range of events—from regular, 
everyday,  unexceptional occurrences of illnesses, disease, and hunger that often pass 
unnoticed (Blaikie et al., 2004) to extreme events that result in widespread loss, 
human as well as material. The blurring of boundaries between the natural and the 
man-made has opened up space to engage with the underlying processes that allow a 
                                                 
1
 The Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) in Brussels, Belgium, defines a 
disaster as ―a situation or event which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request to a national 
or international level for external assistance.‖ It maintains a database (EM-DAT) of all events where 10 
or more people are reportedly killed, and/or 100 or more people are reportedly affected, and /or a call 
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trigger event or hazard to become a disaster. Anthropogenic factors assume greater 
significance in their interaction with nature beyond a subtle environmental 
determinism (Burton, 1978; Whittow, 1980). 
 
In terms of theoretical discussions of human vulnerability, the literature is less 
dense. Hazards and their impacts have been examined closely for the complex 
interactions of human and natural factors that result in a disaster (Deyle, French, 
Olshansky, and Patterson, 1998). Vulnerability (the ―susceptibility of human 
settlements to the harmful impacts of natural hazards‖) has also received greater 
attention from scholars (Olshansky and Wu, 2004, p. 71). Scholars also differentiate 
vulnerability from risk, which is defined as the possibility of suffering harm from a 
hazard.
2
 Extreme events are created in particular contexts. They are not determined 
solely by a set of characteristics inherent in a physical phenomenon; instead, they are 
created by the interaction of those characteristics with other systems (Sarewitz, Pielke, 
and Keykhah, 2003). It has been acknowledged that vulnerability is a complex matter 
that is constituted by the interaction of the natural environment with social, political, 
and economic environments that continuously pattern society. However, despite its 
rootedness in physical, social, economic, and cultural spheres, the social and physical 
aspects of vulnerability have often been treated separately (Sen, 1982, Blaikie et al., 
                                                                                                                                            
for international assistance/declaration of a state of emergency has been made. (Source: http://www.em-
dat.net/documents/bangkok06/Emdat.pdf)  
2
 Risk is often understood as precise mathematical equations of future events, the result of a physical 
hazard that occurs within a physical, built, and social environment that is vulnerable to such hazards 
(see for example Coburn and Spence, 1992). From another perspective, risk is a culturally selected, 
socially constructed threat (see for example: Douglas, 1990; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Fischhoff, 
Lichtenstein, Slovis, Derby, and Keeney, 1981, Johnson and Covello, 1987; Rohrmann and Renn, 2000; 
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2004).   
 
Disaster management efforts have often taken the form of engineering and 
techno-legal measures that focus on reducing the vulnerability of physical 
infrastructure—including housing, improving emergency services, and regulating the 
built form through zoning, land use regulations, and building codes. Despite their 
constant engagement with physical space, such interventions/processes often reduce 
space to a backdrop for the unfolding of social, economic, and political processes 
(Harvey, 1997).  
 
However, patterns of vulnerability are often manifested in patterns of differential 
access to tangible and intangible resources (GFW, 2005; Blaikie et al.; 2004, Glantz; 
2005; Enarson and Morrow, 1998). Overemphasis on the event and physical aspects of 
the built form, ―the hardware aspects of vulnerability,‖ distracts attention from the 
political and economic determinants of vulnerability (Blaikie et al., 2004, p. 56). The 
complex and contextual nature of vulnerability and resilience require that we pay 
attention to many less quantifiable social determinants including attitudes, values, 
behavior, perceptions and social/community networks (Glavac, Hastings, and Childs, 
2003, p. 10). In its rejection of environmental determinism, the vulnerability model 
reduces space to physical space, an inert entity, a product of other processes. This 
attribution of concreteness to space fails to capture the dynamism or fluidity of the 
various processes that constitute space (Massey, 2005) and its experiential qualities 
                                                                                                                                            
Slovic, 2000; Wildavsky and Dake, 1990). For a discussion on the evolution of the concept of risk, see 
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(Tuan, 1977). Such a narrow definition of space cannot account for the dialectic 
relationship between its physical and experiential characteristics that produces space 
(Lefebvre, 1991). 
 
With greater understanding of differential vulnerability to disasters, attention to 
its multiple facets becomes crucial for improving resilience (the ability to cope with 
extreme events and return to a ―normal‖ life) and for development to be sustainable.3 
Solutions to reduce impacts of disasters often point to addressing social, 
environmental, and political issues in society (Zaman, 1986; Haque and Zaman, 1991; 
Davis, 2005). However, equating vulnerability with poverty has also led to a process 
of merely categorizing beneficiaries, rather than analyzing their situation (Christoplos, 
Mitchell, and Lijelund, 2001, p. 191). Under-specification of possible agency of 
vulnerable people through a narrow characterization of them as victims of structural 
inequality as well as reduction of space to its physical form (buildings and other 
infrastructure) fail to capture the complex ways in spatial restructuring following 
disasters are shaped by non-physical factors that constitutes space and its implications 
for long-term recovery of people from disasters and vulnerability reduction. 
 
In the anthropological literature on relocation and displacement, there is a general 
exploration of the way people exercise agency through various coping mechanisms in 
situations conceived as marginalizing (Oliver-Smith, 2001; Olaa, 2001). In the astute 
                                                                                                                                            
Lupton, 1999. 
3
 This is discussed in length in the disaster literature in the urban context by Vale and Campanella 
(2005). 
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words of Sorensen, ―people are not simply victims of change, but social agents taking 
a keen and active role in the ongoing process of social engineering‖ (Sorensen, 1997, 
p. 144). By situating places, people, and the relationships among them in the context 
of the local, national, and global—and not as isolated localities— Sorensen and others 
emphasize the role of agency in bringing about change as opposed to being restrained 
by ―hierarchical relations and chronologically regulated time‖ (Ilcan, 1998, p. 57; 
Turner, 2005; Sorensen, 1997). The recognition of agency of the vulnerable 
populations, along with cognizance of the fluidity and dynamism of space beyond its 
physical dimensions, are critical to a nuanced understanding of how alterations to the 
physical space in the aftermath of a disaster both shape and are in itself shaped by 
processes of recovery of those affected.  
 
In terms of disaster vulnerability and recovery of cities, which by virtue of their 
role as social, economic, political, cultural, and technological centers, have been the 
targets of both ―natural‖ and human-induced disasters, the literature is rich (Ockman, 
2002; Vale and Campanella; 2005; Pelling, 2003). Rapid urbanization along with 
rural-to-urban migration exposes large number of people to unsafe living conditions 
(Neuwirth, 2004; Davis, 2004; Roy, 2003).
4
 The increasing vulnerability of urban 
areas to disasters poses a significant challenge to already impoverished populations in 
                                                 
4 The dichotomization of urban areas into cities of global north and that of south, the developed and the 
developing/underdeveloped, is prevalent even in the analysis of urban disasters (Quarantelli, 2003). 
While the vulnerability of cities like San Francisco or Tokyo or London are attributed to infrastructure 
and the role these cities play in the global economy, the vulnerability of Nairobi or Bombay are 
attributed to their large populations, lack of adequate services, poverty, and so on (Blaikie et al., 2004). 
Hurricane Katrina in the United States demonstrated how even in developed countries of the West, 
inequality is spatialized where certain population groups are ―forced‖ into unsafe living conditions, 
rendering them more vulnerable to disasters. 
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coping with the impacts of hazardous events. It also puts immense pressure on local 
governments and humanitarian actors to address the basic factors contributing to 
vulnerability rather than to engage in ―disaster clean-up‖ after the fact (IFRC, 2010).  
 
However, the dichotomization of disaster vulnerability into either physical 
vulnerability (Tobin and Montz, 1997) or social vulnerability (Oliver-Smith, 2001; 
Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley, 2003; Rossi, 1993; Perry and Mushatel, 1986; Palakudiyil 
and Todd, 2003; Varshney, 2002; Zaman, 1986) generally tends to ignore how societal 
relations embedded in the built form affect the ability to cope with extreme situations 
(Turton, 1977; Torry, 1986; Haque and Zaman, 1991; Barton, 1969; Marris, 1996). 
Urban landscape often reinforces power inequities and social exclusion (Zukin, 1995, 
1991). This spatial ordering which is part of uneven development implies positions of 
dominance and subordination. It is critical therefore to analyze the relationship 
between physical and social vulnerabilities to disasters in neighborhood and 
community spaces in disaster-prone areas, sites of contestation (Zukin, 1995) that are 
both socially ―constructed and produced‖ (Low, 1999).5 
 
Without romanticizing the rootedness of ―culture‖ or ―identity‖ (Malkki, 1992) in 
particular localities or depoliticizing various disaster management policies and 
practices to a technical project in the public interest (Scott, 1998; Ferguson, 1994), a 
deeper understanding of the dynamics of such spaces (congregation, economic 
transactions, and political expression) could better inform disaster management 
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practices that often alter the built form with consequences for community structure, 
social capital, and subsequently, long-term disaster vulnerability.
6 
The inclusion of the 
notion of agency in the vulnerability model provides a useful framework to understand 
not only the impacts of disaster management policies on the vulnerability of 
marginalized groups but also the processes of active, reconstructive negotiation 
between these groups and the state and/or civil society organizations towards 
vulnerability reduction in urban areas. 
 
Reconstruction policies often emphasize construction rather than repair, buildings 
rather than social networks, and housing units rather than accessible communities 
(Olshansky, Kobayashi, and Ohnish, 2005). Some accounts of disaster-rebuilding 
efforts in cities warn against highly centralized political systems that are more likely to 
fall back on routine behavior, making them incapable of responding to the new 
circumstances (Davis, 2005).
7
 Others suggest that equal resources and access to 
information, consultation over time, and shared, inclusive authoritarian decision-
making are more likely to yield outcomes that are fair and wise (Hunold and Young, 
1998). 
 
While there is widespread agreement among researchers and practitioners on 
                                                                                                                                            
5
 Community is not considered a homogeneous static entity, but one that is in a dialectic relationship 
with social, economic, political and cultural processes (Harvey, 1997). 
6
 Some of the accounts of urban disasters have looked at urban rebuilding as a political process (Davis, 
2005) and how urban planning for disaster risk reduction could affect recovery of marginalized 
populations (Green, Bates, and Smyth, 2007). 
7
 Inam (2005) argues that it’s the routine, bureaucratic structure of public agencies based on familiar 
protocols and large-scale coordination which actually enables rapid and successful response in times of 
crisis.  
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differential vulnerability, rehabilitation policies or programs are often shaped by 
notions of disaster vulnerability of the institutional actors and are based on generic 
parameters. Moreover, policies and programs in response to disasters are often 
formulated in haste. Following Lipsky, policies are ―made‖ by street-level bureaucrats 
who interact directly with the ―client‖ populations. Implementing generic policies to 
address issues of differential access to resources, while being sensitive to the 
unfolding of multiple resiliencies, is extremely difficult in a democratic setup. 
Premised on ―equal treatment of all its citizens‖ in an unequal society, decisions made 
in greater public interest often disadvantage a few. The ability of street-level 
bureaucrats to exercise discretionary powers can be a significant aspect of how the 
differences in ―client‖ populations (their differential vulnerabilities) could be 
addressed with policies crafted on the basis of generic categories (Lipsky, 1980).
8
 
Hence, it becomes important to explore not only the processes through which various 
institutional actors ―create‖ policies and programs, but also how they are ―made‖ in 
particular localities in a post-disaster context.  
 
It is equally significant to understand the ways in which vulnerable populations 
can be involved in processes of risk reduction and recovery from disasters. Engaging 
citizens and affected communities might require a shift in the culture of public 
administration (United Nations, 2011). Despite the large number of reconstruction and 
rehabilitation programs undertaken worldwide, disaster literature suffers from a dearth 
                                                 
8
 Considered a possible solution or potential problem, the discretionary powers of street-level 
bureaucrats are influenced by routinization and bias, which force them to put clients into categories 
(creation of client identities) (Lipsky, 1980). 
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of case studies that analyze how policies and plans in urban areas are made to work at 
the local level and how the lived realities of the affected populations shape these 
processes. Various factors that shape urban rehabilitation processes such as the 
complex institutional set-up in urban areas, social, economic, and political aspects of 
urban governance, and the conduct of institutional actors within particular contexts are 
largely missing in the disaster discourse. This dissertation attempts to fill this gap by 
analyzing one such large rehabilitation program after a disaster in Western India, 
specifically the adoption and implementation of urban planning mechanisms in an 
earthquake-affected town.  
 
Notes on Methodology 
 
This dissertation‘s analysis of earthquake rehabilitation processes in Bhuj is based 
on field research done over a period of approximately 22 months from 2004 to 2008, 
with the longest duration from June 2006 to August 2007. In-depth, semi-structured 
interviews, approximately 40- to 90-minutes long, were conducted to gain 
understanding of the earthquake rehabilitation process and town planning, in 
particular, from the people who played a key role in the creation and implementation 
of various plans. This included all the key institutional actors, as well as residents of 
Bhuj for whom the rehabilitation program was created and who experienced or 
influenced these processes as they rebuilt their lives in the aftermath of a devastating 
 16 
earthquake.
9
  
  
Interviewees included: private citizens (residents of Bhuj, community leaders and 
representatives of voluntary organizations); members of the local business community,  
real estate developers, and practicing architects; elected officials (local representatives, 
other government officials including previous office holders); appointed officials 
(Area Development Authority, municipality, GUDC, Gujarat State Disaster 
Management Agency (GSDMA) and Town Planning Officers (TPOs); professionals 
(planning consultants, representatives of NGOs, including local NGOs Abhiyan and 
BDC), civil engineers, historians, and geologists.
 10
   
 
In the case of residents of Bhuj, already defined categories based on caste and 
binaries—such as formal and informal settlers, residents of walled city and relocation 
sites, owners and tenants, men and women, etc.—served as useful starting points to 
capture the experiences of those interviewed. Many of the respondents understood and 
spoke Hindi. Interviews with planners, administrators, and bureaucrats were 
                                                 
9
 Longer interviews with various actors were conducted in order to understand and analyze the ―webs of 
meaning‖ (Geertz, 1973) as expressed through narratives. 
10
 Nearly 280 households in Bhuj were interviewed (stratified by region/caste and gender): 32 from the 
walled city, 167 from the relocation sites (RTO 36, Mundra Road 44, Rawalwadi 64, and GIDC 23 – 
nearly 4.5 to 5% of the total number of households in each site) and 81 from the area outside the walled 
city not included in the relocation sites (31 in the formal and 50 in the informal settlements). In 
addition, 16 government officials were also interviewed, including administrators and planners involved 
in the GERRP formulation and implementation; and 30-35 engineers, architects, planners, NGO 
representatives, journalists, community leaders/representatives, social workers, and others. In many 
cases, multiple follow-up interviews were conducted with the same person to get further information or 
clarification on specific aspects. Also, the same person often talked about his/her family’s recovery 
process and his or her community’s, the socio-political history and development of the city, economic 
recovery of the old city, technical or legal aspects of town planning, etc. In the case of household-level 
interviews, although there was one main interviewee, there were often other family members who 
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conducted in Hindi or English. Interviews in Bhuj were initially conducted with the 
help of two research assistants fluent in Gujarati and Kachchhi. Interviews were 
recorded, transcribed, and analyzed to identify the range of experiences with regard to 
the earthquake and town planning across various respondents. 
 
Secondary data used include: newspaper articles on town planning in Kachchh, 
specifically in Bhuj from 2001-2007; documents pertaining to the built form of 
Kachchh; historical accounts of the urban development pattern of Bhuj (especially 
from historians and Kachchh Museum); archival material on the history of urban 
development of Kachchh, such as District Gazetteers (government reports), etc.
11
 
Official videos (such as ―New Bhuj‖ made by BHADA) and photographs of 
earthquake devastation and the rehabilitation process (including personal albums of 
residents), along with the author‘s own audio and video recordings of the city and its 
people, when situated in the context of Bhuj served not just as snapshots of time but 
how the city was being continuously made and was infused with multiple meanings. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
participated in the conversation and shared opinions and insights. Therefore, the number of people 
mentioned above as having been interviewed is approximate. 
11
 Corresponds to the pre-independence period (before 1947), existence as a Union Territory (1948-
1956), post-unification with Gujarat (1956–1976), introduction of Gujarat Town Planning and Urban 
Development Act of 1976 till the 2001 earthquake (1976–2001), post earthquake period (2001– 2008) 
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CHAPTER 2 
BHUJ, NEAR THE EPICENTER 
 
The Gujarat Earthquake 
 
On January 26, 2001, at 8:46 am, the earth shook violently with a rumbling noise 
in Bhuj, headquarters of Kachchh District.
12
 Many people, including the District 
Collector of Kachchh, Kamal Dayani, thought it was a terrorist attack on the 50th 
anniversary of India becoming a republic (Mishra, 2004). The earthquake of 
magnitude 7.7 Mw (USGS estimate) that caused extensive damage in the entire state 
of Gujarat had its epicenter at Chaubari village, located to the north of Bhachau in 
Kachchh district.
13
 After the earth shook for approximately 110 seconds, nearly 
14,000 people lost their lives, 167,000 suffered injuries, and 150,000 homes were 
damaged.
14
  
 
In view of the geographical spread of the devastation, the Gujarat earthquake, as it 
is widely known, was declared a national disaster.
15
 The damage spread over a radius 
of 400 km from the earthquake epicenter (See Maps 1 and 2), affecting 21 out of 25 
districts of Gujarat. Kachchh and seven other districts—Surendra Nagar, Patan, 
                                                 
12
 Bhuj is located 400 km northeast of the state capital, Gandhi Nagar. 
13
 Initially it was estimated by the Indian Meteorological Department to be 6.9 on Richter Scale. The 
Geological Survey of India estimated it to be 7.6 on the moment (Mw scale) and US Geological Survey 
estimated it at 7.7  (Mw scale). The USGS estimate is the most accepted one. 
14
 Final figures from the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA) report 13,805 dead 
and 166,812 injured, of which 14,382 were severely injured. 
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Banaskantha, Jamnagar, Rajkot, Ahmedabad, and Surat—were most heavily affected. 
182 talukas (sub-administrative units within a district), and 7,922 villages were 
severely impacted (Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority, 2001).
16
  
 
Map 1: Gujarat Earthquake Damage Zones (Source: United Nations, 2001)
17
 
                                                                                                                                            
15
 Based on its geographical spread, disasters are classified into three levels: Level 3 if an area within a 
district is affected, Level 2 if two to three districts within a state are affected, and Level 1 if four or 
more districts are affected (Source: GSDMA spokesperson). 
16
 Taluka is an administrative and geographical block consisting of approximately 80 to 100 contiguous 
villages, with a primarily agricultural base. Details of affected districts are given in Appendix A.  
17
 Medvedev-Sponheuer-Karnik (MSK) is a macroseismic intensity scale to assess severity of ground 
shaking on the basis of observed effects in the area of an earthquake. 
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Map 2: Gujarat Earthquake Isoseismal map (Source: United Nations, 2001). 
 
Since the day of the quake was a public holiday, most business establishments, 
schools, and government offices were closed or unoccupied, thereby reducing the 
number of casualties. However, the earthquake generated several aftershocks, 
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including two shocks of magnitudes 5.9 and 5.3 during the first fortnight after the 
quake, accentuating the extent of damage (Mishra, 2004, p. 59).
18
 More than 230,000 
one- and two-story masonry houses collapsed, and more than 980,000 were damaged. 
The net economic loss was estimated at about US $5 billion (Jain, Lettis, Murty, and 
Bardet, 2002). See Map 3 for details of various talukas (administrative subdivisions 
within a district) affected by the Gujarat earthquake. 
 
 
Map 3: Talukas Affected by the 2001 Earthquake (Source: GSDMA)  
  Note: Map is not to scale and is indicative. 
 
Kachchh, the district affected the worst, suffered 90 percent of the deaths and 85 
                                                 
18
 There were approximately 953, 149, and 53 aftershocks in 2001, 2002, and 2003, respectively.  
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percent of the asset losses (World Bank/ADB, 2001). While four towns—Bhuj, 
Bhachau, Anjar, and Rapar—and more than 400 villages were severely affected, the 
city of Bhuj, the administrative capital of Kachchh district, suffered extensive damage 
to life and assets, including buildings and infrastructure.  
 
Map 4: District of Kachchh with its affected areas  
            (Source: http://www.drmonline.net/drmlibrary/gujarat.htm). 
 
More than 7,000 people died in the walled city ―as buildings constructed of stone 
and mud mortar came crashing down on extremely narrow streets‖ (Balachandran and 
Tyabji, 2001).
19
 
                                                 
19
 The physical form of the walled city of Bhuj is defined by a fortified wall built in 1723, and is 
characterized by a dense urban fabric of compact clusters of houses around cul-de-sacs/falia with 
meandering streets and open courts. 
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The state government‘s long-term disaster management responses turned on 
regulatory urban planning mechanisms to reduce the vulnerability of the built form. 
These efforts were accompanied by the creation of new institutions to implement the 
rehabilitation plans and programs as well as to undertake long-term urban planning 
and disaster management. In the years following the earthquake, the city of Bhuj took 
part in an urban planning ―experiment‖ to transform its dense, medieval urban core 
into a disaster-resistant one with modern amenities. These processes intersected with 
the long history of disasters, geographical peculiarities of the region, history of 
governance, patterns of development, and socio-political and economic processes that 
had been shaping the urban spaces of Kachchh, such as Bhuj.  
 
In the next section, I provide a brief overview of some of these space-making 
processes and their physical manifestations in Bhuj for two reasons: to provide the 
context within which post-earthquake urban planning processes unfolded, and to 
reinforce the significance of understanding such processes for effective disaster 
recovery in urban areas. 
Disasters, Development, and Space-making in Bhuj, Kachchh 
 
With several East-West-trending folds and faults traversing its terrain, 
historically, Kachchh has been seismically active, with a suggested recurrence of 
approximately 200 to 300 years for large magnitude events (Rajendran and Rajendran, 
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2001; Malik, 2000).
20
 Kachchh is located in seismic zone V (see Appendix B), the 
zone of highest intensity earthquakes (see Map 5).  
 
Map 5: Seismic Zones of India (Source: Bureau of Indian Standards). 
 
                                                 
20
 District of Kachchh lies on Seismic Zone V, the highest category of earthquake proneness, according 
to the Geological Survey of India. The Harappan civilization that flourished here around 3500 BC is 
believed to have declined owing to the seismic activity. Though there are references to earthquakes in 
the 9
th
, 12
th
, 15
th
, and 18
th
 centuries, not much information is available about the sizes and effects of 
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Seismic disturbances in the 11
th
 or 12
th
 centuries converted the once-navigable 
waters to the north and east of Kachchh into the difficult and treacherous Rann, 
introducing a period of relative isolation into the history of Kachchh (Rushbrook 
Williams, 1958).
21
 The 1819 earthquake reduced Bhuj to rubble, killing around 2,000 
people, damaging 7,000 houses, and inflicting significant damages on the fort walls.
22
 
 
The semi-arid to arid coastal zone of Kachchh is exposed to periodic droughts and 
other hazards, such as cyclones and storm surges.
23
 Droughts are a regular 
phenomenon. The 2001 earthquake occurred after a two-year drought (1999 and 
2000).
24
 These disasters had an adverse effect on health, quality of life, and level of 
food available in the area, and made farmers vulnerable.  
 
Mass exoduses of people following droughts and famines had been a common 
phenomenon.
25
 Because of the uncertainty of rainfall, along with the lack of livelihood 
options, high-class traders, both Hindus (Bhatias, Osval Vanias (Jains), and Lohanas) 
                                                                                                                                            
these events. Earthquakes were reported in 1819, 1844, and 1954 (Geological Survey of India). See 
Bilham, 1999, for descriptions of the 1819 and 1844 earthquakes. 
21 The Rann of Kachchh is a vast salt desert with a thick salt layer mixed with fine sand and clay devoid 
of vegetation and habitation spread over an area of about 33,000km
2
, divided into two parts, the Great 
Rann to the North and the Little Rann to the East (Gazetteer of India, 1971). 
22
 The 1819 earthquake that occurred on June 16 at 6:45 p.m. is believed to have been more devastating 
than the 2001 earthquake. It changed the course of the Indus River flowing through Kachchh by the 
geological formation called Allah bund. 
23
 Owing to its 352 km long coastline, Kachchh has been extremely vulnerable to cyclones. In 1998, a 
major cyclone hit Kandla Port, killing more than 3,000 people, followed by another cyclone in 1999. 
24
 13,148 of 18,356 villages were in the grip of the drought. Many districts spared by the earthquake 
were under severe scarcity, and many suffered the dual calamity of the drought and the earthquake. 
25
 During the great famine of 1823, one-fifth of the population of Kachchh is said to have left the region 
(Gazetteer of India, 1971). Bubonic plague of 1812 wiped out half the inhabitants of the state, including 
the famous Fateh Mohammed and the ruler Rao Rayadhanji II himself. The infamous famine (known as 
chappanio) of 1900 resulted in yet another stream of disaster-induced population movement (Yagnik 
and Sheth, 2006). 
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and Muslims (Khojas, Memons, and Bohras) left their homes in search of 
employment. Rushbrook Williams (1958) observed: 
 
for every Kutchi [people of/from Kutch] who habitually lives and works 
inside Kutch, there is another Kutchi who habitually lives and works outside, 
whether in Bombay, Calcutta, East Africa, Aden, the Persian Gulf, Europe, or 
the United States.
26
 
 
The Anjar earthquake in 1956, whose epicenter was 55km from Bhuj, and two 
wars with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 also discouraged many settlers and led to a 
significant exodus during 1960-1970. While the search for liberal economies where 
Kachchhis could exercise their entrepreneurial freedom made them venture outside of 
Kachchh, they continued to transact with a place in Kachchh called ‗home‘ (Tyabji, 
2006, p. 47).
27
 
 
The Kachchh region had two distinct eras of development. Early construction 
took place under the Jadeja rule that lasted for over five centuries. Old towns like Bhuj 
and Anjar were fortified, had high density housing, very narrow streets, and old mud 
masonry construction with sloping mud tiled roofs. In the case of villages in remote 
areas, particularly in the northern islands (bets), vernacular architecture prevailed with 
conventional bhoonga or jhumpa dwellings which are rounded structures made of 
                                                 
 
 
27
 Remittances from expatriate Kachchhis have been a major source of income. 
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stone, mud, and dung with conical roofs.
28
 In the case of Bhuj, the Jadeja ruler, 
Pragmalji II (1860-75), known as a great builder, undertook many useful public works, 
including deepening and improvement of many water tanks, the causeway in Hamirsar 
Lake, a new jail, stables, and a hospital (Gazetteer of India, 1971). 
 
The more recent construction in the region began after the partition of the Indian 
Subcontinent into India and Pakistan in 1947. The strategic location of Kachchh from 
the perspective of national security (being located on the international border 
separating India and Pakistan), as well as occurrence of natural disasters, were rather 
the only factors that brought this region to any significant attention, whether in terms 
of development funding or in the national imaginary. During 1948-49 and 1951-52, 
when Kachchh was in the grip of severe famines, with a view to provide relief to the 
people of the famine-stricken area, government undertook road construction. Such 
relief works and Five Year Plans were instrumental in the implementation of several 
projects which increased the total road length of Kachchh (Gazetteer of India, 1971). 
 
During 1948-1956, when Kachchh was under direct central government rule, the 
central government of India showed some interest in the development of the region. It 
developed the port at Kandla (since Karachi, a prominent port on the western 
seaboard, became part of Pakistan after the partition of the Indian subcontinent), along 
with some infrastructure development, including those for the resettlement of refugees 
                                                 
28
 A bhoonga or jhumpa is a traditional house that consists of a single room circular in plan, diameter 3 
to 6 meters, walls made of sun-dried (adobe) bricks about 500 mm thick, pitched roof made of bamboo 
sticks and thatch, with basic earthquake-resistant features built into them. 
 28 
following partition.
29
 In 1948, on the recommendation of Mahatma Gandhi, the 
Government of India for the purpose of developing a township near the Port of Kandla 
granted land and commissioned the Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Limited (SRCL) 
with the main objective of settling and rehabilitating the persons displaced from the 
Sindh province of West Pakistan (now known as Pakistan).
30
  
 
By 1958, the SRCL completed a major part of the construction in two locations, 
which are today‘s cities of Adipur and Gandhidham. However, due to a slow increase 
in livelihoods arising from the marginal growth in commerce, trade, industry, and 
communications, it took a few more decades for these urban areas to realize their full 
potential. In 1965, the region sprung back into national consciousness owing to border 
dispute with the neighboring country of Pakistan, resulting in extensive militarization 
of Kachchh.
31
 
 
During the 50 years after independence, the SRCL, the Kandla Port Trust (KPT), 
the Indian Railways, the Department of Telecommunications, and the Military 
Engineering Service (also responsible for improving and introducing new construction 
                                                 
29
 In June 1948, Kachchh became part of the Indian Union, and the 400-year old Jadeja king’s rule over 
Bhuj ended. After the integration with India, during 1948-1956 Kachchh was placed directly under the 
Central Government, as a Part C state. On the reorganization of states, despite public opposition, 
Kachchh was integrated with the bilingual Bombay state on November 1, 1956. With the bifurcation of 
Bombay state on May 1, 1960 into Maharashtra and Gujarat, Kachchh became a district in the newly 
formed Gujarat state. 
30
 In 1948 the Government of India granted SRCL 6,070 hectares (15,000 acres) of land, which was 
revised in 1955 to 2,600 acres; the Port of Kandla received an adjoining 4,320 acres. 
31
 Though the dispute was later resolved through a tribunal that decided on demarcation of the boundary 
in 1968, the dispute brought Kachchh to national consciousness as a frontier territory that is vulnerable 
to external aggressions. For details on the dispute, see Gupta, 1969, and Indian Society of International 
Law, 1965. 
 29 
technology) were the main organizations that undertook construction activity in the 
Kachchh region. Construction in other parts of Kachchh was a consequence of the 
development in the Gandhidham-Adipur areas. The road from Nakhatrana to Lakhpat 
was given priority for strategic reasons, thereby opening up the area for commercial 
exploitation of deposits of lignite, gypsum, and rock-salt (Rushbrook Williams, 1958). 
The growth of the Kandla Port Trust, the construction of new highways during 1970s, 
and the commissioning of the Broad Gauge Railway line in the 1980s, led to an influx 
of people into the region. 
 
Real estate and land business began to flourish in Kachchh in the 1980s. 
Expatriate Kachchhis invested in property and built houses and bungalows in the 
Wagad area (eastern Kachchh) as well as in Mundra (in the South) for their parents, or 
they left it with caretaker. They also made contributions for the development of social 
and physical infrastructure in their ancestral villages. This has been a significant factor 
in the development of villages and also fuelled real estate development in the region. 
 
The physical form of Bhuj is characterized by a princely citadel, the Bhujjia 
Fortress that overlooks the city from a hill known as the Bhujjio. The recorded history 
of Bhuj dates back to the days of the Naga Chieftain Bhujang, and it is said to have 
witnessed the Indus Valley civilization, the exile of the Pandavas during the 
Mahabharata, and the invasion of Alexander the Great.
32
 In 1548, Rao Khengarji I, the 
                                                 
32
 According to legend, Bhujang Naga who ruled the area on which Bhuj stands today was a ruthless 
Naga ruler. Later in life he renounced all his powers and did penance by helping the poor. After his 
death, he became Bhujangadeva and the hill was named Bhujangia or Bhujjia (Khare, 2004). 
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Jadeja ruler, chose Bhuj as the administrative capital of the princely state of 
Kachchh.
33
  The old city was confined within fort walls with five gates and an 
emergency exit known as the Chattibari (sixth window). The city grew around the 
darbargarh, a complex of royal apartments and palaces at the core of the walled city. 
The walled city area (gamtal) served as the residential and commercial center, 
surrounded by relatively scant development in the area outside the walled city known 
as the simtal.
 34
 
 
Ordinary life around the darbargarh revolved around the falia, or neighborhood. 
Inside the walled city, the urban form was characterized by compact clusters of 
contiguous row of houses built on meandering streets or open courts.
35
 Streets served 
as a social amenity, affording social interaction in day-to-day life, as well as on special 
occasions, such as festivals, when it translated to a group space. Domestic activities 
often extended into the street. The entrance node was defined by a gateway, or deli, 
which marked the transition from the public (external road) to the semi-public 
(settlement) spaces. The neighborhoods were often differentiated from each other 
based on caste or trade. The general layout of towns of Kachchh was similar with 
regard to the functional distribution of houses by caste. 
                                                 
33
 Bhuj was known as Tahej in the ancient times. 
34
 In Bhuj, while most residences were located within the walled city, land outside the fort walls was 
given to Bakalis (Muslims) or the Waghiris (Hindus originally from the Wagad region of eastern 
Kachchh) to grow vegetables, fruits, and flowers to be supplied to the city. The only settlements outside 
the walled city were those near the British campson the foothills of Bhujio fortress, inhabited by Parsis, 
Bhils (from Rajasthan), Christians, Kolis, Maldharis, and Bakalis. 
35
 Darbargarh is a complex of royal apartments and palaces at the core of the walled city. Prag Mahal, is 
situated across the courtyard from the old palace, Aina Mahal designed by Henry St. Claire Wilkins, a 
British engineer, and built around 1865 by Rao Pragmalji. A grand Durbar Hall in the new Gothic style 
and the 45 m lofty clock tower commanded the skyline of the whole town of Bhuj. 
 31 
 
In the post-independence era, the fortification remained intact until the 1960s 
when the Vaniawad gate, along with the southern edge of the fort wall, was 
demolished under development pressure. The moat surrounding the wall was filled in 
to permit contiguous development towards the south of the city.
36
 In the 1960s, the 
first legal housing society outside the walled city was developed by migrants from 
Karachi.
 37
 By the 1970s, the walled city had mixed construction that ranged from old 
mud masonry construction with sloping, mud tile roofs, and masonry structures with 
reinforced concrete roofs. Several cooperative housing societies were built outside the 
walled city. Tyabji (2006) describes the nature of this development as follows: 
 
In the newly developing Bhuj, however, there was little hint of the original 
falia arrangement of housing, and none of the traditional signs of community 
identity which builders had used for generations in Kachchh.  . . . although 
residents of the first few colonies seemed to be bound by tradition and tended 
to form housing societies as though they were an extended family, newer 
developments were to reflect an individualism and economic independence 
previously unseen in the city. It was as though residents had been bound 
together in the 1930s by a common vision to break from the past and 
modernize, spurred by a common dream of economically emancipating 
themselves from a restrictive monarchy. In doing so, people had ironically 
begun to isolate themselves from one another, to ignore those very social and 
                                                 
36
 One of the first attempts to build settlements outside the old city was in the 1930s, when the Prince 
Regent, Vijayarajji, decided to sell parcels of land (60 x 90 foot plots for approx. Rs150, or 500 Koris 
per plot) to cater to wealthy, potential Vania clients, many of whom had settled in Mumbai, Hyderabad, 
Kerala, and East Africa, and who could afford to buy plots of land and to build on them (Tyabji, 2006). 
However, the plan didn’t materialize until Khengarji III’s lifetime. 
37
 Mulji R Ganatra and Jamiat B Vora, businessmen from Karachi who moved to Kachchh after the 
partition, formed a cooperative housing society with an initial membership of 11 that would be called 
Orient Colony (Jamiat Vora, personal communication, in Bhuj, 10/26/2006).   
 32 
economic ties that had bound them for four hundred years . . . (Tyabji, 2006, 
p. 64) 
 
The 1970s also saw the beginning of apartment construction (outside the walled 
city) in response to the housing needs of people who did not want to commute from 
Bhachau or Rapar to work day jobs and wanted more permanent housing in Bhuj. 
Absentee landlordism and remittance economy significantly influenced the nature of 
land ownership and tenure arrangements. The absentee landlords of Kachchh living in 
Bombay or other parts of the world (UK, US, and East African countries) had left their 
houses in charge of caretakers who had been living there for several decades without 
any legal documentation. In many cases, the houses were either kept vacant or rented 
out. In comparison with urban areas, rural areas have large number of vacant houses 
belonging to the émigrés. 
 
With passage of time, when land speculation started to gain momentum and the 
government began to approve fewer and fewer housing cooperatives, residents of Bhuj 
who could not afford land close to the walled city found themselves living in high-rise 
apartments. Also, land outside the walled city, owned by bakalis (Muslim community 
members engaged in fruit and vegetable farming outside the walled city) and harijans 
(lower caste Hindus), would be subdivided into plots and sold off to those who wanted 
housing at affordable rates close to the commercial centers of the walled city. Since 
most of this land was granted for agricultural purposes (sometimes on lease), its sale 
as well as use for residential purposes rendered the houses constructed on it ―illegal.‖ 
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In other cases, to accommodate expanding families, additional rooms or even floors 
were added to existing homes without taking into account their implications for the 
structural safety of the house. In the 2001 earthquake, these buildings would suffer 
maximum damage, claiming the lives of many of its residents. 
 
Urban development took place in an unregulated manner, with no specific efforts 
to undertake systematic planning of developing areas or enforcement of building 
standards. The urban built form reflected existing economic divides, with the southern 
and western parts of the city having primarily bungalows, apartments, row houses and 
tenements, while the northern and eastern parts largely comprising of very low income 
houses ranging from shanties/hutments to small tenements (one or two floors high).  
Nearly 30% of its total population lived in informal settlements. Yet, outside the 
municipal limits, Bhuj Taluka had 24 villages belonging to the affluent non-resident 
Indian community of Patels.
38
 According to the Development Plan of Bhuj:  
 
There have been hardly any systematic efforts towards planning. The only 
planned areas are Vijaya Nagar area and an approximate 50 hectare patch 
around Hospital Road. Development has been loosely regulated as evident 
from the widespread violation of building bylaws and illegal construction, 
especially in the northern and eastern parts of the city. Small portions of the 
Government-owned land are often allocated in ad-hoc manner. Many water 
bodies have been encroached upon. Natural drains have been covered up or 
built upon. Access to basic physical and social infrastructure is mostly 
concentrated in the south and west while the north and east are the most 
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 The villages are Sukhpar, Manakuva, Bodki, Shamatra, Varasar, Naranpar, Kera, Bhadadiya, 
Meghpar, Daisara, Barasar, and Mirzapar. 
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deprived areas. (BHADA, 2001a, p. 47)  
 
In 1996, the first high-rise apartment within the walled city, near Mahadev Gate 
of the fort wall, was about to be constructed. At the same time, based on seismological 
observations in the Rann of Kachchh, a geologist from MS University in Baroda 
declared that there was a greater chance of earthquakes in Kachchh of intensities on 
the order of the 1819 earthquake, and emphasized the need to monitor seismic 
activities continuously.
39
 Despite attempts by the District Collector to stop the 
construction, the apartment building was constructed with political influence, followed 
by many more high-rises in different parts of Bhuj. 
 
In 2000, Bhuj, a monocentric town, had a 1 square kilometer inner urban core 
with eight municipal wards that houses as many as 38,653 people, while the remaining 
18 km
2
 of the municipality (wards 9 to 12) housed 63,523.
40
 An estimated 40,000 to 
50,000 defense services personnel lived there owing to the military and air force bases 
located in the city. Being the administrative capital of the district, all important 
government offices were located in Bhuj. These government offices along with some 
of the major educational institutions, hospitals, and commercial establishments (nearly 
8,000 in the walled city alone) brought people to Bhuj on a daily basis.
41
  
 
The walled city, an intertwined network of commercial and residential areas, was 
                                                 
39
 An editorial was published in the regional newspaper, Kutch Mitra, on the press conference. 
40
 In 2001, Bhuj Municipality extended over an area of 19km
2
 and consisted of 12 wards with an 
estimated population of 165,000 (2001 projected population) compared to 120,000 in 1991. 
41
 It was estimated that Bhuj had a floating population of 50,000 to 60,000 (BHADA, 2001a, p. 35). 
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a major commercial node. It catered to the needs of people inside the city as well as 
those living outside and from surrounding villages and talukas. Commercial activities 
outside the walled city were concentrated on the Hospital Road, with its high-end 
commercial establishments and large number of clinics and hospitals. Recent 
commercial establishments started developing on the Mirzapar and Madhapar roads. 
As a result of its central location, most of the commodities to be exported and 
imported from Mundra and Mandvi ports passed through Bhuj. Also, its location on 
the transportation route of lignite from Pandhro (in northwestern Kachchh) had led to 
the establishment of many transport agencies and related business in Bhuj and nearby 
Madhapar.
42
 Bhuj had several bauxite and bentonite pulverizing factories. Compared 
to other districts of Gujarat, Kachchh had a very low level of industrialization.
43
 
Despite the incentives offered for the development of industries in the district, 
industrialization had not quite picked up in the Golden Corridor of Gujarat. There 
were no large-scale industries in or around Bhuj city.
44
 
 
In the last week of December 2000, a four-day seminar was conducted in the city 
of Baroda in Gujarat on Kachchh geology and seismology, emphasizing the need to 
monitor the seismicity of the area and advocating for development that was cognizant 
                                                 
42
 Sale of lignite from the Pandhro mines to outside of the Kachchh district was banned by the State 
Government in 2008 (http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/transporters-agree-to-pick-lignite-from-
kutch-mines/316100/). 
43
 Existing industrial activity is centered around Kandla Free Trade Zone and Gandhidham. Minerals 
such as lignite, limestone, and bentonite are mined in Lakhpat and Abdasa talukas. There are also 
several cement plants. Kachchh is also an important producer of salt from sea water in India. 
44
 Bhuj taluka has about two medium-scale industries and about 809 small-scale industries (textiles, 
wood based industries, engineering units, etc.) with an investment of Rs. 524,000 and Rs. 637,000, 
respectively (DIC, Bhuj); 2 GIDC estates exist within the BHADA area, one on Bhuj-Madhapar Road, 
three km from the center, and another in Madhapar village. 
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of such geological processes.
45
 That same week, a tremor occurred with its epicenter 
near Bhachau in Kachchh district.
46
 Two weeks later, on January 17, 2001, geologists 
of Kachchh made a public statement emphasizing the need to monitor these tremors. 
But neither politicians nor administrators acted on it. Elections to the municipal 
council, the governing body of the municipality, were scheduled.  
 
Nine days later, on  January 26, 2001, within 110 seconds, an earthquake reduced 
the once-thriving walled city of Bhuj in Kachchh to a ghost town with no power or 
other critical services, piles of debris, and dead bodies buried in them. The city 
disappeared from tourist maps and guidebooks, only to reappear on the routes of 
another category of visitors, referred to as ‗disaster tourists.‘ From their tents, 
residents wandered in the deserted city, gathering what was left of their homes, 
memories, and a city they called theirs. 
 
As many people grappled with the extensive human misery and devastation, the 
state was confronted by the daunting tasks of recovery and rehabilitation. Policies and 
plans to rebuild lives, livelihoods, homes, businesses, and infrastructure in the towns 
and villages would be debated and adopted. Over the next five years, Kachchh, and 
Bhuj more so, became the epicenter of a rehabilitation exercise of gigantic 
proportions, unseen in the history of independent India, with a massive convergence of 
people, materials, and ideas. 
                                                 
45
 For four days, Kutch Mitra published articles on the seminar. Last of the series was published on 24
th
 
December 2000. 
46
 This would be the epicenter of the January 26
th
 earthquake. 
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In May 2001, the Government of Gujarat announced an earthquake rehabilitation 
package. This was followed by a tax holiday to encourage new industries to come and 
establish their business in Kachchh. The Chief Minister of Gujarat, Kesubhai Patel (a 
member of the prominent farming community of Patidars or Patels) stepped down on 
allegations of corruption related to the earthquake response and was replaced by 
Narendra Modi, a right-wing Hindu politician. With this change in political leadership 
at the state level, earthquake rehabilitation would assume a state priority. Under its 
new Chief Minister, the state of Gujarat soon assumed an authoritarian regime with a 
strong neo-liberal development agenda.
47
 
 
Many expressed their faith in the ―resilience of Kachchhis‖ and their inherent 
ability to overcome adversities in a tumultuous terrain where vagaries of nature 
intersected with socio-cultural, economic, and political processes continuously 
shaping and being shaped by a space in flux called Kachchh. 
 
Rehabilitation Through Town Planning 
 
The state response to the 2001 earthquake was significantly different from the 
response to previous disasters. Under the Gujarat Earthquake Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction Program (GERRP), the state government‘s long-term disaster 
management responses turned on regulatory mechanisms of Development Plans (DP), 
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and Town Planning Schemes to reconfigure the earthquake-affected towns of Bhuj, 
Bhachau, Anjar, and Rapar.
48
 It also adopted Development Control Regulations 
(DCR) and building codes to reduce earthquake vulnerability of its built form.
49
 
Setting up an institutional framework, including the creation of new institutions to 
implement the plans, accompanied these efforts. 
 
In May 2001, the government of Gujarat created Area Development Authorities 
(ADA) in Bhuj, Bhachau, Anjar, and Rapar, for implementing town planning 
proposals and ensuring adherence to improved building regulations.
50
 In the case of 
Bhuj, Environmental Planning Collaborative (EPC), a non-profit organization based in 
Ahmedabad was commissioned to prepare the Draft Development Plan as well as 
Town Planning Schemes as a strategy to re-organize the walled city‘s morphology 
(Balachandran and Tyabji, 2001).
51
 
 
Using the statutory planning tool of TPS, the walled city of Bhuj, where most of 
                                                                                                                                            
47
 For the authoritarian nature of the new regime and its developmental agenda, see Mukta, 2003; Shah 
et al., 2004. 
48
 The Development Plan, as mandated by the GTPUD Act of 1976,  generally indicates the manner in 
which the use of land in the area shall be regulated and also indicate the manner in which the 
development therein shall be carried out (this typically includes land use zoning, road networks, and 
development control regulations for various land uses); the Town Planning Scheme is a statutory 
planning mechanism used to regularize existing plots on urban fringes, along with provisions for 
physical and social infrastructure to achieve  balanced growth. Under the GERRP Development Plans 
and Town Planning Schemes would be prepared and implemented in Bhuj, Bhachau, and Anjar. In 
Rapar town, headquarters of the taluka by the same name, only a Development Plan would be prepared. 
49
 The new DCR restricted both building heights and permissible built area, or the Floor Space Index 
(F.S.I.). Floor Space Index is defined as the ratio of total floor area to the area of the plot/land parcel. 
50
 These were created under the provisions of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act 
(GTPUDA) of 1976. 
51
 The previous Development Plan for Bhuj was prepared in 1976. 
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the casualties had occurred, would be de-densified.
52
 A new hierarchical network of 
widened roads would be built along with access streets to individual plots. Alternate 
sites (relocation sites) would be provided to households affected by town planning 
activities, such as road widening and reconfiguration of plots, and to those who opted 
for ‗voluntary‘ relocation from the walled city. Owners whose houses were damaged 
in the earthquake, and who could not accommodate the previous inhabitants 
(especially of joint families) due to smaller size of the newly rebuilt homes, 
constructed in compliance with the setback, height, and bulk requirements, also 
qualified for plots in relocation sites.
53
  
 
The outdated and inaccurate land ownership records (as indicated by revenue 
records) and plot layout maps (as indicated by City Survey maps) complicated the 
entire reconfiguration exercise, which used these records as the base for the micro-
level planning interventions. Many records were lost in debris as the government 
offices which housed them collapsed in the earthquake. Despite these concerns, the 
pressure to rebuild a disaster-resistant and ―efficient‖ city overwhelmed the 
rehabilitation process, leaving very little room for public debates on the 
appropriateness of the plans or the social and economic implications of the de-
densification efforts on the walled city and its residents. The trauma suffered from the 
loss of dear ones deterred many people from returning to the city or taking part in the 
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 This term is used to indicate the approach to enhancing the safety of the densely crowded walled city 
and hence the underlying rationale for implementation of TPS. 
53
 Many houses which earlier occupied entire plots and/or had a number of floors higher than that 
permitted by the new development control regulations now needed to be rebuilt smaller to be compliant 
with the regulations. 
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public consultations. The technical nature of post-earthquake planning processes, 
along with uncertainties regarding its implementation, also curtailed public 
involvement. 
 
Substantial damage suffered by the administrative machinery, along with a history 
of corruption in  local elected bodies and collusion with land lobby, led to the creation 
of new institutions for local planning and implementation. The fear of politicization of 
issues, along with the pressure to rebuild faster, encouraged the state machinery to 
adopt a mode of post-disaster planning and implementation contrary to the 
decentralized urban governance. It discouraged the creation of institutions that could 
act as channels for the multiple voices of the earthquake-affected, especially the 
marginalized groups who lack legitimate ways of expressing/communicating their 
concerns regarding rehabilitation policies and plans. The techno-legal approach 
employed by the rehabilitation program, in line with the dominant discourse of 
disaster management in India, maintained silence about those outside the legal 
frameworks of the state. 
 
The choice of Bhuj as a case for exploring the larger question about disaster 
vulnerability reduction through post-disaster planning processes in urban areas—and 
to understand town planning and vulnerability reduction ―as a contextualized set of 
practices with an emphasis on meaning and human concerns‖—was significantly 
 41 
shaped by two key concerns:
54
 
1. How could a planning mechanism (such as the Town Planning Scheme) that is 
used to reconfigure largely unbuilt agricultural tracts in the urban fringes be 
applied to restructure a 400-year-old medieval walled city with 10,000 plots 
ranging from 10 m
2
 to 400 m
2
 where 7,000 people had just died, and where 
50% of the structures were damaged and the remaining 50% partly damaged or 
unaffected, dispersed all over a 1 km
2
 area? What would be the technical, 
administrative, and financial challenges in making work such a planning 
mechanism in a post-disaster scenario?
55
  
 
2. If disaster vulnerability is constituted by physical and socioeconomic aspects 
of everyday lives embedded in the lived spaces of neighborhoods and towns, 
then in an earthquake-affected town where the built-form undergoes drastic 
restructuring, what implications would there be from the changes brought 
about by both the earthquake and ensuing rehabilitation process, in terms of the 
coping processes and the recovery of those affected? How would residents 
experience and cope with, as well as influence, these changes? 
 
There were also concerns about the fairness of these interventions. Considering 
the differential nature of damage, how could the argument of the ―democratic‖ nature 
of town planning schemes (through equal sharing of costs and benefits for greater 
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 To gain understanding of the earthquake rehabilitation policy and planning process as a ―social 
reality connected to socio-economic conditions and institutions and thoroughly grounded in specific 
persons, times, places, conditions and institutions‖ (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006) it seemed the 
case-study method would be an appropriate choice. See Flyvbjerg (2006) on the merits of case study 
approach and how social science may be strengthened by the execution of a greater number of good 
case studies. 
55
 Building permissions are not granted until the Town Planning Schemes (TPS) layout is finalized. 
Here in a post-disaster scenario where rebuilding was the most important consideration for both the 
government and the earthquake-affected, the average time period of 10 years that it takes TPS to be 
fully implemented, seemed like a significant concern that might affect the recovery of the earthquake-
affected. Given the history of the continued inability of TPS to generate revenues for financing its own 
infrastructure development, I was also skeptical about its financial capability to fund the infrastructure 
from the betterment charges paid by the plot owners. This was critical since reinstating the 
infrastructure was key to successful disaster rehabilitation. However, unlike other TPSs, the 
infrastructure for Bhuj TPS was financed by the Government of Gujarat through a loan from the Asian 
Development Bank, thereby making it possible to undertake the work before the residents paid their 
betterment charges. Also, in contrast to the ―usual‖ TPS method of claiming the betterment charges as 
each owner developed individual properties, the earthquake made it possible to deduct the betterment 
charges from the housing compensation for the earthquake-affected owners as and when they got 
disbursed. 
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public good) hold good?
56
 Damage was more intense in the northern part of the walled 
city of Bhuj where two major fault lines intersected and which at the time of the 
earthquake had a lot of old, non-compliant construction and was also inhabited by a 
majority of poor residents. Tenants, who constituted 40% of the residents at the time 
of the earthquake, and informal settlers posed additional challenge to a rehabilitation 
program framed around legal ownership of property. 
 
Bhuj presented itself as an extreme case of physical restructuring, considering the 
nature of devastation, especially in the old urban core or the walled city, where half 
the buildings were severely damaged or destroyed while the other half were either 
undamaged or partly damaged (therefore repairable).
57
 Being the administrative 
capital of Kachchh District, Bhuj was the focus of attention of the media, which added 
to the pressure to produce faster, visible results. The earthquake and the ensuing town 
planning processes were important events in the personal histories of the residents. 
Many who were not severely impacted by the earthquake were nonetheless affected by 
town planning. The restructuring of the walled city and its immediate surroundings—
the dense built-form central to the socio economic life of the city and its residents—
would not only delay the physical rebuilding of homes (a significant aspect of 
recovery) but  also have repercussions on the economic, social, and cultural aspects of 
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 Costs are reduction of one’s plot size, sometimes complete or partial demolition of building with 
compensation, and benefits are new infrastructure, appreciation of property values, safer city, better 
access, etc. 
57
 Reconfiguring the walled city of Bhuj, 1 km
2
 in area with high density, narrow, winding streets, 
10,000 plots (and around 20,000 ownerships) with plot sizes varying from less than 10 to 400 m
2
, was 
an enormous task. Rehabilitation policy required that all standing structures be left undisturbed to the 
maximum possible extent, which further constrained the process. Barzelay (1993) demonstrates the 
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recovery. Hence, Bhuj presented a unique opportunity to understand not only the 
processes of adaptation of urban planning mechanisms to post-disaster rehabilitation, 
but also to understand the dialectic between these processes and recovery of those 
affected by the disaster. 
 
This dissertation attempts to offer an alternate way of understanding post-disaster 
response and planning processes in urban areas by capturing their dynamic nature in 
relation to socioeconomic processes. This dissertation builds on the idea of differential 
vulnerability and its articulation through spatial practices, a product or outcome of a 
dialectic relationship between urban form and socioeconomic-political processes. It 
attempts to capture the highly political process of disaster management facilitated 
through constant negotiations between various actors. 
 
Vulnerability from ambiguous land ownership/tenure, uneven allocation, and 
issues pertaining to management of land (including maintenance of records) could be 
found in any city with or without disasters. While disasters offer a great opportunity to 
address the basic causes of vulnerability, responses often focus on physical 
reconstruction generating a myth of well-being and resilience.  
 
Analysis of Bhuj demonstrates how planners intervening in urban areas engaged 
in constant negotiations with various actors using means within and beyond legal 
frameworks mandated by the state. In Bhuj, it was these extra-legal processes of 
                                                                                                                                            
capability of the single case study to produce empirical generalizations regarding administrative 
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negotiation, including long-drawn-out grievance redressal that facilitated the 
implementation of town planning efforts after the earthquake. By examining how 
changes in the physical environment of Bhuj came forth (structures, institutions) 
through negotiations between various state and non-state actors, I attempt to present a 
more nuanced narrative on earthquake rehabilitation that captures the complexities of 
policy formulation and implementation processes in post-disaster urban planning and 
rehabilitation.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
rationality, professional treatment, and normative reasoning. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO REBUILDING OF 
KACHCHH 
 
 
This chapter examines in detail the state machinery‘s response to the Gujarat 
earthquake that caused massive destruction to life and property. It analyses the 
formulation and operationalization of the institutional framework along with specific 
policies, assistance packages, and plans for the rehabilitation of earthquake-affected 
areas. In the following sections, beginning with a discussion of the impacts of the 
earthquake on Kachchh, I explore how recovery and rehabilitation priorities were 
established and specific measures adopted in Bhuj to meet the recovery as well as 
long-term vulnerability reduction needs. 
 
Damage, Assessment, and Response in Kachchh 
 
The district of Kachchh accounted for nearly 90% of the total deaths and 82% of 
asset losses after the earthquake (Balachandran and Tyabji, 2004).
58
 The entire 
population was affected as an estimated 12,221 people lost their lives and 136,048 
suffered injuries. The earthquake affected both urban and rural areas. This included 
one major city, Gandhidham, and four large towns: Bhuj, Bhachau, Anjar, and Rapar. 
                                                 
58
 Kachchh District: Bounded in the north and northeast by Pakistan, on the northeast by the state of 
Rajasthan, on the east by the districts of Banaskantha, Patan and Mehsana, on the southeast by 
Surendranagar district, on the south by the Gulf of Kachchh and Rajkot district and on the west by the 
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Since the earthquake occurred on a public holiday, most of the office buildings, public 
facilities, schools, etc. were not open, thereby minimizing the number of casualties.
59
 
 
Critical infrastructure in the region was severely disrupted. The Bharat Sanchar 
Nigam Limited (BSNL) telecommunications building in Bhuj suffered extensive 
damage, disrupting phone services. There were traffic blocks on highways connecting 
Bhuj, Anjar, Bhachau, and other devastated towns and villages due to vehicles 
carrying relief materials, rescue teams, and security personnel and also people fleeing 
the state. The Old Surajbari Bridge, a vital transportation link connecting Saurashtra 
and Kachchh, was damaged by the earthquake and closed to traffic for the first two 
days after the quake, causing delays in relief and rescue operations. 
 
Hospital facilities housed in seismically vulnerable structures were badly 
damaged or destroyed in the earthquake (Jain et al., 2002). Collapse of the 281-bed 
Civil Hospital of Bhuj, the largest in Kachchh, killed 172 people, and left a large 
number of injured and sick without any medical treatment.
60
 In Bhuj, the fairground 
was converted into an instant hospital with minimal infrastructure where volunteer 
doctors handled patients. After their initial treatment, these patients were immediately 
moved to hospitals outside of Kachchh, including those in Mumbai, Pune, and Surat. 
                                                                                                                                            
Arabian Sea. The population density is 33 persons per km
2
 compared to 258 persons for the entire state 
(Socio-Economic Review, Gujarat State 2002-2003). 
59
 In Anjar, 300 school children who had come to participate in the Republic Day march died when they 
were trapped on a narrow street and buildings on both sides of them collapsed. 
60
 This was built in 1956 after the Anjar earthquake and inaugurated by Prime Minister Jawaharlal 
Nehru despite local resistance to its location far from the old city (Tyabji, 2006). Prior to the 
earthquake, it was designated as the referral hospital to attend to the medical needs of around 1 million 
people living in the region. 
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Several small and medium earthen dams that provided drinking water and 
irrigation to local communities, urban and rural water supply systems, public 
buildings, municipal infrastructure, roads, power and telecommunication systems, etc. 
suffered heavy damages. Thousands of small and cottage-based industries and 
agricultural assets were also destroyed or damaged. More than 10,000 small and 
medium industrial units in the earthquake-affected areas stopped production due to 
damages to plants, factories, and machinery. The earthquake also caused serious losses 
to agriculture and livestock. More than 20,000 cattle deaths were reported in the 
region. Many salt refineries were damaged and brine wells and salt fields destroyed.
61
   
As many as 50,000 artisans in the handicrafts sector lost their houses, workshops, and 
tools.
62
 
 
In Bhuj, the administrative capital of Kachchh district, there was heavy damage to 
the office of the district collector (chief administrator of the district from the Indian 
Administrative Services (IAS)),
63
 the Zila Panchayat (District Council, an important 
organization for the development activities of the district), the Municipal Office 
building, and a number of police stations. Significant damage to office buildings, loss 
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 Kachchh accounts for 80 percent of India’s salt production. 
62
 Kachchh is famous for its diverse crafts with recognized craftspersons for every material (wool, 
textile, wood, clay, stone, brass, zari, and mirror) and it is well known for craft techniques such as 
vegetable dyes, embroidery, block printing, resist dyes (tie-and-dye or bandhani), lacquering, etc. 
63
 The District Collector, who is also the District Magistrate, plays a pivotal role in the administration of 
the district. Responsibilities include land revenue, tenancy reforms, magisterial work, civil supplies, 
small savings, land acquisition, elections to the State Legislature and Lok Sabha, census, etc. Under the 
Famine Code of 1915, the District Collector is required to keep himself informed of agricultural 
conditions within the district, organize relief measures, and create as far as possible a permanent famine 
relief fund on a charitable basis for the relief of the needy (Gazetteer of India, 1971). 
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of records, and injuries to personnel had a negative psychological impact on the 
administration‘s capacity to deal with the rescue efforts. Extensive damage to 
residences along with injuries and fatalities in their families posed additional 
challenges to personnel in the public and private sectors who were needed to resume 
their official duties.  
 
Approximately 70% of the buildings in Kachchh were destroyed in the 
earthquake. In the towns of Bhuj and Anjar, a majority of the casualties occurred 
within the area enclosed by the fort walls.
64
 These places had suffered similar damages 
during the 1819 earthquake, and most of the reconstruction and repairs at the same 
sites. Lack of maintenance of historic buildings and heavy masonry work with 
inadequate through-stones also contributed to earthquake damage (Jain et al., 2002). 
 
In the densely populated urban cores where families expanded by adding rooms or 
floors to older structures, this expansion was often done without considering the 
implications for structural safety. Hence, a large number of masonry structures were 
hybrid in nature.
65
 Such construction sustained severe damage to the weaker, lower 
story. (The opposite was also observed.) Structures with traditional wooden frame and 
stone masonry performed better than some of the modern structures built near them.
66
 
                                                 
64
 Most of the fort walls in villages and towns were made of undressed stones (with well-dressed face 
stones) and thick lime mortar. 
65
 In a typical two-story construction, while the older first story walls might have been constructed in 
random rubble masonry with mud mortar, the newer extension of the upper story was built in brick 
masonry laid in cement mortar with reinforced concrete slabs for floors and roof. 
66
 In this type of construction, wooden frames consist of lintels and posts tied together with wall plates 
to act as a single unit, enhancing the seismic resistance of a structure. Examples of this include 
Swaminarayan Temple next to Darbargadh Palace and Rani vas (Queen’s Residence) in Bhuj.  
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Over 7,000 people perished in Bhuj, a majority of them in the fortified central 
urban core of 1 km
2
 area (the gamtal or gam). In this walled city area with a 
population density of 350 people/hectare, buildings that were constructed of stone and 
mud mortar collapsed into the narrow streets. Nearly 50% of the walled city area 
suffered considerable damage to buildings and infrastructure. Several of these 
buildings were unreinforced construction built in the 1700s.
67
 Outside of the walled 
area, 75% of the multistoried reinforced concrete buildings (3 to 10 floors) collapsed. 
Nearly 60% of the shops and establishments were also damaged in the earthquake 
(BHADA, 2001a, p. 41). 
 
In villages that were severely damaged, masonry construction with random rubble 
and mud mortar had been widely used. Since this type of construction offered poor 
shear strength, thicker walls were built to compensate for it—sometimes as thick as 
750 mm (Jain et al., 2002). Unlike the normal practice in India of using stones with a 
maximum dimension of 400 mm, in Kachchh semi-dressed stones of 600 mm x 400 
mm x 250 mm were employed in stone masonry with 80-mm-thick mortar. Under 
strong seismic shaking, the out-of-plane dislodging of one stone can lead to the 
collapse of a significant portion of the large-block masonry above, jeopardizing the 
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 Noted historic buildings and monuments such as the palace of Rao Pragmalji and Sharad Baug 
Palace, Kachchh Museum, Jubilee Hospital, Alfred High School, Kalyaneswar Temple Complex, 
Mohammed Pannah Mosque, Fateh Mohammed’s Tomb, the chhatris, and the Fort, all suffered severe 
damage. Aina Mahal (Palace of Mirrors), another major tourist attraction, was also damaged.  
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safety and stability of the entire building.
68
 
 
Damage assessment. In order to assess the extent of physical damage to the 
built form, buildings were surveyed and classified into five damage categories: G-0 
(no damage), G-1 (slight non-structural damage), G-2 (slight structural damage), G-3 
(moderate structural damage), G-4 (severe structural damage), and G-5 (collapsed).
69
 
In urban areas, damage assessment and categorization were performed by teams 
constituted by the District Collector (for the areas under his jurisdiction). The teams 
comprised a representative of an NGO or professional body, an engineer from the state 
government, and a representative from the Revenue Department at the district-level. 
  
 
Table 1: Damage statistics in towns of Kachchh district (Source: Jain et al., 2002:   
                                                                                                                           306) 
 
 
Town 
Distance 
from 
Epicenter 
 
Percentage of Buildings in each 
Damage Category 
 
G-1 
 
G-2 
 
G-3 
 
G-4 
 
G-5 
Bhachau 13 km 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.7 98.4 
Rapar 33 km 3.1 11.2 21.0 31.9 32.7 
Anjar 41 km 35.5 12.7 12.7 6.7 32.4 
Gandhidham 44 km 47.4 22.6 12.9 8.5 8.5 
Bhuj 63 km 16.0 19.2 18.3 20.5 25.7 
Total  29.2 17.4 14.1 13.1 26.2 
 
 
Table 1 indicates that unlike Bhachau, where more than 95% of  affected 
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 In the older construction, walls were made of rammed earth, adobe, or uncut stone masonry with mud 
mortar, and roofs were made of wooden trusses and clay tiles. More recent stone masonry used quarried 
sandstone or lateritic rock available locally (cut/dressed stones) or burnt clay bricks, cement mortar, and 
reinforced concrete slabs. 
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buildings were in the G-5 category, in Bhuj nearly 50% were in badly 
damaged/collapsed condition (G-4 and G-5) and the other 50% were partly 
damaged/standing. This fact presented a significant challenge to reconfiguration of the 
walled city using town planning interventions as the damage pattern (standing 
structures, either undamaged or partially damaged,  interspersed with collapsed ones 
which would be cleared, creating vacant plots), along with special considerations for 
the earthquake-affected people did not allow for a uniform application of the basic 
principles of Town Planning Schemes, such as deducting the same percentage of land 
from all the plots (within each size range) for infrastructure development and plot 
reconfiguration. It also tested the adaptability of a land restructuring mechanism such 
as the TPS, typically used in unbuilt areas on the urban fringe, in a dense urban center 
with 50% standing structures and remaining 50% vacant plots (from clearance of 
damaged structures) that severely restricted the flexibility offered by large vacant plots 
or agricultural land on the urban fringes for changing the layout of plots and 
demarcating land for social and physical infrastructure in the TP Scheme area, 
 
The assessment of building damages was in itself an extremely difficult process 
due to the extent of damage and debris that made it hard to get to all the structures. In 
addition, the assessments were often subjective (based on visual inspection of 
structures), done in haste without thorough inspection, and influenced by owners or 
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 Categorization of Reinforced Concrete framed buildings damaged in cities of Gujarat during 
earthquake is given in Appendix C. 
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occupants.
70
 Mud buildings without any reinforcement that sustained little exterior 
damage were assigned to lower damage categories. If most of the houses in a 
neighborhood had fallen, the surveyor assigned a category to an individual building 
based on external inspection (―quick look from the outside‖). There were no 
standardized yardsticks with which to measure damage.
71
 The enormity of the task 
also contributed to the lax manner of the damage assessment process. Survey results 
were published at the District Collector‘s office as well as mamlatdar’s (chief 
administrator of a taluka or sub-district) office. 
 
Many areas had to be resurveyed because of inconsistencies or inaccuracies, as 
well as allegations of irregularities in the surveying process. However, the results of 
the damage assessment became the baseline for the rehabilitation process, including 
planning and housing assistance. 
 
Emergency assistance. Immediately after the Gujarat earthquake was declared 
a national disaster by the state government of Gujarat, the Government of India (GoI) 
deployed its Defense Services to provide assistance to the affected areas.
 72
 The Indian 
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 Buildings classified in G-4 and G-5 categories had to be demolished and rebuilt according to the new 
building regulations, which included reduced built-up area. Hence, many residents found it beneficial to 
have their building assigned to a lower damage category so they could have them repaired later without 
losing their total buildable area. Many of them used personal connections or bribes officials to influence 
the surveyors. 
71
 Criteria for assessment of damages and who should be part of the assessment teams were discussed 
early on among the state government agencies involved in rehabilitation as indicated by Dr. Anand S. 
Arya, National Seismic Advisor to the Government of India (personal communication, New Delhi, 
March 22, 2007).  
72
 Disaster management in India, like most federalist political systems, is the responsibility of the State 
governments. The role of the national/central government is often advisory. In the wake of a major 
 53 
Air Force Base at Bhuj, as well as the airport at Ahmedabad, served as focal points for 
the initial national response. The Ministry of Agriculture spearheaded the central 
government‘s relief operations through a National Disaster Management Control 
Room at the ministry in the capital city of New Delhi (United Nations, 2001). On 
January 29, three days after the earthquake, the United Nations Disaster Assessment 
and Coordination (UNDAC) Team arrived in Ahmedabad. It worked primarily with 
Indian authorities in Ahmedabad and Bhuj on assessment and coordination of 
international assistance (including urban search and rescue). Other Indian states 
contributed generously to disaster relief by providing cash, medical staff and supplies, 
communications teams, relief workers, shelter supplies, food, clothing, heavy 
machinery, transport, domestic supplies, and reconstruction materials. 
 
Government of Gujarat, as well as a large number of nongovernmental 
organizations (including philanthropic and religious groups, development agencies, 
and private businesses), stepped in to provide food, medical services, clothes, 
blankets, utensils, basic supplies, and tents (WB/ADB Report, 2001). Local industries 
donated equipment and personnel for search and rescue operations. The Gujarat 
government established a State Control Room in the state capital of Gandhi Nagar to 
coordinate response activities. In addition, it established an External Aid Co-
ordination Cell in Ahmedabad and appointed a Chief Relief Coordinator in the district 
                                                                                                                                            
catastrophe, the national government provides administrative and financial support to the affected 
states. If and when it is beyond the capacity of the state government, the national government agencies 
would take over. It facilitates assistance through various committees coordinated by the Central Relief 
Commissioner. It can also mobilize additional assistance from national and international agencies on 
behalf of the affected states (Todd and Palakudiyil, 2003). 
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headquarters of Bhuj to coordinate relief activities from within the worst affected area 
of Kachchh. 
 
Of immediate concern were the rescue of those trapped in the debris and 
restoration of essential services—electricity, water, sanitation, and health care—and 
the Public Distribution System (PDS).
73
 Removal of debris and disposal of dead 
bodies had to be undertaken at the same time. Rescue efforts were largely finished by 
the first week of February 2001. At that time there were about a million people on the 
streets who had lost their homes and did not have a roof over their heads in winter 
temperatures of less than 2° or 3° Celsius at night. Thus, along with locating and 
procuring equipment such as cranes, trucks, and other heavy machinery to carry out 
the removal of debris, the administration had the equally important priority of 
distributing blankets, clothing, tents, and food—relief materials for those made 
homeless by the quake.
74
  
 
With several different government agencies entering into the rescue effort and 
NGO personnel joining in, too, coordination had to be established. Communication 
channels were established with the state government to report on the immediate issues 
and seek assistance. Efforts to address immediate needs required careful planning to 
ensure that the most cost effective and efficient approach was followed and that 
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 Public Distribution System (PDS) is an Indian food security system established by the Government of 
India under Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food, and Public Distribution and managed jointly with state 
governments in India that distributes subsidised food and non-food items to India's poor through a 
network of Public Distribution Shops. 
74
 A. Mukim (personal communication, New Delhi, March 21, 2007). 
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interim measures could be incorporated into the long-term reconstruction and recovery 
efforts.  
 
To ensure a transition from the immediate response to the crisis to   long-term 
recovery and reconstruction, the state government established a rehabilitation 
committee (Punarvasan Samiti) in each town, made up of civic leaders and elected or 
appointed representatives of the major interest groups and cultural committees. Their 
responsibilities included: participating in decision-making processes of the 
administrative authorities; monitoring reconstruction work; facilitating public 
consultations and information campaigns to explain relief strategy and procedures; 
supervising detailed examination and testing of public structures and systems to 
determine their structural soundness; overseeing temporary repairs to restore water 
and sewerage systems; setting up  regular tanker service for water to unserviced areas 
and the numerous temporary camps around the major centers; monitoring the 
restoration of superficially damaged buildings on a permanent basis; removal of rubble 
to enable private building owners and builders to access their sites; and  clearing the 
roads of congestion and relieving dangerous driving conditions. 
 
One of the urgent needs was to provide temporary shelter to those affected by the 
earthquake and to do this before the onset of the monsoon season in July. These 
temporary shelters needed to be built with a life expectancy of two years, at least. In 
urban areas where town planning would take longer than it would in the rural areas, 
this was an important priority. Vast numbers of people had to be accommodated until 
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Town Planning Schemes for core areas of the cities could be prepared and translated 
into action (through reconfiguration of the layout of plots as well as development of 
infrastructure in the scheme areas) and relocation sites developed. For urban residents, 
private contractors constructed cluster-type arrangements of individual family shelters. 
In rural areas, affected families received reusable building materials and the technical 
assistance they would need to construct shelters   in their own yards. 
 
Immediately after the earthquake, while deliberations on how the city should be 
rebuilt were going on, most residents of Bhuj stayed in tents in various locations 
across the city. The temporary settlement, known as the Hungami Awas or Awas for 
short, was built on government-owned land 5 km from the city center, near the Gujarat 
Industrial Development Corporation (GIDC), one year after the earthquake. Some 
4,500 dwelling units were set up with the assistance of the World Bank, United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), NGOs, and community organizations.
75
 
Through a joint venture of UNDP and the Government of Gujarat, temporary shelters 
were also constructed for people who could not afford to construct their own. Each 
unit was 32 m
2 
in area, with two small rooms; and two such units with a shared wall 
occupied a 65 m
2
 plot. 
 
Another temporary settlement called Tin City, a collection of shipping containers, 
was established by the Bochasanvasi Akshar Purushottam Swaminarayan (BAPS) to 
                                                 
75
 The government provided Rs. 12,000 for each house, and the rest was contributed by a community 
organization with or without contribution from the beneficiary. The Islamic Relief Fund (a Muslim 
NGO) constructed temporary shelters in GIDC for Muslim families with government’s assistance. 
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provide temporary shelter to followers of the Swaminarayan Sect until they found 
permanent housing. Other people constructed temporary shelters on their own on 
vacant plots, most of it government-owned land in various parts of the city. Many 
others moved out of Bhuj to stay with relatives in Gujarat or other parts of India. 
 
Comprehensive Recovery Planning 
 
A joint assessment by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
identified priorities for the first phase of earthquake rehabilitation, which was 
estimated to last for two to three years. These included: (i) provision of temporary 
shelters, (ii) initiating reconstruction of damaged housing stock as well as rebuilding 
physical and social infrastructure in accordance with new earthquake-proof standards 
and specifications (to strengthen the reconstructed facilities against damages from 
future disasters), (iii) measures to restore livelihoods, and (iv) long-term disaster 
reduction and mitigation efforts. Other priorities were full restoration of services and 
the development of new building sites to accommodate existing owners who chose to 
relocate their houses or businesses. Urban planning initiated in the first phase would 
incorporate future requirements into the reconstruction plans. 
 
At the institutional level, the WB/ADB Report identified strategies for coping 
with future disasters by developing disaster management capabilities at the municipal 
level aimed at reducing the delays and problems faced during an earthquake. Kachchh 
suffers from nearly annual calamities related to cyclones and droughts. In the past, 
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municipalities were fully dependent on the state government to provide emergency 
services, relief, and rehabilitation. These municipalities relied on grants and subsidies 
from the state government to manage, operate, and maintain local services and public 
facilities. The report suggested that once recovery from the earthquake was well 
underway, appropriate measures be undertaken by the municipal authorities to 
rationalize property taxes, water tariffs, and fees for sewerage, sanitation, and other 
services, and to institute these measures through a plan to achieve cost recovery of the 
operation and maintenance expenditures.  
 
Based on the recommendations of the WB/ADB assessment report, as well as 
other studies conducted by various agencies in the aftermath of the earthquake, in 
February 2001, three weeks after the day of the earthquake, the Government of 
Gujarat (GoG) announced a statewide rehabilitation and reconstruction policy.
76
 The 
rehabilitation policy framework emphasized both mitigating the destructive effects of 
disasters and preparedness— the readiness of a society to forecast, take precautionary 
measures, and respond to an impending disaster. With regard to reconstruction, the 
policy adopted an approach that combined in-situ reconstruction and partial relocation. 
The framework evolved into a multi-year rehabilitation program that came to be 
known as the Gujarat Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Program 
(GERRP), funded by multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank along with the central and state governments. 
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 In policy formulation, the role of the Central Government is restricted to setting broad policy 
guidelines. Decisions pertaining to details of the policy, including housing assistance, come within the 
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GERRP, a comprehensive multi-sector program, aimed at ―the rehabilitation of 
the people affected by the earthquake through provision of housing, social amenities, 
infrastructure, and livelihood support, based on sustainable economy and ecology‖ 
(GSDMA, 2001, p. 3).  
 
GERRP‘s objectives were to: 
1. Build, retrofit, repair, and strengthen houses and public buildings affected by 
the earthquake through the application of earthquake-resistant technology 
2. Revive the local economy by providing assistance to agriculture, industries, 
small businesses, and handicrafts, and regenerate livelihoods of the people 
3. Rebuild and upgrade community and social infrastructure, improve education 
and health system, and strengthen social protection measures for weaker 
sections of the population 
4. Provide health support to the people injured by the earthquake on a long-term 
basis and psychological counseling for those suffering from trauma 
5. Restore lifeline infrastructure of transport networks and utilities such as power 
and water supply, and reduce their vulnerability to natural disasters 
6. Support gender empowerment by involving women at all stages of program 
implementation 
7. Provide support for children affected by the earthquake, and alleviate social 
deprivation through an integrated nutrition and education strategy 
8. Implement a comprehensive disaster management program, improving disaster 
preparedness and emergency response capacity of the government to deal with 
different types of disasters  
9. Reduce vulnerability through long-term mitigation programs aimed at 
watershed management and drought mitigation, and improve people‘s 
                                                                                                                                            
purview of the respective state governments. Source: V. Thiruppugazh (personal communication, 
Gandhi Nagar, March 17, 2007). 
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resilience and food security through diversification of sources of income-
generation and asset building 
 
To go beyond the immediate priorities of earthquake reconstruction and to pursue 
broader social and economic issues impinging on development and empowerment at 
the household and community level, the reconstruction and rehabilitation program was 
based on the following guiding principles (Gujarat Earthquake Reconstruction and 
Rehabilitation Policy, GSDMA, 2001): 
1. Involve people and representative institutions in the decision-making processes 
2. Strengthen civil society institutions through partnership-building and 
collaborations in the implementation process 
3. Apply principles of equity and empowerment 
4. Disseminate knowledge pertaining to seismic technology, building materials, 
and construction practices to facilitate informed decision-making with regard 
to habitats 
5. Encourage participation of the private sector 
6. Introduce structural and non-structural measures that are feasible, affordable, 
suitable for the climatic conditions, and culturally sensitive 
7. Ensure high levels of transparency and accountability in the program 
implementation 
 
GERRP comprised five key components:  
1) Housing Recovery 
2) Livelihoods Support Programs 
3) Infrastructure Development 
4) Social and Community Development 
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5) Disaster Management.  
 
For details of the program see Appendix F. 
 
The housing component of the rehabilitation program involved monetary 
assistance for the purposes of reconstruction, repair, and strengthening (retrofitting) of 
buildings. The policy clearly stated that ―individual grants for reconstruction is by way 
of assistance and not compensation.‖ This implied that the housing assistance would 
not be equivalent to total loss estimates but would be proportional to damages, as 
determined on the basis of damage category (G-1 to G-5) and the type of construction, 
within certain limits. A second priority was to provide houses for living. Hence, in 
cases where residential buildings had been used for non-residential purposes, the 
owner or occupants of such houses were not entitled to any assistance. Beneficiaries 
were to be identified ―strictly on the basis of ‗house replacement‘ needs‖ (GSDMA 
2001, pp. 12-13). These housing assistance packages were financed through a loan 
from the World Bank.  
 
A special, fifth package was developed with an emphasis on urban planning for 
the rehabilitation of the four worst affected towns in Kachchh viz., Anjar, Bhachau, 
Bhuj, and Rapar. Separate compensation schemes were offered in these towns based 
on damage category and the type of structure and its built area. The assistance was 
provided in three tranches: first installment of 40% as mobilization assistance in the 
beginning of construction; second installment of 40% when construction reached sill 
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level; and third and final installment at the lintel level. The maximum assistance was 
about Rs. 175,000 or US $3,700 (GSDMA, 2001). Financial assistance was also 
provided for the repair of multi-storied and non-multistoried buildings as well as huts 
that were completely destroyed. For details of the housing assistance package, see 
Appendix G.   
 
The initial package for those affected by the earthquake was directed to home 
owners, even though many of them were absentee owners. In Bhuj, where 40% of 
residents were tenants, the compensation scheme raised the question of who should be 
compensated—the absentee owner, or the tenant who had invested in the property and 
suffered material losses?
77
 Later, another assistance package was extended to tenants, 
making them eligible to buy plots in one of the relocation sites at rates higher than that 
for owners from the walled city.
78
 
 
The livelihoods support component under GERRP consisted of short-term 
economic benefit packages to self-employed people and those in service or cottage 
industries. These were arranged through commercial banks and financial institutions. 
Popularly known as 60:40 Schemes, loans of up to Rs. 2 lakhs, or approximately US 
$4,000 (with 60% subsidized by the government) were offered to cottage-industry 
owners and handicrafts artisans for a variety of purposes, including the purchase of 
tool kits, temporary construction of work sheds, and direct material assistance. To 
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 N. Upadhyay (personal communication, Bhuj, April 2, 2008). 
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create long-term employment opportunities and promote industrial development 
overall in Kachchh, the government introduced a Special Incentive Scheme six months 
after the earthquake that remained operational until October 2004. Popularly known as 
Tax Holiday for Industries, the scheme granted new industrial units exemption or 
deferment of sales tax based on their preference and total investment. This was 
supplemented by excise duty exemption by the central government.
79
 
 
The infrastructure component of GERRP included repair and reconstruction of 
transportation infrastructure (primarily the road network), water supply, irrigation, and 
power systems in the earthquake-affected areas. A key aspect of the policy was to 
improve town planning to provide the framework for infrastructure development in the 
four towns of Kachchh. The Urban Development Department (UDD) of the state 
government and the newly formed Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority 
(GSDMA) developed a strategy for the restoration of basic services in larger urban 
areas using a three phase approach: (a) addressing the immediate need to restore 
essential services, such as water, power, sanitation, and roads, to a level that would 
sustain both the people still remaining in their homes and the large, displaced 
population; (b) the two-to-three-year medium-term need to rehabilitate or reconstruct 
the urban infrastructure and civic facilities; and (c) long-term plans to improve the 
ability of local governments to maintain all local infrastructure systems, which they 
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 This was applicable only for Bhuj and Anjar, as according to the municipal records Bhachau did not 
have any tenants. Despite the large number of absentee owners in Bhachau, official records did not 
reflect any occupancy by tenants or caretakers. 
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had become responsible under the 74
th
 Constitutional Amendment (WB/ADB 2001, p. 
50).
80
 
 
Institutional Framework for GERRP 
 
Earthquake rehabilitation in Kachchh saw the creation of a new institutional 
framework to guide the process of planned reconstruction and recovery—and to 
engage in disaster management preparedness and mitigation as a sustained activity. 
The intensity and geographical extent of earthquake-related damage warranted the 
involvement of central and state governments, as well as non-state actors, such as 
United Nations agencies, in formulating strategies and approaches to move from short-
term relief to long-term rehabilitation and recovery. 
 
The relief effort was centrally coordinated by the Natural Disaster Management 
Control Room, which worked closely with the Government of Gujarat. To coordinate 
long-term recovery and reconstruction, the state government also established the 
Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA), under the chairmanship of 
the Chief Minister. The central government set up a high-level Disaster Management 
Task Force to advise the government on relief and reconstruction policy and related 
activities. 
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 An excise tax or excise duty (now known as Central Value Added Tax or CENVAT) is the tax on the 
production or sale of a good within the country (as opposed to customs duties, charged on goods from 
outside the country). 
80
 The 74
th
 Amendment to the Indian Constitution mandates devolution of power from states to local 
governance bodies such as the Panchayats (in rural areas) and Urban Local Bodies (ULB) in matters of 
development planning and financial decisions. 
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Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA). In May 2001, 
the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA) was established by the 
Government of Gujarat to finance and oversee the entire post-disaster reconstruction 
project in the state of Gujarat.
81
 The mission of GSDMA was broad. It would:  
 
provide effective management of disaster, mitigation of effects of disaster,  
administer, facilitate, coordinate, and monitor emergency relief during and 
after occurrence of disasters, and implement, monitor and coordinate 
measures for reconstruction and rehabilitation in the aftermath of disasters, in 
the state of Gujarat (GSDMA, 2003a).   
 
The governing body under the chairmanship of the Chief Minister had the same 
powers as the State Cabinet to expedite decision-making. A State Advisory 
Committee, consisting of government officials, technical experts, representatives of 
civil society organizations, professional organizations, and academe, gave broad 
outlines and suggestions on policies. The technicalities of the policies would be 
worked out by respective government ministries and departments before being sent to 
GSDMA, where it would be discussed by the Committee and then formally approved 
by the governing body with or without modifications.  
 
A Central Implementation and Review Group, under the chairmanship of the 
Chief Secretary, would review and monitor program implementation. Though the 
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 Its status as a Society (under the Societies Registration Act) gave it autonomy and flexibility in 
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implementation of GERRP was decentralized to the district-level governmental 
agencies, quality-control of earthquake and cyclone resistant construction, financial 
management, and procurement procedures were to be coordinated by GSDMA 
(WB/ADB Report, 2001, p. 44). Loans were negotiated by the state government, and 
the allocation of funds, monitoring, and coordination (with funding agencies, NGOs, 
experts, and various government departments) fell within the mandate of GSDMA.  
 
GSDMA also acted as a facilitator of the town planning processes in urban areas 
where Development Plans as well as Town Planning Schemes were to be prepared and 
implemented. Despite the Urban Development Department‘s stronghold on the 
preparation and implementation of plans in the earthquake-affected towns, GSDMA 
had an upper hand in approving decisions pertaining to GERRP. The Urban 
Development Department had the authority to approve Development Plans, but the 
Department sought GSDMA‘s consent before approving plans because GSDMA was 
responsible for the allocation of funds. A plan could be implemented only if money 
were sanctioned for infrastructure, roads, water, sewer lines, etc. Hence, consultants 
prepared their plans and presented them for approval to the ADA, which then 
forwarded them to GSDMA for final approval.
82
 
 
The approval process of the Town Planning Scheme (TPS) was similar. TPSs 
were prepared and implemented according to the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban 
Development Act of 1976. Because of the legal processes involved in TPS preparation 
                                                                                                                                            
implementing the reconstruction program. 
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and implementation, the Urban Development Department and Town Planning Officers 
were in charge. Instead of having individual centers in the different towns, GSDMA 
operated through Area Development Authorities (ADA) to provide assistance in 
policy-making, planning and implementation, and to get feedback from the towns. In 
Bhuj, the district headquarters, a Camp Office was set up to oversee the process. 
State government activities. The Urban Development Department was 
responsible for the implementation and coordination of the reconstruction and 
rehabilitation program in urban areas (the four towns of Kachchh). A key component 
of the earthquake rehabilitation program was the creation of a new and planned built-
form that would be disaster resistant. Since the post-earthquake urban reconstruction 
program demanded ―special attention, dedicated staff and special skills,‖ the Gujarat 
government designated the Gujarat Urban Development Company (GUDC) as the 
implementing agency for housing and infrastructure.
83
 Instead of the line departments, 
GUDC was given the power and resources to hire experts and make decisions about 
infrastructure planning and implementation.
84
  The implementation would be done in 
two phases. In the first phase, draft development plans for the four towns were 
prepared by the Town Planning and Valuation Department (within the Urban 
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 M. Sahu, (personal communication, New Delhi, March 23, 2007). 
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 GUDC is a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) established by the government of Gujarat in 2000 to 
conceptualize and implement urban development projects. GUDC ―facilitates urban development by 
assisting state government and existing agencies in formulation of policy, institutional capacity 
building, and the funding and implementation of projects.‖ Source: http://www.gudcltd.com/gudc-
role.asp  
84
 Line departments are government departments at the state level, with mandates related to specific 
thematic sectors. A line department is generally headed by a state government Minister, assisted by a 
career bureaucrat, of the designation of Secretary, Principal Secretary or Commissioner, depending on 
seniority. Each Line Department has a district-level head, staff for implementation of work, and clerical 
staff. Source: http://sapplpp.org/glossaryterms/line-department/  
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Development and Urban Housing Department) of the Government of Gujarat. The 
second phase involved design proposals for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of 
urban infrastructure and its supervision. 
 
A preliminary assessment by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) of damage and reconstruction needs resulting from the earthquake indicated a 
total of Rs. 9,900 crores (US $2.1 billion) in asset losses and Rs. 10,600 crores (US 
$2.3 billion) in improved-standard reconstruction costs (WB/ADB, 2001).
85
 
Subsequently, the state government negotiated loans of US $675 million and US $377 
million from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, respectively, to fund 
earthquake reconstruction. As the rehabilitation and recovery phase began, the state 
government assumed a coordination/facilitation role, working with various national 
and international agencies involved in the rehabilitation program. Funding sources and 
types were as follows: 
 
Table 2: Details of GERRP funds, including sources and types of funding (Source:   
                                                                                                            WB/ADB, 2001) 
 
Agency Type of 
Funding 
Amount in Rs., in crores
86
 
(US $ in millions) 
Government of Gujarat Grant 2,603 (578) 
 
Government of India Grant 490 (109) 
 
World Bank Loan 3,044 (675) 
 
                                                 
85 See Appendix D for detailed sector-wise losses and reconstruction costs and Appendix E for 
Rehabilitation Cost Estimates. 
86 Indian Rupee 1 crore = US $ 200,000  
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Asian Development Bank Loan 1,697 (377) 
 
European Commission Grant 172   (38) 
 
The Netherlands Grant 170   (38) 
 
Others (NGOs, other state governments) Grant 320 (108) 
 
Total  8,496 (1,885) 
 
 
In general, the newly created GSDMA acted as the focal point for donors. 
However, in the case of urban rehabilitation, GSDMA worked closely with the 
Department of Urban Development in deciding on the allocation of funds and 
coordinating with donors. 
Local administration. The district administration of Kachchh was badly 
affected by the earthquake. There was extensive damage to public buildings, including 
various government offices; deaths or injuries to personnel were numerous; and 
records were lost, buried in the rubble. All of this exposed the vulnerability of 
administrative machinery. Most government officials and functionaries suffered either 
loss of life in their families, injuries, or damages to their houses. Therefore, additional 
personnel were mobilized from other parts of the state.
87
  
 
At the district level, the administration presided over by the District Collector was 
responsible for the implementation of GERRP. An advisory committee headed by the 
minister in charge of the district provided guidance. At the talukalevel (sub-district 
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level), Additional Collectors, Additional District Development Officers, or Deputy 
Collectors with delegated powers of the District Collector and the District 
Development Officer were responsible for program implementation, while at the 
village level, an officer of the rank of Deputy Mamlatdar (administrative head of a 
taluka/ sub-district unit) coordinated the implementation. 
 
In smaller urban areas (towns), where municipal governments are typically 
responsible for regulating development, creating and maintaining infrastructure and 
services, and making investment decisions in their jurisdictions, the local municipal 
councils had been suspended and elections  scheduled just before the earthquake,. The 
Additional CEO of GSDMA explained why existing local bodies were considered 
inadequate to undertake the task of earthquake rehabilitation:  
 
The history of corruption and collusion between local government authorities 
and local elites and land developers had led to their de-legitimization in 
popular imagination. This along with the lack of technical competency of 
local bodies to undertake a massive rehabilitation effort favored the 
formation of a new body that would be autonomous and flexible, and 
therefore, capable of faster decision-making and less susceptible to influence 
of local politicians.
88
 
 
Hence, in May 2001, the government of Gujarat created Area Development 
Authorities (ADA) in the four towns of Bhuj, Bhachau, Anjar, and Rapar under the 
provisions of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act of 1976. 
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Responsibilities of ADAs included implementation of Development Plans, as well as 
town planning proposals, development and upgrading of urban infrastructure, and 
ensuring adherence to improved Development Control Regulations (DCR) through 
granting of building permissions. The Technical Advisory Cell (TAC) within each 
ADA, consisting of civil engineers and architects, scrutinized structural designs, 
suggested modifications, and made recommendations to the ADA. 
 
Despite the fact that the ADAs were local bodies, there were no locally elected 
representatives in them.
89
 According to the Town Planner of Bhuj Area Development 
Authority (BHADA): 
 
It is no question of whether they [local elected representatives] were involved 
or not . . . we required a special body to tell them . . . to assist them. They 
cannot do it because the system is complex. They were having several 
politicians and all. ADA is a special body created, so there is no politician 
involved. All government [officials], specialists from different departments, 
technical experts from Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) [a premier 
technical university] and other places, following all the procedures. . . there 
was no kachara [garbage].
90
   
 
Once the program was implemented, the ADAs would cease to exist and the 
responsibility of enforcing the new regulations as well as maintaining the newly 
created infrastructure would be that of the Municipalities of the respective towns. Line 
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 The GTPUD Act was amended in 1999, giving the state government the authority to overrule the 
requirement of local representation under ―special‖ circumstances. 
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 P. V. C. Prasad (personal communication, Surat, January 5, 2008). 
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departments, referred to as Implementing Agencies (IA), were responsible for 
implementing sectoral programs. For information on the Departments responsible for 
each sector, see Appendix H. 
 
Town planning and infrastructure consultants. While larger cities and 
municipalities tend to use services of private or non-profit planning and infrastructure 
design consultants in the preparation of development/master plans, smaller 
municipalities assign this function to be performed by their respective Town Planning 
and Valuation Departments (TPVD). Since it was not mandatory for municipalities to 
prepare either Development Plans or Town Planning Schemes, most small 
municipalities were less familiar with these processes. 
 
In order to support the ADAs and GUDC, the Government of Gujarat chose to 
outsource the tasks of town planning, infrastructure planning, and scrutiny of 
applications for building permissions, in contrast to the conventional method of hiring 
new staff or temporarily deputizing government employees from other departments. 
Preparation of Development Plans and Town Planning Schemes were contracted to 
professional planning agencies, referred to as Town Planning Consultant (TPC), 
through competitive bidding to avoid bureaucratic delays.
91
 Many of the state 
government officials were of the opinion that public consultations, which were 
considered very important at that time, would be more intense if a professional agency 
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prepared the plans, instead of a government agency.
92
 Infrastructure Design and 
Supervision Consultants (IDSC) were appointed by GUDC for detailed infrastructure 
planning and design including repairing damaged infrastructure, and upgrading and 
expanding existing infrastructure based on the Development Plan.   
 
Town planning consultants saw this as an opportunity to apply their technical 
skills, and more— to learn from the challenges of operating in a post- disaster context 
in which none of them had any previous experience. Coordinating with communities 
and government agencies, meeting the demands of the earthquake-affected, 
confronting clientelism (social relations based on patronage), and delivering services 
as promised would prove to be extremely challenging in most cases. Despite the fact 
that they were at the forefront of rehabilitation planning, decisions had to be approved 
by the state government, which not only controlled the flow of funds but also 
exercised a strong hand in dictating criteria for choosing projects and beneficiaries.  
 
However, what was most rewarding for many of them was the prospect of 
actually seeing the plans they made implemented in their lifetimes. Consultants took 
pride in their role as clients to the government, and often provided technical assistance 
beyond the contract period in helping with problems that were not their 
―responsibility.‖ The humanitarian nature of the exercise that provided the opportunity 
to ―save lives in the future‖ and ―create safe and efficient urban areas‖ was also a 
motivating factor. Compared to the infrastructure consultants, the town planning 
                                                                                                                                            
house projects under the supervision of respective Area Development Authorities (ADA).  
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consultants had a stronger presence in the affected localities. This was partly because 
the process of preparing Development Plans and Town Planning Schemes required 
information as well as public acceptance that could only be obtained through long-
term engagement with the local population.  
 
Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs). Gujarat has a strong network of 
non-governmental organizations that quickly rallied to support community efforts. The 
government encouraged partnerships between international and local NGOs to pool 
resources and expertise to meet disaster relief needs. Many international NGOs had 
existing relationships with Indian NGOs, while others formed partnerships as activities 
developed. In Kachchh, a local NGO, Kutch Nav Nirman Abhiyan (known as 
Abhiyan), coordinated NGO activities in the region.
93
 The Abhiyan network was 
active in 350 villages and supported activities ranging from natural resource 
management to health and micro-credit programs. With encouragement and formal 
endorsement from the government, Abhiyan set up 22 local sub-centers known as 
setus (bridges) in Kachchh to coordinate relief distribution and rehabilitation 
initiatives. They set up information management systems to assess losses and needs of 
the communities, and conveyed this information to government agencies for targeted 
assistance. 
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 The Kutch Nav Nirman Abhiyan, or the Kutch New Building Movement, is a collective of 14 
grassroots NGOs in Kachchh. It was formed to undertake relief and rehabilitation work in a coordinated 
manner after a disastrous cyclone in June 1998. 
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A total of approximately 200 NGOs came forward to offer assistance in various 
sectors, including housing reconstruction, dam repair, health, education, handicrafts, 
livelihoods, and legal assistance. Several local and national NGOs, such as the Self-
Employed Women‘s Association (SEWA) that were already active in the region, 
helped people restore their livelihoods and meet other needs. Many of these NGOs 
were engaged in the construction of houses, either owner-driven or through public-
private partnerships.
94
 Other organizations provided assistance to community members 
in their transactions with banks (including creating bank accounts); some trained 
women in handicrafts; others set up software skills training programs. 
 
The formal interactions between various agencies involved in the reconstruction 
and rehabilitation program is represented in the diagram on the next page (GSDMA, 
2001): 
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 In the case of the owner-driven approach, individual owners performed the reconstruction with 
technical assistance from a government-appointed village engineer; in the case of public-private 
partnerships, the Government of Gujarat provided 50% of the assistance and the remaining 50% was 
provided by an NGO that identified the beneficiaries and ensured quality control. In that case, 
assistance money was handed to the NGO and not to the owner (Murty, Green, Jain, Prasad, and Mehta, 
2005). 
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Figure 1: Various stakeholders of GERRP and their interactions 
 
Now that I have discussed Gujarat‘s policy framework and the institutional 
arrangements for implementation of GERRP, I turn to the rehabilitation policies in the 
urban areas of Kachchh and some of the debates that shaped those policies. 
Post-earthquake Urban Rehabilitation 
 
The lack of an effective street pattern was a major obstacle to disaster 
management in the earthquake‘s aftermath. Over the years, poorly framed 
building regulations had been loosely adhered to, and this had exacerbated 
 77 
congestion in the city.
95
 
 
The statement quoted above, made by the executive director of the planning firm 
that had been hired to prepare the Development Plan and Town Planning Schemes for 
Bhuj, captures the basic concern regarding earthquake-affected urban areas, which 
shaped as well as provided the rationale for post-earthquake interventions.  
 
In urban areas, the number of casualties was accentuated by the inability to 
undertake rescue and relief operations in the narrow streets that made evacuation 
difficult. The congested nature of the urban form, characterized by a cul-de-sac (falia) 
street network in the inner core often made it impossible for earthmoving machines to 
reach the narrow lanes. When they did, they damaged parts of standing structures 
during search and rescue or debris removal that had not been badly affected by the 
earthquake.  
 
To many people, the extent of earthquake damage was a result of governmental, 
bureaucratic failure to enforce building standards. Allowing the use of low-quality 
construction materials and unsafe construction techniques created vulnerable building 
stock. Municipal authorities, who were responsible for the enforcement of building 
regulations, had largely been unaware of the long-term safety implications of lax 
enforcement of structural standards.
96
 These authorities often colluded with the land-
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 During one of the legal proceedings, Bhuj municipal officials pleaded that they were not aware that 
their town was in Seismic Zone V (the zone of highest earthquake intensity and occurrence) and had 
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developer lobby by granting permission for structures that did not meet the safeguards 
stipulated in building codes and Development Control Regulations. Inadequately 
regulated urbanization meant that non-compliant structures increased in number in the 
already dense urban cores; the number of multi-storied apartment buildings within and 
outside the urban core increased as well. The real estate boom that began in the 1980s 
and continued throughout the 1990s was an impetus to a surge of construction that was 
non-compliant with seismic safety requirements (Jain et al., 2002). 
 
Taking into account these factors, as well as the area‘s proneness to earthquakes, 
the rehabilitation of urban areas in Kachchh was centered on the regulation of the 
built-form through new development standards and stricter enforcement mechanisms 
for them.
97
 Three ideas were discussed for the rehabilitation of urban areas, ranging 
from in-situ reconstruction to complete relocation of towns and villages to new sites. 
 
Relocation versus in-situ development. The first idea was to rebuild in-situ, 
without town planning. With World Bank funds, the government would provide 
housing assistance to rebuild homes, as per the wishes of the owner. This was rejected 
by donors, such as World Bank and ADB, as well as agencies within and outside the 
government primarily because of concerns about whether such construction would be 
                                                                                                                                            
never received any circular (notification) from the state government regarding matters of earthquake 
safety. 
97
 Historically, there has been an earthquake in Kachchh almost every 50 to 60 years. In spite of this, 
building bylaws were generally not complied with—neither in terms of built-up area, number of floors, 
or other safety requirements. Permissions were granted for the construction of buildings of ground floor 
plus seven floors. Source: N. Tewari (personal communication, New Delhi, March 22, 2007). 
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earthquake-proof or not. The second idea was complete relocation—to relocate the 
entire city to a new site.
98
  
 
In the case of Bhuj, a 140-hectare site located within a kilometer of the urban 
center was identified for this purpose and the preliminary planning was done under the 
initiative of the District Collector, Sundaramurty Jagdisan, the strongest proponent of 
this idea. According to this plan, the entire gamtal (walled city) would be moved to a 
new location where the government would allocate plots to families. On this new site, 
houses, services, and social infrastructure would be built according to a plan requiring 
use of earthquake-proof materials and techniques. The old city of Bhuj would be 
retained as a ―museum,‖ and memorial to those who lost their lives and homes and as 
a reminder of the devastating effects of an earthquake. 
 
The CEO of BHADA explained why despite initial agreement to undertake 
complete relocation, the government considered that idea to be problematic: 
 
There was nothing wrong in that idea. It would have been a new city, a new 
Bhuj. And this [walled city] would have been a monument for people to visit 
to see how a severe earthquake would be felt [experienced] by people. But 
there are always political interests. There were some politically influential 
groups who wanted to make profit out of it by having the city relocated to 
their land.
99
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The developer lobby in Bhuj strongly favored complete relocation. Developers 
wanted the walled city to be abandoned. Many of them had already cornered land 
along the periphery of the city. They lobbied for the government to acquire their land 
for the development of relocation sites. If the walled city were abandoned without 
being rebuilt, the demand for private development was likely to go up. The developers 
would have gotten huge profits immediately, rather than later (due to increased 
demand for land for housing and commercial uses due to population increase or 
greater business opportunities).
100
 
 
Funding agencies such as the World Bank strongly opposed this idea. The 
spokesperson for GUDC explained the bias against relocation as follows: 
 
When people talk about relocation of an area which is impacted, somebody 
has got impacted and because of which they have been moved, it is seen more 
as an adverse kind of a situation. Relocation is usually seen as something 
negative, even the way Bank [World Bank] talks about it.
101
 
 
The idea of complete relocation was also vehemently opposed by inner-city 
business people.
102
 There were also concerns about what would happen to the walled 
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city in case the entire city were relocated.
103
 The idea of improving the walled city 
area to make it earthquake resilient therefore emerged.
104
 
 
The Chief Relief Coordinator at Bhuj described why complete relocation was 
not adopted as a rehabilitation strategy: 
 
This [complete relocation of towns and villages] was more of an elite 
sentiment. Cities are not built in five or ten years. It is an evolving process. A 
city is built over a period of hundreds of years. A village culture is developed 
over hundreds of years. You cannot have a cement concrete prototype 
structure, build 500 of them, and say that you have built a new city. We could 
realize it pretty fast that it was not the right approach. Media also started on 
this idea of relocating everything and that everything would be pucca 
[permanent], earthquake proof. Then one started realizing that it was not 
possible, totally impractical. NGOs also slowly started realizing it and public 
opinion started emerging. Ultimately, state government also agreed.
105
 
 
In addition, the World Bank/ADB assessment of reconstruction needs had 
estimated the cost of rubble clearance in the damaged areas to be one third the cost of 
constructing new sites and services (WB/ADB, 2001).
106
 Therefore, after two months 
of pursuing a plan to relocate the center of Bhuj to a new site, the state government 
changed course. In the face of strong opposition   from the commercial interests of the 
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inner city, including public demonstrations, the state government agreed to adopt a 
strategy of in-situ reconstruction and voluntary partial relocation to decongest the 
walled city, calling this ―a democratic middle way leaving the decision to the 
people.‖107 Those who wanted to continue to live in the gamtal area were allowed,and 
those who wanted to move from the walled city were given that option, too.  
 
In March 2001, the School of Architecture at the Centre for Environmental 
Planning Technology (CEPT) in Ahmedabad carried out an initial assessment of urban 
rehabilitation options and made the following suggestions for rebuilding urban areas 
of Kachchh (Mishra, 2004, p. 156): 
1. Improve the layout of settlements and urban infrastructure 
2. Establish a local authority for urban areas to offer technical assistance for 
appropriate construction and monitoring of reconstruction 
3. Finalize an approach for the preparation of a Development Plan 
4. Adopt Town Planning Scheme (TPS) for re-development of the inner city 
5. Widen roads to facilitate movement of vehicles at the time of crisis and 
development of a hierarchy of streets 
6. Reorganize plots of land in order to widen the roads; and acquire plots that are 
cut more than 75 percent 
 
The suggestions reinforced what many institutional actors were already 
advocating for: reconfiguration of urban areas using existing planning mechanisms. 
The executive director of Environmental Planning Collaborative (EPC) explained why 
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his organization advocated for the use of existing planning mechanisms for rebuilding 
urban areas:  
 
There were several rounds of discussions on what should be the 
reconstruction approach to urban areas. ILFS, ADB, UNDP, WB, all of them 
were involved in these. We [EPC] were also talking to the Secretary of the 
Urban Development Department. Eventually, we took the stand that ideally 
you should use the existing legal and institutional framework for long-term 
intervention. Do a Development Plan which is sanctioned under the Town 
Planning Act so that it has sanctity over a longer period of time.
108
 
 
As a result of these discussions and continuous persuasion by many organizations, 
including EPC, the idea to carry out town planning for urban rehabilitation was 
accepted by the state government. Therefore, to guide and regulate reconstruction and 
to promote safe future growth of urban areas affected by the earthquake, the 
government declared the adoption of town planning and revision of Development 
Control Regulations. The town planning process involved three key elements: 1) a 
Development Plan for the entire urban area in each of the four earthquake-affected 
towns of Bhuj, Bhachau, Anjar, and Rapar; 2) Town Planning Schemes for the urban 
core of Bhuj, Bhachau, and Anjar; and 3) Relocation Sites where the above processes 
warranted new settlements.
109
  In addition, the urban infrastructure would be expanded 
and upgraded under the supervision of GUDC. 
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 In India, traditionally, development or master plans consist of three components: 1) Land Use 
Zoning, 2) Road Networks, and 3) Development Control Regulations (DCR). Town Planning Schemes 
are typically used to reorganize parcels of undeveloped or farm land on the fringes of urban areas (just 
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Reconstruction of the four towns of Bhuj, Bhachau, Anjar, and Rapar would be 
based on the following principles (Balachandran and Tyabji, 2003, cited in Murty et 
al., 2005): 
 
 To build back the city better by encouraging partial relocation and partial in 
situ reconstruction 
 To continue repairing and strengthening the town‘s existing infrastructure 
 To improve building construction quality by incorporating earthquake-resistant 
technologies and adhering to regulatory reforms 
 To assist people in the reconstruction process by helping them understand 
statutory requirements in planning, building consensus, and framing projects  
 To make the planning process as participatory as possible 
 
The Government of Gujarat in consultation with the four area development 
authorities adopted common Development Control Regulations for all four towns. The 
urban reconstruction package announced in April 2001 made provisions to reduce 
development intensity in urban areas by restricting both height of the building and 
permissible Floor Space Index.
110
 Development Control Regulations restricted 
building height to ground level plus one floor (G+1), thereby taking a conservative 
approach to minimize damages in case of a disaster. Construction guidelines were also 
developed for traditional building materials, such as earth. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
outside the urban area) into regular shaped plots with street access, along with the provision of adequate 
physical and social infrastructure, to avoid haphazard development in the future. 
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For micro-level planning in urban areas, Town Planning Scheme (TPS)—a 
statutory planning mechanism used to physically reorganize parcels of land in a given 
jurisdiction while retaining a small portion of land from each plot to create new streets 
and open spaces—would be prepared under the provisions of the Gujarat Town 
Planning and Urban Development Act of 1976.
111
 Rather than acquiring land for the 
expansion of urban infrastructure, TPSs were deemed appropriate to decongest the 
damaged urban cores of Kachchh in a democratic and equitable manner.
112
  
 
Decongestion of the earthquake-affected urban cores through partial 
reconstruction and partial relocation necessitated the creation of new sites to house 
people who could no longer be accommodated in the redeveloped urban centers. This, 
along with restrictions in building heights and built-up area, implied horizontal 
expansion of the earthquake-affected urban centers, both during reconstruction and in 
the future. The collapse of multi-storied buildings and limited availability of land in 
the urban cores of towns also meant that the residents of such buildings would be 
given the option to construct houses on new plots. These sites would be developed on 
government-owned land. ADA was responsible for the identification of land for such 
sites, development of the site (layout of plots, laying utilities, and building roads), 
selection of beneficiaries, and monitoring of house construction.  
 
In order to facilitate authorized dwelling units for the urban poor in the context of 
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overall town planning, the state government announced assistance for occupants of 
fully collapsed houses. A plot of 50 m
2
 (maximum) would be provided with a 
permissible built-up area of 25 m
2
 in a location designated by the government. The 
financial assistance would beat the rate of Rs. 2,200 per m
2
 (maximum Rs. 55,000). 
 
The World Bank provided monetary assistance for the reconstruction of houses in 
the urban areas under GERRP, while the ADB funded the urban infrastructure 
development. Housing construction in the four towns would be owner-driven and the 
beneficiaries would be responsible for organizing the construction process. The 
government would facilitate by providing technical guidance, material specifications, 
and technical supervision for building earthquake-resistant buildings (GSDMA, 2001, 
p. 15).  
 
Having provided an overview of the institutional and policy framework for state-
led rehabilitation, I now turn to the rebuilding processes as it unfolded in the urban 
area of Bhuj and how it shaped the actions of various stakeholders as they coped with 
the disaster.
113
 Rather than looking at the state and its institutions as a single entity, I 
focus on the state‘s various representative forms and the interactions among them. 
Negotiations among stakeholders, including those within the state, are analyzed to 
achieve a nuanced understanding of the workings of the state, as well as the challenges 
and opportunities of undertaking urban planning, especially in a post-disaster context. 
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By examining the narratives of various state actors that were involved in the 
rehabilitation processes and their mediating experiences, I attempt to understand how 
compromises between equity, economic well-being, and environmental sustainability 
were made in the highly politicized context of a disaster that demands a response that 
is both measurable and visible. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MAKING TOWN PLANNING WORK IN BHUJ 
 
 
How did the rehabilitation process as defined by the Gujarat Earthquake 
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Program (GERRP) unfold in the city of Bhuj, the 
administrative capital of the district that was worst affected? How did rational 
planning mechanisms, such as Development Plan (DP) and Town Planning Scheme 
(TPS), affect the rehabilitation process? How did the particular context of disaster 
rehabilitation shape the processes of preparation and implementation of the DP and the 
TPS? What specific strategies were adopted to overcome challenges and to make plans 
work? In the following sections I explore the nuances of specific practices of physical 
restructuring that pertain to plans for rebuilding the city of Bhuj, primarily through the 
narratives of various state actors involved in the rehabilitation of the city. 
 
Development Plan of Bhuj 
 
The last Development Plan for Bhuj, which as prepared in 1976 by the Town 
Planning and Valuation Department, covered a planning area of 13.58 km
2
.
114
 The 
Plan consisted of a land use and zoning map that demarcated areas according to 
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Town Planning and Valuation Department prepared a Plan during the third Five Year Plan of India 
(1961-1966). Later, in 1976, the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act was enacted to 
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specific land use categories. Since the preparation of this 1976 development plan, the 
city had grown (urban agglomeration) beyond its limits in all directions, and 
particularly along the major transportation corridors toward the nearby villages of 
Madhapar and Mirzapar. Taking these villages into account, the new Development 
Plan would cover a total ―urbanizing‖ area of 56 km2 consisting of Bhuj Municipality, 
Mirzapar village, part of Bhuj village, and part of Madhapar village (see Map 6).
115
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
govern town planning related activities for the entire state of Gujarat. A Development Plan for Bhuj was 
prepared under the auspices of this Act.  
115
 In India, the Development Plan serves as the primary planning instrument for an urban area. Its 
scope extends over an entire urban area, including peripheral areas that show signs of urbanization. 
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Map 6:   Bhuj Area Development Authority jurisdiction (with 12 municipal wards of 
Bhuj municipality forming the core) (Source: EPC, 2001a) 
 
On May 18, 2001, seven days after the creation of Bhuj Area Development 
Authority (BHADA), the Town Planning and Valuation Department (TPVD) under 
Section 13 of the GTPUDA of 1976 notified and published a Draft Development Plan 
for Bhuj.
116
 On the same day, Environmental Planning Collaborative (EPC), a not-for-
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 Under Section 13 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, once a draft plan is 
prepared, the public is given two months to respond to it. The plan is modified based on these 
suggestions, and then published to seek public response for another two months. Once the second round 
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profit organization based in Ahmedabad, was appointed as the Town Planning 
Consultant (TPC) to modify the published plan based on detailed studies and 
consultations under the framework of the GTPUDA 1976. EPC had completed a 
Regional Development Plan for Kachchh, working closely with the network of NGOs, 
Kachchh Nav Nirman Abhiyan (known as Abhiyan). Considering that this was an 
emergency situation, the Department of Urban Development of the state government 
directed EPC to ―speed up‖ the process and prepare the plan within six months.117 
 
Instead of working with the plan already prepared by the Town Planning 
Department, EPC started to prepare a new conceptual plan for Bhuj. The Executive 
director of EPC explained why it was important to create a new plan: 
 
The plan [first version prepared by the TPVD] was unrealistic because it 
proposed widening of all the roads in the walled city, all [original emphasis]. 
If you widen all existing streets in the walled city then buildings that survived 
the earthquake would have to be demolished as most of them were next to 
main roads. There was a huge furor in the town about that, with people 
saying, ―Jo earthquake ne chhod diya woh tum tod rahe ho‖ [What the 
earthquake had spared, you are demolishing]. If that plan were to be 
followed, it could have meant demolition of a few thousand buildings. It was 
called the ―second earthquake.‖118 
 
While objections and suggestions were being sought by BHADA on the first 
                                                                                                                                            
of suggestions is incorporated, a revised plan is submitted to the Urban Development Department of the 
State Government for approval. Normally development plan preparation takes a minimum of two years. 
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version of the plan, EPC carried out a new mapping exercise to determine plot 
boundaries and verify standing structures.  
 
Surveying and mapping required for implementing the development and town 
plans presented challenges. Not all destroyed buildings had been removed by the time 
the mapping started, and the debris complicated the mapping process by obscuring lot 
boundaries (Murty et al., 2005). EPC Director explained the repercussions as well as 
reasons for such discrepancies: 
 
Our base-map preparation was running parallel with the removal of debris. 
So when we actually published the plan our base map was not fully accurate. 
There was a lot of confusion because of that. Road alignments seemed to run 
over existing housing layouts. It was a problem with reconciliation of ground 
realities. The overlay was not yet corrected properly. The original maps 
prepared by the office of the District Inspector of Land Records (DILR) and 
the City Survey were extremely bad. There were large patches of government 
land; many of these were encroached upon. So mapping those was difficult. 
We couldn‘t make out what was encroachment and what was real.119 
 
However, EPC prepared a new conceptual plan based on the new maps, presented 
it to the public in various meetings, and updated it based on their feedback. When they 
communicated to the people of Bhuj that the new conceptual plan was entirely 
different from the one that was shared with them earlier by BHADA, there was a lot of 
confusion. The first plan helped to reduce the statutory time period that went into the 
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process. The new plan proposed demolition of a couple hundred buildings.
120
 
 
Another problem soon emerged. Property ownership records were found to be 
outdated and inaccurate and did not reflect realities on the ground.. Land records had 
been minimally updated by owners as well as municipal authorities in the last 30 
years. This was reflective of a systemic problem with regard to land records in 
Kachchh. In order to avoid stamp duty levied on property sales entirely, most property 
owners did not get their records updated by the respective authorities when the 
ownership of their properties changed. Hence, many transactions related to the sale of 
property were ambiguous. Sometimes an ownership document was just an agreement 
between individuals but carried no legal validity. Lack of interest on the part of 
concerned authorities to verify the records also contributed to records being outdated.  
 
In case of rental property, if a tenant protected by the Rent Control Act did not 
want to stay in the house but did not have the right to sell it, he or she transferred the 
use rights informally to another by designating them as the power of attorney on all 
property-related transactions, after receiving money at prevailing market rates. Such 
informal sales were never reflected in the records, which still had information on the 
original owner and first tenant. In the case of high-value properties, people ensured 
that the records were updated.
121
 
 
In order to get such issues rectified and to gain public acceptance for the plan, 
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EPC sought public participation in the preparation of the plan through community 
level meetings and discussions with other stakeholders. A note on the planning process 
and how the plan would affect reconstruction of homes was printed in a frequently 
asked questions (FAQ) format in Gujarati and circulated. Over a period of six months, 
the planning team conducted 158 stakeholder consultations, approximately one 
meeting a day.
122
 Once the conceptual plan was shared and feedback sought, strategies 
were developed by the planners of EPC, first in the form of microprojects in two areas 
within the walled city, and later in the form of official proposals for rebuilding the 
social and physical infrastructure.  
 
The plan prepared by EPC emphasized the need to rebuild the city consistent with 
its historic character and suggested measures for such development. Over the years, 
the real estate market had mushroomed and eclipsed historic areas. Only the 
Darbargarh area and select neighborhoods in the walled city retained a semblance of 
their former historic character. Much of the traditional housing stock in the city had 
also disappeared, and the skyline was threatened by unregulated development. This 
trend had produced an inconsistent and visually jarring landscape which pitted modern 
construction against proportionally smaller historic buildings (BHADA, 2001a, p. 
130). Hence, Development Control Regulations (DCR) proposed by EPC had a variety 
of zones for residential use and four types of commercial zones with variations in 
height and bulk. However, BHADA in consultation with GUDC later replaced these 
with a uniform set of regulations for the entire urban area. According to the GUDC 
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planner, such a conservative stance was deemed appropriate for safety considerations 
since with time people largely tend to forget the earthquake and therefore not follow 
the safety standards for financial reasons or lack of skilled construction laborers. 
Hence, it was considered better to indirectly reduce fatalities, even if the buildings 
were to collapse in another earthquake.
123
 
 
A Development Plan principally addresses the physical growth of a city and is not 
typically concerned with social infrastructure. However, in the aftermath of the 
disaster that affected all of the social and economic institutions of the city as well as 
its physical assets, EPC saw the opportunity to integrate planning for the informal 
sector, social infrastructure, economic development, environment, tourism, and culture 
into the city‘s development plan. In addition to land use and infrastructure strategies, 
the plan defined 14 strategic social infrastructure projects.
124
 
 
The Draft Development Plan published under section 15 of the GTPUD Act 1976 
consisted of 12 components:  
a. Relocation and Rehabilitation 
b. Economic Development 
c. Land Development 
d. Road Network and Transportation 
e. Physical Infrastructure 
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f. Social Infrastructure 
g. Water Bodies and Environment 
h. Open Spaces and Environment 
i. Heritage Conservation and Tourism  
j. Solid Waste Management 
k. Informal Sector 
l. Institutional Framework and Implementation Strategy. 
 
Bhuj Area Development Authority (BHADA), the custodian of the plan, received 
1,542 objections and suggestions and scrutinized them. In December 2001, the 
modified plan was finalized under section 16 of the Town Planning Act. 
 
During the Development Plan preparation, the Urban Development Department 
directed the planning consultant to leave the walled city out of the DP. The rationale 
for this was that the problems that might arise from the contested and complex nature 
of the walled city could be isolated and handled separately without affecting the DP 
process. As a consequence, the Development Plan was prepared and implementation 
initiated before plans for restructuring the walled city were prepared. 
 
Implementing the development plan. Once the Development Plan was 
approved by the Urban Development Department, development control regulations 
became legally binding. Land use zoning as well as the road network, the other two 
key components of the Development Plan, also could not be changed except through 
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the statutory process for variations as specified in the Town Planning Act. For any 
new construction, ensuring compliance with the new regulations was the responsibility 
of BHADA. However, GUDC would oversee implementation of infrastructure 
development according to the Development Plan. They worked with BHADA for land 
acquisitions for road construction and to compensate people whose land was acquired.  
 
The construction of roads would be done in phases. The decision regarding which 
roads would be constructed is often political. However in the case of Bhuj, since it was 
part of the post-earthquake rehabilitation process, technical advice of consultants was 
sought by the government agencies. EPC was asked to assist BHADA and GUDC in 
the process of demarcating the proposed road layout on the ground. 
 
However, new problems emerged because of inaccurate cadastral maps. The 
cadastral boundaries which were certified by the District Inspector of Land Records 
(DILR) were inaccurate. In many cases, buildings that were thought would not be 
affected by the proposed roads were fully or partially in their way, requiring them to 
be ―cut.‖ Therefore, adjustments were subsequently made during the implementation 
and these were ratified post facto by varying the DP as per section 17 of the Town 
Planning Act. These adjustments were finalized by the Town Planner, CEO of 
BHADA, and District Collector.
125
 The consultants were largely kept out of the 
decision-making process pertaining to such changes. 
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Despite its comprehensive nature, not all elements of the plan were considered for 
implementation. Top priority was given to establishment of the road network, 
infrastructure development in the walled city and outer areas, and reorganization of 
plots in the walled city.. Economic development was addressed ―willy-nilly,‖ not with 
focused attention.
126
 
 
Environmental concerns such as dumping of debris that had disturbed the natural 
drainage pattern and also destroyed the natural system of water bodies were discussed 
in the Development Plan and proposals for their improvement suggested. Pragsar 
Lake, which had been previously filled with water, was completely filled with debris. 
In the absence of perennial rivers, Bhuj relied on extraction of groundwater from 
aquifer resources to meet its water requirement.  
 
The Hamirsar system was built to utilize the natural drainage and geology to 
harvest water for the city of Bhuj. The rivulets and canals were designed to bring in 
water from different areas of the catchment into a central water reservoir.
127
 The water 
bodies of Bhuj, especially the channel to Hamirsar, were repaired by Abhiyan, yet the 
larger project for reclaiming the natural drainage system of Hamirsar catchment area 
would not be initiated by GUDC or BHADA. Proposals for heritage conservation and 
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tourism development would also take a back seat. They would be addressed in an ad 
hoc manner through individual projects, such as restoration of the historic gates of the 
walled city, as well as a few other heritage structures. Improvement of informal 
settlements would be relegated for a later time. 
 
Given the discussion on the formulation of the Development Plan for Bhuj, in the 
following section, beginning with a brief discussion of the ―rationale‖ for the adoption 
of TPSs, I will examine how they were prepared and implemented in Bhuj by EPC and 
BHADA under the tutelage of the Urban Development Department through its nodal 
agency GUDC. 
 
Restructuring the Walled City: Town Planning Schemes 
 
The executive director of EPC recounted his first impressions of rebuilding the 
walled city as follows: ―In the first visit itself, we went for a walk in the old city and I 
had this instinctive feeling that the only way to rebuild that place was to reorganize 
land, such a mess – it was just a gut feeling, nothing to base it on.128 
 
The arguments for restructuring the walled city of Bhuj were presented by the 
planning consultants as follows: 
Reorganization of the walled city of Bhuj will significantly enhance safety of 
both residents and visitors. With wider streets, evacuation of the city in any 
kind of disaster would be faster and emergency vehicles could access the 
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entire walled city area. The infrastructure systems in the walled city which 
had already begun to deteriorate suffered more damages by the movement of 
heavy machinery during demolition and debris removal. A complete 
renovation of the system as part of the reconstruction process would mitigate 
the risk of contamination of drinking water due to breakages in both water 
supply and sewer lines that were impossible to trace as well as supply losses 
due to those breakages.
129
 
 
There was general consensus among the architects of the program that the walled 
city needed to be replanned. The real question was how to achieve this. As most 
neighborhoods (falias) ended in cul-de-sacs, turning the cul-de-sacs into thoroughfares 
and providing access to individual homes required drastic reconfiguration. The town 
planning consultant for Bhuj explained why they thought Town Planning Schemes 
were suitable for restructuring the walled city: 
 
When we did the conceptual plan [for the DP] we had looked at the walled 
city. We said that the walled city area requires a detailed plan and we said 
there are two ways of doing it. One is whatever road widening or 
improvement you want to have, propose it in the development plan and we‘ll 
acquire the land required for it and do a surgical intervention. The other 
option we said is to use the Town Planning Scheme. It will make it more 
equitable and democratic.
130
 
 
For the first time in the history of disaster rehabilitation in India, a statutory 
planning mechanism such TPS would be used to reconfigure an existing urban core. 
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The planning consultant continued to explain why it was innovative: 
 
This [Town Planning Scheme] is usually done at the city‘s edge, as a 
practical maneuver in converting agricultural plots [in the urban periphery] to 
urbanizable land [with the provision for infrastructure development], but in 
the case of Bhuj the legislative instrument has been used as a strategy to re-
organize the walled city‘s morphology. The precise significance of its 
application lies in the fact that a piece of urban legislation was reinterpreted 
and applied—in a rather unusual manner—to a city‘s historic core in its post-
disaster reconstruction.
131
 
 
In February 2002, EPC got the contract to prepare the Town Planning Schemes of 
Bhuj. Though the walled city was 1 square kilometer in area (the area for a typical 
TPS), owing to the large number of plots (12,000 to 13,000) and an even greater 
number of owners, designation of the entire walled city as one TPS was deemed 
unsuitable. This was important because the town planning statute required individual 
hearings for each and every property owner, who needed to be notified three times 
during the process. So, for the ease of preparation and implementation, the walled city 
was divided into eight TPSs coinciding with the municipal wards as indicated in Map 
7.
132
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Map 7: Town Planning Schemes in the Walled City of Bhuj  
              (Eight Town Planning Schemes coinciding with the eight municipal wards)  
              (Source: EPC, 2001a) 
 
The Town Planning Schemes, prepared under the provisions of the Gujarat Town 
Planning and Urban Development Act, typically involve three stages: 
1. In the first stage, known as the Draft Town Planning Scheme, the Area 
Development Authority prepares and publishes a plan, seeks objections and 
suggestions from plot owners, revises the plan in response to their 
objections/suggestions, and then submits the Draft Scheme to the State 
Government for approval.  
2. Once the Draft Scheme is approved, government-appointed town planning 
officers, who in their quasi-judicial capacity, give three rounds of individual 
hearings to all the owners, and finalize the physical layout, known as the 
Preliminary Scheme/Physical Plan.  
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3. In the third stage, known as the Final Scheme, the financial details, such as the 
compensation to be paid to the owners and the betterment charges to be levied 
on them, are finalized. 
 
As part of the TPS preparation, to make room for the new roads and open spaces, 
percentage-wise deductions were applied to plots that had buildings in the G-5 damage 
category.
133
 Up to 30% of the total area was deducted from plots of 30 to 500 m
2
 area 
and 35% from plots larger than 500 m
2
. No deductions were applied to plots that were 
less than 30 m
2
 in area. Considering the disaster context, to avoid further destruction 
of homes and other buildings, the government decided not to disturb standing 
structures (nearly 50% of the pre-earthquake structures) and allocated final plots to the 
owners in the same location as prior to the earthquake. However, since there were no 
12m-wide roads in the walled city before, some of the standing structures were cleared 
to make room for them. In other cases, buildings were either cut or a complete plot 
was acquired and owner provided with another plot elsewhere.  
 
The rehabilitation package also specifically mentioned that government properties 
inside the walled city of Bhuj would be made available for the redevelopment of the 
walled city. Several government offices were relocated from the walled city, thereby 
opening up plots for the town planning process. Activities that caused traffic 
congestion within the walled city such as the Grain Market in the Bhid area would also 
be relocated to a new site. On the northern side of the city, where the devastation was 
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extensive, there were considered to be more opportunities for accommodating final 
plots. Families who desired to move from the walled city to various relocation sites 
developed by BHADA were given the option to surrender their plots in the walled city 
and move to one of the three sites. Plots surrendered by those who moved out were 
used for readjustment of the plots or for open spaces within the walled city.
134
 
 
Preparation of draft town planning schemes. Despite the decision made by 
the Government of Gujarat to use TPS to reconfigure the walled city of Bhuj, many 
people including Town Planner of BHADA were unsure of public acceptance of the 
proposed plans as elaborated below: 
 
You have say five to seven members staying in a house and 100% [built up 
area] was allowed previously…now if we say we have reduced it to 30%, 
how will people react? We were skeptical whether this process could be done 
in 10 years…because normally TPS preparation takes around, not less than 
10 years even in the urban peripheries. Here it was to be done in an area with 
standing structures.
135
 
 
Nevertheless, the preparation of TPS was initiated by EPC. Planners and 
administrators soon realized that convincing people to live in smaller plots was the 
least of their worries. 
 
One of the first steps in the preparation of a TPS is the verification of the layout 
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and property records of all plots in the scheme area. After this an Original Plot (OP) 
number is assigned. Typically, City Survey records serve as the basis for verification 
of the physical layout of plots and the built area. Property cards issued by the Revenue 
Department (which maintains records of property sale transactions) serves as the 
primary source of ownership information. In the words of EPC‘s executive director:  
 
The original city surveys were bad, because according to one of the officials, 
surveys in Bhuj were carried out by a batch of surveyors who were 
particularly bad. They didn‘t make the records properly. Lots of property 
drawings in Bhuj only had the outer dimensions making it impossible to 
construct, geometrically accurately at the site.
136
 
 
Yet, existing City Survey records were scanned and digitized. In the case of 
structures in the G-5 and G-4 categories (determined by the damage assessment survey 
and noted down for demolition) municipal survey numbers were noted. This was 
particularly significant because a higher percentage of deductions could be applied to 
vacant plots obtained after demolition of G-4 and G-5 structures, thereby giving more 
room for designing the new streets and final plot layouts. Standing structures had to be 
measured and their damage category verified.  
 
It was found out later that many structures that had been assigned the G-5 
category were not in G-5 or even G-4. Several others which might have originally 
been in the G-4 or G-5 category were repaired by their owners/occupants, which later 
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appeared to belong to G-1. However, in the TPS preparation, under the assumption 
that these plots were vacant (due to removal of totally collapsed or badly damaged or 
nearly collapsed structures), higher deductions were applied to the plot area and the 
land was used for widening streets, readjusting other plots, providing open spaces, etc. 
Many including the Town Planner of BHADA considered the extended time span of 
the project to be the main reason for such errors: 
 
Three years is not a small period of time. we didn‘t have time to take each 
and every record under such a rigorous exercise…and to ask people under 
which category it fell, they were not there…they were staying outside 
somewhere. Even though coordination is there, not perfect coordination, from 
the records between different agencies…these problems have come up.137 
 
To make matters worse, the surveys conducted by EPC also had issues. They 
were not accurate, particularly in the walled city. The EPC director explains the 
problem as follows: 
 
When the surveys were done in the walled city, initially the demolitions were 
going on. There were bulldozers all over the place. Later, the scenario 
changed. Buildings which were standing at the time of the survey were not 
there. Blocks of buildings looked different. The right boundaries were not 
captured during the survey. It was extremely difficult, as machines couldn‘t 
reach some places. When the City Survey maps were compared with our 
survey maps, they did not fit properly. City Survey maps themselves had 
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cumulative errors from frequent tracing over a period of 30-40 years.
138
 
 
Then the second issue emerged: inaccurate records. Property cards had not been 
updated and hence did not reflect the changes in ownership in the last several years. 
Revenue records indicating property ownership were very old. In several instances, 
records had not been updated for five generations. They indicated the original owners‘ 
name, while the user was someone else. Plots had been subdivided, and portions of 
them amalgamated. Ownership had changed hands as well. However, the official 
records did not get updated; hence, there were plot boundaries and ownership records 
different from what was at the time of the earthquake.  
 
A third issue came up due to construction outside the limits specified in the city 
survey records. Building regulations were never enforced, and therefore people had 
been constructing houses according to their own wills.
139
 Common features included 
staircases in the access roads, balconies overhanging roads, and structures occupying 
entire plot areas. However, such features were often not included in the official 
records. These omissions complicated the determination of Original Plots (OP) as well 
as subsequent allocation of Final Plots (FP). 
 
EPC attempted to resolve such discrepancies by advertising in the local 
newspaper, asking people to provide photocopies of their records or other documents 
indicating pre-earthquake plot layout and extent of construction. Out of 24,000 
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properties (10,000 plots), EPC received only 1,200 records from the owners. Later on, 
with the help of Abhiyan, eight ward offices were set up, one in each TPS area.
140
 At 
the ward offices people were assisted in filing their objections. Despite these attempts, 
many of the records did not get updated.
141
 
 
In August 2002, six months after the appointment of EPC as planning consultant, 
Draft Town Planning Schemes were completed. EPC published eight Draft TPSs, one 
for each ward, sought objections and suggestions from property owners, and then 
submitted the schemes to the Urban Development Department for approval. State 
government approved the Draft Scheme and subsequently appointed eight Town 
Planning Officers (TPO), one for each TPS, for the purpose of finalizing the 
Schemes.
142
  
 
Physical plan. In the process of finalizing the Draft TPSs, TPOs played the 
important role of arbitrating between BHADA and property owner, acting as an 
interface between the public and the government and interacting with individual 
owners. They did not directly deal with BHADA, who was both their client and the 
implementing agency. TPOs had their own offices and maintained separate records. 
The Town Planner of BHADA acted as the focal point for all the eight TPSs. 
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As part of the finalization process, TPOs were required to conduct site visits to 
ensure that the Draft Schemes (proposed plot layout and road network) reflected 
ground realities, and make suitable adjustments. One of the town planning officers 
elaborated on the significance of field visits: 
 
Once the draft schemes were prepared, I did site visits. Draft schemes do not 
show anything about elevation or so. TPS 1 is in the Uplipad area. There 
adjacent plots have level difference of even 10 ft. A road cannot be connected 
in such a situation. The map might suggest that it‘s possible. Such 
adjustments needed to be made. Some of them [owners in the Scheme area] 
wanted to know where their relatives who lived next door had gotten their FP 
[Final Plot]. I told them to come back as a group so that adjustments can be 
made to the location of FP without disturbing their ties as much as 
possible.
143
 
 
This was also the opportunity for property owners to interact with the TPOs and 
convey their grievances related to town planning and have them resolved. Even though 
forms and maps were made available for public response, not many issues were raised 
by property owners during the finalizing of the Draft Scheme. Plans were still on 
paper and not yet demarcated on the ground. The TPO explained why problems were 
not raised by many: 
 
When the process was going on, people did not have any complaints because 
they did not understand or know what was going on. Later, when the 
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structures were going to be cut, they started asking why the building where 
they had been living for decades was being cut. That‘s when they realized 
what had happened in town planning. Had they known before, they would 
have told the TPO that the entrance is being obstructed or that their building 
is being cut. So mostly people came to know about TPSs when they were 
being implemented.
144
 
 
Apart from the inaccuracies in the City Survey and property records, other 
problems emerged because of the peculiarities of house design in Bhuj. For example, 
toilets were outside the main structure, near the gate.  In many cases when the 
deductions to plots were made during TPS preparation, the spaces previously occupied 
by toilets were ―cut.‖ Another set of problems were due to the small size of the plots, 
sometimes as small as 1 to 2 m
2
 and with multiple owners. In order to resolve such 
issues, BHADA allocated alternative plots in the walled city using plots surrendered 
by the families who opted to relocate. 
 
Many property owners did not understand the benefits of town planning, 
especially the new physical infrastructure that would be built, as well as the 
appreciation of their property values once the new roads were built. Hence many were 
hesitant to allow any deductions from their plots. When standing buildings were to be 
cut or removed to make way for roads (because those buildings were not accounted for 
in the base maps used for proposing the roads), the government‘s decision to leave the 
existing structures undisturbed made it difficult for the TPOs to reconcile with the 
plan. Often compromises were made regarding road alignments and widening due to 
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these standing structures. The TPO elaborated on this dilemma: 
 
It‘s true that we could have done planning a lot better that way [by 
demolishing some of the undamaged buildings]. We could have cut buildings 
to make room for new roads; the Act [GTPUDA 1976] has provisions for 
that. If there is a room in 10 ft, if we cut 5 ft, what can people do in the 
remaining 5 ft? As far as possible, built-up area was not disturbed. From the 
ones that had been completely damaged, deductions were made and for 
others it was done if it was possible to do so without disturbing the structure. 
One also needed to look at things like location of the main entrance [door – 
right of way] to the house before finalizing the roads. There was only one 
high-rise building in TPS1. It had to be cut to make way for a 9 m road. The 
owner told me to change the orientation, but that would have resulted in more 
disruption.
145
 
 
The disaster context also imposed additional challenges to the TPOs in finalizing 
the Draft TP Schemes. TPOs‘ site visits were always advertised in the local and 
regional newspapers, and people who owned plots in those areas were advised to be 
there and supply the required information. However, during site visits conducted to 
verify complaints filed by individual owners, many of the adjacent houses were 
unoccupied as the owners/occupants had moved to locations within or outside of Bhuj. 
Hence site visits to verify the complaints and consult adjacent plot owners to reach a 
solution regarding plot layouts were often unsuccessful. For houses in the G-5 
category (completely damaged) it was impossible to ascertain the nature of the 
structure that previously occupied the plot. Since the records were not updated, the 
claims of owners had to be taken at face value with confirmation from neighbors.  
 112 
 
Despite the subjective nature of decision-making during the site visits, lack of 
such visits to verify claims on the ground created further problems.
146
 Plots that were 
indicated as vacant (because the building was in the G-4 or G-5 category) were often 
allocated to others or used to make adjustments to adjacent plots, only to realize that 
there were structures in those plots that did not get recorded in the mapping process or 
were repaired by their owners.  
 
There were several cases where people had their stairs in the gali (narrow street) 
outside the property line. While preparing the plan, many such streets were used for 
reconfiguration of adjacent plots and given as Final Plot (FP) to another person. 
Hence, entrances to houses or plots were blocked by other FPs or the newly proposed 
access roads were inconsistent with the orientation of a building. In many cases, 
according to the plan, new access roads were proposed at the backside of a building.  
 
There were several small religious structures or trees which did not have any 
entry in the property cards. Although someone might have been allocated a final plot 
there, it could not be developed as removing religious structures or cutting down trees 
was difficult. In some cases, the final plot was given in an adjacent plot that had a 
standing structure, which TPO could not demolish due to the government order to 
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preserve undamaged structures. Therefore, such households needed to be moved to 
other locations. 
 
Many such discrepancies that could have been rectified during TPOs‘ field visits 
did not take place as some of the TPOs chose not to visit their TPS areas.
147
 The 
planning consultant explained how despite attempts to provide assistance to the TPOs 
in verifying the claims and making changes without compromising the integrity of the 
particular TPS as well as adjoining schemes, they were unable to do so: 
 
Those changes [modifications to the draft scheme] were not political—those 
were complete stupidity. What went wrong in the process was that when we 
[EPC] made the plans there were of course problems. But because of the 
speed at which it was going, we said we‘ll rectify these problems at the TPO 
stage. Our recommendation was that we provide a pool [of technical support 
personnel] to the TPOs. We put up a team or an office, or rather the TPOs use 
our office as the drafting office. So, when they did the hearings, [they 
explained] explain to us what changes were needed and we then make the 
changes, verify it on the ground and then give it to the TPO. They didn‘t want 
to be controlled. So they prevailed on the Urban Development Department 
that, ―This is not what we want. We want EPC to provide us an AutoCAD 
operator because we do not understand AutoCAD, that fellow will take our 
instructions and modify the drawings.‖ That created a lot of problems with 
the plot layout.
148
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However, one of the TPOs attributed the town planning related problems to the 
lack of interaction between the TPOs and their client, BHADA: 
 
The Authority [BHADA] and the Revenue Department were under the 
impression that everything would happen as per the wishes of the Authority. 
It wouldn‘t be wrong to say that the role of TPO was more or less ignored. 
They just thought that the TPO would finalize whatever that was prepared. 
They didn‘t realize the fact that whatever TPO did would be final. If there 
were some form of formal interaction between the TPOs and the District 
Collector, etc. that would have been better.
149
 
 
Meanwhile, EPC had its offices in all eight wards of the walled city. Several 
residents went to these ward offices to understand the implications of the draft 
schemes on their property and to raise any issues they had, which could then be 
presented to the TPO for resolution.  
 
As part of the statutory process, TPOs held three rounds of individual hearings 
with property owners. Several residents could not be reached at the addresses the local 
authorities had. New addresses to which notices regarding the hearings could be sent 
were not available (many people were living in other places within or outside of 
Kachchh). Advertisements were issued in local and regional newspapers, asking 
owners of specific plots or areas to attend the meetings to discuss the issues regarding 
their plots. Even then many owners did not participate in the meetings. People who 
understood the importance of attending the hearings to get their problems resolved 
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attended them and were largely successful in arriving at a solution. The TPOs 
scrutinized some of the issues and then the schemes were announced. To complete all 
these procedures, the TPOs were not given more than three months‘ time. 
 
Many in the administration, including BHADA Technical Division Engineer, 
were less sympathetic to those who could not attend the hearings and therefore could 
not get their problems resolved. The engineer attributed the lack of participation to the 
carelessness and lethargy of the residents: 
 
Several residents did not pay attention to what was happening, they were 
either gone or did not bother . . . so rahe the [were sleeping]. They did not 
care about what was happening to their property. For example, in the case of 
entrance related issues in each TPS, if they had been raised during the 
preparation of Draft TPS, the issue could have been resolved. At that time 
nobody paid any attention. Or if they felt that the compensation wasn‘t 
adequate or some other issue. . . . Now that the schemes have been finalized, 
nothing could be done. So, whatever issues that have emerged after the 
declaration of the Final TPSs are from those who weren‘t paying attention.150 
 
When asked if it were possible that those who went to stay with their relatives 
outside of Bhuj did not know what was happening and hence were unable to 
participate in the hearings and meetings, the engineer disagreed: 
 
That is less likely. Even if I am staying in Bombay, if I own property here, I 
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would have definitely given the power of attorney to someone here, for 
example to a care-taker. This is a common practice which you can find even 
in villages like Sukhpar [in the outskirts of Bhuj].
151
 
 
The executive director of EPC narrated how the specific way of functioning of the 
TPOs and the solidarity amongst residents in each TPS produced different outcomes 
for the planning process within the walled city: 
 
TPS 8, Soniwad, is the best, because they were the most organized. They 
interacted on a daily basis at critical junctures. TPSs 1 and 2 came out 
decently because the TPO was very good. He actually went down to the 
ground and went plot by plot, checked everything. TPSs 5 and 6 were the 
worst. The TPOs never went to the ground. In TPS 5 the TPO did not visit 
the site even once [original emphasis] in two years; his assistants were not 
good. In TPS 4, the TPO never went to the site, but the assistant was good. 
So it came out well. So the eight TP Schemes fared very differently.
152
 
 
Those groups which were articulate and well organized interacted with the 
planners or the TPOs to get their problems resolved. Others missed the opportunity. A 
range of issues from technical errors to lack of site visits, lack of coordination between 
the TPOs and the local authority (BHADA), and the lack of participation of owners 
was carried over to the finalized Draft Scheme, also known as the Physical Plan. The 
Physical Plan gave BHADA the authority to demarcate the layout of plots on the 
ground and begin infrastructure development, including construction of roads.  
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EPC was asked to demarcate the roads and plot boundaries on the ground. When 
the demarcation began, there surfaced unresolved problems related to land records as 
well as new problems created by redesigning of the TP Schemes by different TPOs 
without being sensitive to the details on the ground. EPC demarcated the schemes on 
the ground as per the plan.  
 
Of the 12,000 plots dealt with in the Town Planning Schemes, BHADA received 
2,000 applications against the changes proposed by the TP Schemes. The BHADA 
officials classified them into different categories: relocation wanted, but plot allotted 
inside the city; relocation given, but plot wanted inside; applied for relocation but did 
not want to go when city developed; land related issues; ownership related issues, etc. 
If an applicant had a problem with another person, then the other person also had to 
file an application, which meant many more applications than the original 2,000 
received by BHADA.
153
 
 
On one side, construction of roads and other infrastructure began, while on the 
other side the TPOs continued to make changes to the schemes to resolve the problems 
in coordination with the Town Planner of BHADA. The Town Planner of BHADA 
negotiated with individual property owners to arrive at mutually agreeable solutions, 
although legally it was not his mandate to do so. This process continued for two to 
three years. 
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In the case of plots that were not buildable because of the way they had been laid 
out, or if the owner(s) wanted to subdivide the property and was not happy with the 
plot allotted as per the Draft Scheme, the Town Planner negotiated and offered 
individual plots in the relocation site for each household in exchange for the plot in the 
walled city. Families had to purchase the plots from BHADA at subsidized rates. 
However, the prospect of getting multiple plots (for each household) in lieu of the 
single plot in the walled city fraught with legal issues seemed attractive to many. 
When such plots were surrendered, the BHADA Town Planner directed the TPO to 
record the changes, and used this to solve other issues or include the change in the list 
of plots BHADA was entitled to sell as part of the TPS process.  
 
BHADA also organized three lok darbars (people‘s courts), starting on August 
29, 2003. Each day, approximately 50 to100 people attended the courts. It proved to 
be a momentous task for BHADA officials as described by the CEO of BHADA: 
 
I realized that it‘s very difficult to address their grievances when they come 
in such high numbers. If there are five people, I can solve, but if there are 50, 
even then I can solve only five, maybe less… Manpower available to me was 
only so much. Mr. X [Town Planner of BHADA] was there. I was the signing 
authority. So the deciding authority was only one… Even if I cannot solve 
their problem, I still have to listen to them. I cannot drive them away. They 
have come to me. I listen to them for three to four hours. But even after three 
hours if I am not saying anything they will think that the authority is not 
doing anything. But they do not know the magnitude of work that we were 
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doing. To see the information of these 50 to 60 people on the computer, even 
the computer takes some time, right? Looking at the problem is not solving 
the problem. We had just setup a process to understand the problems, so 
when we see one, we try to understand it.
154
 
 
He continued to explain how they proceeded with solving individual problems: 
 
Sometimes a few changes here and there could solve the issues. No doubt we 
didn‘t have the authority to change the law, but [we did it] in good faith. . . . 
For example, if someone had an issue with the entry to his plot, because the 
authority had plots in all corners, we could give the gentleman entry to his 
plot. There were plots marked for sale for commercial or residential purposes. 
So if he was rich enough, we would ask him to pay for the whole plot or 20 
or 30 m
2
. But if he was not, then we would allow 2 m
2
 just for the entry. 
After three lok darbars for grievance redressal, we were in a position to know 
the facts. Later on, some people got their records updated, but wouldn‘t help 
no? The TP Schemes were already announced.
155
 
 
According to the planning consultant, despite the fact that there were ―horrible‖ 
errors in the final plan that was demarcated on the ground, because of their docile 
nature, people of Bhuj were generally very cooperative in finding solutions or 
accepting the changes. For the cases that were hard to resolve, the Town Planner often 
persuaded the owners to surrender their plots in exchange for plots in the relocation 
sites. In most cases people accepted his offer.
156
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In order to resolve the problems related to town planning, GUDC expedited 
infrastructure development in the relocation sites to encourage more residents to move 
to the sites and surrender their plots in the walled city (gamtal). GUDC Planner 
explained how they used the plots in the relocation sites to resolve problems 
associated with the TPSs: 
 
We had an idea that people would want to shift in case they get that plot [in 
the relocation site]. So what we did was that while the preparation of TPS 
was going on we started servicing the land in one of the relocation sites. So, 
people saw good quality roads, light, water, good schools, etc. which they 
could not dream of in the gamtal. Then people started surrendering their land 
[plots], which had actually created [made available] a lot of land for other 
facilities within the TPS. Also, the level of deduction [percentage] that had to 
be applied to the plots [in the TPSs in the walled city] could be reduced…and 
so the timing is important.
157
 
 
Even if one were to construct a house within the city, it could not be done unless 
the government published the Preliminary TPSs.  By that time the government had 
started developing the relocation sites. The resolution of TPS-related problems could 
have been relatively easy had the relocation sites been developed earlier and people 
opted for plots there.
158
 
 
In certain cases, dedensification of the old city happened without government 
intervention. Several private housing colonies arose outside the walled city, along the 
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periphery. Many sold their property within the walled city at rates higher than what the 
government was offering as part of the town planning process and moved to these 
housing societies. Others moved in groups, as in the case of the affluent business 
community of Jains who built a township nearly 10 km from Bhuj (beyond 
Madhapar), on land that was purchased even before the earthquake.
159
 Daudi Bohras, 
who lived in the northern part of the walled city which was heavily damaged in the 
earthquake, moved to a new settlement in the outskirts of Bhuj, nearly 8 km from the 
city center.
160
  Such moves, whether community-wide or individual families moving to 
new private developments, did not always ―free up‖ plots that could be used for 
solving problems related to Town Planning Schemes. In the northern part of the city, 
where the devastation was much greater, not much out-migration happened in the case 
of the Muslim or the dalit population, with the exception of tenants who had no 
property rights.
161
 The entire administrative machinery focused its energies on 
attending to the complaints from the residents so that the Final TPSs could be 
published. 
 
Final town planning schemes. Once the Physical Plan was prepared and approved 
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by the state government, the financial details needed to be worked out for each Town 
Planning Scheme. This involved settlement of compensation to plot owners for 
deductions in plot area, and calculation of incremental contribution (50% of property 
value increase due to implementation of the TP Scheme) to be paid by individual 
property owners to the government based on the Original Plot (OP) and Final Plot 
(FP) values determined as part of the Draft Scheme Preparation. Typically, the base 
price was fixed by the Town Planning and Valuation Department, and not by the 
ADA. But in Gujarat, this was not always the case as explained by the Town Planner 
of BHADA: 
 
In Gujarat, the Valuation Department does not have a strangle hold on the 
valuation process. The Authority [Area Development Authority] can fix its 
own price. If it is undervalued, then it leads to a scam. But if the Authority 
makes more money than expected then nobody is going to press any 
charges.
162
 
 
In each TPS, valuation is done for the entire scheme area. The sales records for 
the past five years are taken and average of the highest and lowest values is 
determined. This forms the basis for calculating the final plot values. Individual 
property values are then be calculated depending on its exact location, types of 
uses/facilities in its vicinity, accessibility, etc. As a result, property values in a TP 
Scheme would vary significantly across the scheme area. While such fine tuning of 
property values was possible, in Bhuj it depended on the TPOs of each scheme. 
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The recorded value of property in most places in Gujarat, including cities, was 
mostly around 10 to 20% of the market value. Prior to the earthquake, the jantri value 
(value based on official land evaluation) inside the walled city was around Rs. 100 to 
200 per m
2
 for the entire city, whereas the actual values in certain locations were as 
high as Rs. 10,000 per m
2
. Since the values indicated in the sales records were much 
lower than actual market values, for the purpose of TPS, the government decided to 
indicate the actual value (100%) on the land records so that the recorded prices were 
closer to the market values.
163
 Hence, the valuation process in itself led to a drastic 
appreciation of land values of the final plots as laid out in the physical plan.  
 
In order to calculate the compensation to be paid to property owners (in lieu of the 
deductions applied to their plots) as well as the incremental contribution to be paid by 
the owners to the government, the planning consultants in consultation with BHADA 
used previously recorded jantri prices as the base price for the Original Plots, but used 
the adjusted values (that reflected the actual prices) for the Final Plots. This resulted in 
huge differences between the original and final plot values. It meant, if a property 
owner surrendered a portion of his or her plot in the main locality, the compensation 
he or she would receive as per the jantri was significantly lower than what BHADA 
would receive when that surrendered piece of land was sold at rates based on the Final 
Plot value. Such sales were done through auctions where commercial interests 
artificially increased the values, thereby letting BHADA make a profit.  
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Land values established by the auctions were soon reflected in the real estate 
market, fuelling a significant rise across the city. People who wanted to purchase land 
adjacent to their property (other than what was allocated as the final plot) for various 
reasons—including privacy concerns, building a work shed, getting direct access to 
the street (as the original access to the street might have been lost in the town planning 
process), etc.—had to pay exorbitant rates.164 Many involved in the town planning 
process considered this dramatic increase in land values an inevitable outcome. The 
town planning consultant for Bhuj explained why it was in the public interest to 
maximize the values: 
 
You have to feel the market and maximize the benefit. That is also in the 
public interest to maximize the profit. Suppose you reduce the value saying 
that people in the locality can only afford a lower value, then how do you set 
the price, whom do you sell to? I understand the public sentiment. Because if 
I have a plot and I surrender a portion of my plot as part of the TPS, and then 
I see a plot created from the surrendered piece of land being sold at a value 
that I cannot afford, I get angry because that was part of my plot. However, if 
you look at it from the municipality‘s point of view, the revenues from the 
sale of plots have to at least partly compensate for the infrastructure costs.
165
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In Bhuj, the revenue from the sale of plots was used to pay the salaries of ADA 
employees as well as meeting other expenses related to water supply and drainage at 
the temporary relocation site, water supply at other relocation sites, removal of 
temporary shelters, and other work related to reconstruction.
166
 The money was also 
used to repay the World Bank loan. 
 
The process of development of relocation sites happened simultaneously with the 
town planning process in the walled city. These alternative sites were created as part 
of the decongestion objective of GERRP. Several factors influenced people‘s 
decisions to relocate, even when the location of the sites were not known. Many 
residents did not want to continue living in the same location because of fear of 
earthquakes. Overall perception was that the walled city was unsafe. Decision to 
relocate was also driven by emotion. Many did not want to live in the walled city 
anymore because someone dear had died there. When asked about their desire to 
relocate, many residents indicated that they would like to move provided they got a 
space near ―their people.‖ Public sentiments about relocation did not suggest clear 
differences between the higher and lower income groups.
167
  
 
Several residents decided to stay in the city. They had been living there for some 
time, their friends and relatives lived close by, and theirs was a close-knit society. 
Another significant factor was travel distance. If people with shops or other 
commercial establishments within the walled city moved out, they would have to 
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travel at least 20 to 30 minutes to get to their workplace. However, if they lived within 
the city they would not have to commute. 
 
Despite their initial hesitance to move farther away from the walled city, due to 
the complex issues associated with the TPSs, many residents realized that it was easier 
to rebuild their homes if they chose to relocate. Some moved because their house was 
going to be demolished and they wanted to act quickly. So the only option was to 
move to the relocation site. In cases were several households were living in the same 
house, each occupying a small portion of it, in a joint family setup, if the final plot was 
too small for all of them to be accommodated in the same place, the families opted to 
move to relocation sites. By 2006, of the 2,000 complaints, less than 50 remained 
unresolved and those were to be taken care of in the varied scheme.
168
 
 
In the next section, I examine the processes related to the development of the 
relocation sites, and the reconstruction of houses by those who moved to these sites. 
 
Relocation Sites of Bhuj 
 
Relocation was to be done on a voluntary basis. In the end of May and early June 
2001, in order to determine the extent of relocation, EPC surveyed a stratified random 
sample constituting 10% of the households of the entire city (including BHADA area), 
stratified by location (ward-wise) and income.. The questionnaire covered a host of 
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socio-economic characteristics as well as desire to relocate and individuals‘ visions of 
how the city will/shall change.
169
 Since property records typically do not indicate 
religion of the owner, in each municipal ward random sampling was done for Hindu 
and Muslim areas. Statistical analysis indicated that approximately 3,500 households 
were likely to opt for voluntary relocation. The town planning consultant explained 
how the final numbers were arrived at: 
 
During town planning, we had to determine the extent of demolition required 
to accommodate the new roads, infrastructure, etc. 150 plots could not be 
accommodated even in terms of the Final Plot. Clearly this number was much 
smaller than the number of households that were willing to relocate. So we 
took the 3,500 as the minimum number we would cater to in terms of 
relocation, added a little leeway and decided to go with 4,000 households.
170
 
 
The urban rehabilitation package offered plots at specific relocation sites to both 
homes and businesses that wished to relocate from the walled city and to those who 
were affected by the town planning proposals. Town planning activities such as road 
widening and provision of open spaces required partial or total demolition of several 
buildings. In case of private housing, owners of fully collapsed (G-5 category) houses 
or those to be pulled down (G-4 category) were given the option of relocation. 
 
New Development Control Regulations prohibited construction of any structure 
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higher than G+1 (ground floor plus one) in the entire area under the jurisdiction of the 
Area Development Authority. In the case of individual dwelling units under G-5 
category, owners were given housing assistance as per the government package and 
were allowed to rebuild in the same area. In the case of multiple dwelling units or 
apartments under G-5 category, new Development Control Regulations necessitated 
the relocation of some dwelling units, due to reduction of Floor Space Index (FSI). 
This meant that people who lived in multistoried buildings now had to be 
accommodated either in the existing multistoried buildings that survived the 
earthquake or in new sites. Due to the extensive damage suffered by multistoried 
buildings, several households who owned apartments in such buildings had to be 
relocated.  
 
The Town Planner of BHADA elaborated on the ―luring‖ tactic that was widely 
employed to convince people to move to the relocation sites: 
If you have 10 m
2
 here [in the walled city], why should you go out if you are 
given 10 m
2
 outside [in the relocation site]? So a policy was made, that if you 
have land up to 100 m
2
, you will be given 100 m
2
. Even if you have 1 m
2
, if 
you surrender it [to BHADA], you can take 100 m
2
 at very subsidized price 
[in the relocation site].
171
 
 
According to the government package, beneficiaries holding less than 100 m
2
 of 
land were offered 100 m
2
 and those holding more than 100 m
2
 as well as apartment 
owners were offered 125 m
2
 if they opted for a relocation site nearby, and 150 m
2
 in 
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case they opted for a relocation site that was more than two kilometers from the inner 
city. Beneficiaries with landholdings greater than 125 m
2
 were given the option to buy 
additional 25 m
2
 at market rates (finalized by the district level land price committee) 
subject to availability. 
 
Plots were allotted to beneficiaries based on the existing Jantri plus the 
development charges at a rate of Rs. 300 per m
2
. Land values were significantly higher 
in the walled city compared to the relocation sites. Those who were eligible for plots 
in the relocation sites either paid BHADA the difference in price between the plot 
surrendered in the walled city and the plot in the relocation site, or they were paid the 
difference by BHADA. 
 
Selection of sites. Identification of sites and assessment of the extent of 
relocation took place simultaneously. The government package specified that 
whenever possible government land would be used for relocation. However, 
identification of government land was difficult because records did not clearly state 
which lands were public and which were privately owned. Based on the advice of a 
retired revenue officer, GUDC put total station survey equipment in three or four 
locations to create an impression (if this was not government land) that the land was 
being taken by the government, thereby forcing the owners to come forward to 
establish their claims. Thus, through a process of elimination, government land was 
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identified in different parts of the city.
172
 
 
From this initial list, possible sites were identified that were large enough to 
accommodate a settlement layout. During public consultations, people had expressed 
the desire to move to places where members of the same community or compatible 
communities lived. For example, the Jains would not go to the North because it was 
inhabited mostly by Muslims and lower-caste Hindus. Brahmins would not go there 
either. Hence, it was important to identify sites in different locations where people 
from all communities who wanted to relocate could do so without compromising their 
communal sensitivities.  
 
Therefore, EPC used seven criteria to arrive at the final list of relocation sites. 
These criteria were: availability of government land, availability of large contiguous 
patches of land, community compatibility, availability of water, accessibility, and two 
vulnerability parameters. On the basis on these, seven separate sites spread across the 
city were identified. Following this, documents pertaining to all seven were submitted 
to the government, for the land to be transferred to BHADA for development of the 
relocation sites (see Map 8 and Table 3 for the details of these seven sites).
173
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Map 8:   Proposed Relocation Sites for Bhuj (Source: BHADA, 2001a). 
Table 3:  Proposed Relocation Sites for Bhuj (Source: BHADA, 2001a). 
 Location Approximate 
area 
(m
2
) 
Approximate no. 
of plots that can 
be accommodated 
1 Near Rawalwadi and Kailash Nagar 977,164 3,909 
2 South of Bhujio behind the RTO 122,158 489 
3 Off the Mundra Road, behind the BSF 
camp 
306,009 1,224 
4 South of GEB 143,024 572 
5 Between police quarters and jail quarters 321,741 1,287 
6 South of Bhujio near NRI Nagar 172,125 689 
7 On the Bhuj-Madhapr Road near the 
military area 
498,722 1,995 
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From the initial list of seven sites, four were approved by the government, of 
which only three were developed by BHADA. The CEO of GSDMA explained why 
only three of the four sites were chosen for development: 
 
The rest were not required, because the northern side has nothing. Northern 
side, there is not enough space. Western side there is the army cantonment. 
Eastern side has the airport and Air Force. The city can grow only towards 
the South. [In the list of four sites there was one in the North] But that [site 
identified in the North] was very small. It was just pure availability of land. 
Better and bigger chunks of land were available in the South. Where the army 
cantonment is present, they also have underground storage facilities . . . so in 
effect there is very little land available there.
174
 
 
However, the planning consultant had a different story of what happened once the 
list of seven possible sites for relocation was submitted to the state government for 
approval:  
 
…something went on in the government and what came out of the black box 
was that all seven were not possible, you start with these three. These sites 
were Mundra Road, Rawalwadi, and RTO. There was no site in the North 
[Site 2 on Map 8] which we were slightly concerned about as a lot of 
Muslims lived in the north. But that was partly a political decision and they 
said that the site available on the northern side, south of the airport, had a lot 
of encroachments, mostly scattered encroachments. If that was the problem 
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then they could have solved it. But they did not solve it. They said nothing 
could be done and so we backed out and gave it up. Which meant all the 
Muslims in the northern part of the city will get readjusted in the city itself. 
We accepted that and we moved ahead.
175
 
 
The town planner of BHADA attributed Muslims‘ insecurity after the 2002 
Godhra riots in Gujarat (where Muslims were targeted) and their religious practices as 
reasons why Muslims did not move to any of the three relocation sites, without giving 
a reason as to why the site on the northern side was not chosen. Yet he too agreed with 
the planning consultant that had there been a site closer to the walled city on the 
northern side, many of the Muslim families from the walled city might have relocated. 
Many had expressed a desire to relocate if the site were within half a kilometer, as 
they did not want to go any farther (their dependence on the walled city for their 
livelihood being a major factor). According to the consultant, if alternative locations 
had been developed, nearly 40% of Muslims would have moved out. This would have 
been a desirable scenario for the planner as it would have meant more plots available 
to resolve TPS-related issues. However, the request for an alternative site came from 
the Muslim community leaders towards the end of his stint at BHADA. Also, by that 
time the finances available for the development of relocation sites had been 
exhausted.
176
 
 
Despite all the apprehension about the decision to drop the fourth site, all the 
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agencies accepted that the three relocation sites would be these: near the Road 
Transport Office (RTO), Mundra Road (a highway that connects Bhuj with the port 
town of Mundra in the south of Kachchh), and Rawalwadi. 
 
Development of sites and plot allocation. Once the three relocation sites 
were finalized, the process of infrastructure development and demarcation of plots 
began. The sites would be developed based on the concept of township because the 
estimated population in each of the three sites was greater than 5,000. The total 
estimated population for the three sites was increased from the initial figure of 40% to 
65 to 70% of the walled city population in order to accommodate future growth. The 
final layouts were prepared by the town planner of BHADA. 
 
In the development of the sites, most of the road alignments were designed to 
require minimum excavation and filling of land. However, because of errors in 
surveying contours used in determining road alignments, in some places such as the 
Rawalwadi relocation site, infrastructure contractors had to cut through a huge hill 
where the cutting and filling alone cost 4 crores (approximately US $800,000). 
According to the planning consultant, a little more time and effort spent on that survey 
could have saved a huge amount of money.
177
 
 
New roads, water lines, and sewers would be laid in all three sites with ADB 
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funds. As the infrastructure work progressed, simultaneously, the process of 
determining the beneficiaries, people who would get plots in the relocation sites, 
began, and this was followed by the actual allocation of plots.  
 
Once the sites were declared by the government, those eligible for plots in the 
relocation sites were asked to choose from the three options. Most people opted for the 
site at RTO because of its higher development potential and proximity to the city.
178
 
RTO was referred to as gold, Mundra as silver, and Rawalwadi as bronze.
179
 
 
When it came to the allocation of plots to eligible beneficiaries, EPC proposed 
public outreach in order to inform people of the availability of plots in the relocation 
sites and the possibility of people moving to them in groups, instead of as individual 
families. Despite the history of communal living in the walled city, the question of 
whether to encourage the movement of people in groups posed a serious dilemma to 
the planners. The executive director of EPC elaborated on this: 
 
When we were looking into this issue of communal living, the dilemma was 
like this: If I encourage people to move in groups, then they will move in 
close-knit communities, which means you are creating homogenous 
communities. These communities automatically draw a mental boundary 
around them. So you are encouraging separation of religious and caste-based 
community groups. If you mix them randomly, then you have a mix of 
culturally incompatible people living next to each other and creating potential 
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conflicts in the future.
180
 
 
EPC offered to help BHADA consolidate groups and then do the allocation of 
plots. They also volunteered to help design sets of plots for each group, so that the 
layout of neighborhoods of the Walled City could be retained or modified based on the 
requirements of the group.
 
They suggested that BHADA hire an NGO to do this. 
Although EPC was asked to design a process that allowed for this, the layout EPC 
proposed was rejected by the government because of higher costs it entailed.
181
 The 
planning consultant elaborated on why it was a missed opportunity: 
 
They [state government] didn‘t like the idea. There was a strong feeling that 
we [government or consultants appointed by the government] shouldn‘t get 
into all this. Sociologically, it was very obvious. You had the falias inside 
[the walled city] and then you are creating something new [in the relocation 
sites] which is drastically different from what is inside. There was a 
possibility of people getting involved in determining what kind of community 
system they wanted to create. The opportunity was lost. Then we also thought 
if there is so much resistance to this, why the hell we as consultants should 
push for it so much.
182
 
 
Cost was cited as the reason for not accepting the layout and the process proposed 
by EPC. The executive director of EPC continued to explain why it was not just a 
matter of the cost: 
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They [the state government] looked at it [the proposed process and layout for 
group allocations in the relocation sites] and said it is too costly, we‘ll do it 
ourselves. They obviously didn‘t want to give us an additional contract. 
Second was that they wanted the allocation power within their control. The 
earliest official in charge of BHADA, the first CEO followed the process that 
was adopted in Gandhi Nagar [the state capital] for the allocation of plots 
which was random through draw of lots. We suggested groups . . . 
negotiation with groups. Finally what happened was something in between. 
There was some randomness to it, but also some accommodation of the 
people who came in groups.
183
 
 
The land was allotted by the drawing of lots, with priority given to families that 
had to be relocated due to town planning and development regulations. Despite 
BHADA‘s indifference to group allocations, requests from many groups (defined by 
caste or religious sects) were accepted for group allocation of plots. The town planner 
of BHADA elaborated on the rationale for the change of attitude: 
 
Swaminarayan community [followers of a powerful Hindu sect, most 
prevalent in Gujarat] got 200 plots, Rajgor community is there, they have got 
some 50 . . .  lohana community is there . . . they have gotten some 100 to 
200. We tried to give first preference to them, because our assumption was 
that if community comes then the sites would develop. We are not bothered 
[by] which community. We tried to relocate them in such a way that if land is 
there they get plots of their choice. Individuals, even if they decide to go [to 
the relocation site], he might construct [the house], he might not. But when 
groups move in it will attract more people to move in, too. In every relocation 
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site you‘ll see that certain category of houses that are similar. They belong to 
the same group.
184
 
 
Despite the ―attractive‖ offer, many residents, including those who were allotted 
plots in the relocation sites, hesitated to move or construct houses. This was 
particularly true in the case of relocation sites located farther from the walled city. 
People were skeptical about the development potential of the relocation sites, and did 
not want to risk losing their high value property in the walled city for a plot in an area 
they hardly knew. Hence, many waited to see how the sites developed and if others 
were moving in.  
 
The pace of development of the walled city was a major factor that influenced the 
move to the relocation sites. The longer it took for Town Planning Schemes to be 
implemented, the more people started to consider that moving to relocation sites was a 
better option. According to the planning consultant, larger plots, location on either the 
ring road or very close to it, and better chances of future development attracted those 
who understood what the development plan implied and the economic logic of roads. 
The new roads were predicted to bring businesses as well as houses outside the city, a 
planning logic expected to appeal to the mercantile ethos of the residents (Yagnik and 
Sheth, 2006). 
 
In the case of commercial uses in the relocation sites, the layout plan made 
provision for commercial establishments in specific locations by designating areas for 
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shops. However, there was no specific package for allotting plots for commercial uses 
in the relocation sites. Although BHADA had set aside land for commercial uses in 
each site, it did not have the funds to construct the shops. At the same time, the option 
of auctioning the plots for sale was not considered. Efforts by particular progressive 
administrators to integrate the development of relocation sites with provision of 
employment options to low-income service providers were not approved by the state 
agencies. Suggestions to provide housing for those engaged in such unskilled labor 
(mostly household work) were also rejected by state government agencies. 
 
Later on, under the initiative of the district collector, following a tendering 
process, a prominent real estate firm was given the contract to construct shops in all 
three sites. 250 shops were constructed in each of the three relocation sites, 50% of 
which would be government-owned and 50% were to be sold by the real estate firm at 
market rates. These shops were not just meant to service the relocation sites, but to 
facilitate the decongestion of the walled city by providing alternatives for businesses 
to relocate. While this worked largely in the case of shops constructed in the RTO site, 
primarily owing to its proximity to the city center and also its location on a main 
highway, shops in other relocation sites remained mostly unoccupied even many years 
after their construction. 
 
Construction of houses. The relocation sites were announced simultaneously, 
but development of the sites took two to three years. While the allocation of plots by 
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BHADA began in 2002, the construction of houses took place from 2004 to 2005.
185
 
In RTO, where beneficiaries were primarily owners from the walled city, housing 
construction progressed faster. In Mundra relocation site, construction of houses 
would gain momentum when the religious organization, Bochasanvasi Akshar 
Purushottam Swaminarayan Sanstha (BAPS), an NGO within the Swaminarayan sect 
of Hinduism, decided to build houses for its followers.
186
 Rawalwadi, the farthest from 
the city center, had the least number of houses. When plots were allotted,, many 
people were financially incapable of constructing houses. 
 
The government built a temporary relocation site near the Gujarat Industrial 
Development Corporation (GIDC), known as the hungami awas, which continued to 
house families that did not have the resources to purchase plots or construct houses. In 
2003, awas had nearly 1,500 families from various communities, mostly economically 
weaker tenants. The site also housed a number of new immigrants from various slums 
and nearby villages, plus some communal riot victims from other parts of Gujarat 
(Theckethil, 2004). They lived in harsh conditions awaiting assistance from the 
government or NGOs to re-establish their homes and lives. Most low-income tenants 
did not receive any financial assistance except for their joint check issued by the Chief 
Minister in the names of the owner and tenant. Many tenants who could not get the 
owner to reconstruct the house and allow them to continue as a tenant were largely 
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unsuccessful in finding other housing options.
187
 Therefore, they continued to live in 
the temporary relocation site in the shelters constructed by community organizations 
and other NGOs.  
 
Owing to the efforts of the district collector, several NGOs, such as Gems and 
Jewelers, CARITAS, Rotary, and Kutch Yuvak Sangh (Kutch youth group), agreed to 
construct houses at the relocation sites, mostly for tenants and low-income owners, 
especially in Rawalwadi.  
 
The details of housing construction, completely or partially funded by NGOs, in 
all three relocation sites and the temporary relocation site (unofficial fourth relocation 
site) are as follows: 
 
Table 4: Houses constructed by NGOs in relocation sites (Source: compiled with data  
                                                                                           from BHADA, 2008) 
 
 Donor 
Name 
Type of 
house 
Plot 
Size 
No. of 
Houses 
Funding 
Scheme 
Beneficiary 
Rawalwadi Rotary 
Rebuild 
Trust 
1 R-K 100    
m
2 
157 Construction 
cost borne by 
NGO 
Low-income 
tenants 
 CARITAS 1 R-K 100 
m
2
 
200 Construction 
cost borne by 
NGO 
Low-income 
tenants 
 Gems & 
Jewelry 
 
2 R-K 100 
-150 
m
2 
372 Construction 
cost 50-50 by 
NGO & 
beneficiary 
Tenants, 
owners 
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 Kachchh 
Yuvak 
Sangh 
250 Sq.ft 
built-up 
area 
100 
m
2 
85 Construction 
cost Rs. 
90,000 by 
NGO 
Tenants, 
owners 
R.T.O BAPS 2 R-K 100 
n
2 
45 Rs. 75000 to 
BAPS by 
beneficiary 
Tenants, 
owners who 
are followers 
of BAPS 
Mundra 
Road 
BAPS 2 R-K 100 
m
2 
290 Rs. 75000 to 
BAPS by 
beneficiary 
Tenants, 
owners who 
are followers 
of BAPS 
GIDC KNNA 1R-K 65 
m
2 
280 Construction 
cost borne by 
NGO 
Tenants, 
owners, 
informal 
settlers 
displaced by 
Development 
Plan  
 Hindu 
Samaj 
Britain 
1R-K 65 
m
2 
92 Construction 
cost borne by 
NGO 
Tenants, 
owners, 
informal 
settlers 
displaced by 
Development 
Plan  
 
 
By end of 2006, all the TP Schemes were finalized by the Urban Development 
Department. GUDC, the agency responsible supervising infrastructure work, closed its 
office in Bhuj. In 2008, all relocation sites were incorporated into the Municipality of 
Bhuj, and responsibility of provision of services and maintenance of infrastructure was 
officially transferred to the municipality. 
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Table 5: Progress of reconstruction in the relocation sites (Source: BHADA, 2008) 
 R.T.O Rawalwadi Mundra 
Road 
G.I.D.C TOTAL 
No. of plots created 705 1739 1259 755 4458 
No. of plots allotted 
by BHADA 
697 1718 1216 755 4386 
Building 
permissions granted 
673 1500 991 372 3536 
No. of houses 
constructed 
668 1485 983 372 3508 
 
 
GERRP provided the overall policy and institutional framework for the post-
earthquake town planning processes in Bhuj. Despite GERRP‘s multi-sectoral 
approach to earthquake rehabilitation,   its focus in Bhuj was on physical restructuring 
of the city and construction of a road network (along with sewer and water lines). 
Housing and infrastructure development (primarily the road network) received the 
attention of the implementing agencies while ambitious efforts of the consultants to 
incorporate vulnerability reduction of ‗natural‘ environment, heritage conservation, 
needs of slum dwellers, etc. would remain largely on paper. 
 
The processes of physical restructuring also reflected the political nature of 
decision-making associated with town planning with regard to relocation or in-situ 
reconstruction, selection of relocation sites, their allocation, etc. We also find in Bhuj 
hesitation of state actors to engage with the social realities of the earthquake-affected 
population, whether in the rejection of a relocation site in the northern part of the city 
or in a mixed response toward facilitation of communal living in relocation sites. 
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Poorly maintained land records and outdated property ownership records along 
with inaccurate damage assessment, which served as the basis for the plan preparation, 
would severely challenge the application of rational planning mechanisms for 
earthquake rehabilitation. Yet, the urgency to rebuild faster, along with deadlines 
mandated by the Town Planning Act and the overall program, did not allow for 
rectifying such ―mistakes.‖ It would take extra-legal problem solving to bring down 
the number of applications filed against town planning.  
 
It required initiatives of particular administrators at BHADA— the district 
collector (by inviting NGOs to build houses in the relocation site of Rawalwadi, and 
expediting service provision at the site to attract people to move there) and the town 
planner—to resolve problems created by town planning and hasten the pace of 
housing construction. Allocation of plots in the relocation sites at subsidized rates, in 
exchange for plots in the walled city, served as the greatest ―bargaining chip‖ held by 
the administrators. 
 
Having given an overview of the town planning processes in Bhuj, specifically 
the preparation and implementation of Development Plan and Town Planning 
Schemes, the next chapter explores the dynamics of decision-making pertaining to 
post-disaster planning and implementation in urban areas such as Bhuj. It asks if 
disasters offer a window of opportunity to implement rational planning measures, and 
it then examines the strategies adopted by various state actors in implementing a 
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program. Negotiations between stakeholders, including those within the state, are 
analyzed to get a nuanced understanding of the workings of the state as well as the 
challenges and opportunities of undertaking urban planning in a post-disaster context. 
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CHAPTER 5 
POLITICAL PROCESS OF URBAN PLANNING IN BHUJ 
 
Does the technical and legal nature of town planning mechanisms, such as 
development plans and town planning schemes, offer the planners and administrators 
in charge of their implementation immunity from political processes at play? Do 
disasters offer a ―window of opportunity‖ to undertake otherwise hard-to-implement 
projects?  
 
The following quote from the planner of GUDC suggests that disasters do not 
automatically lead to adoption of innovative ideas by governments or non-
governmental actors; and in the case of Bhuj, it was the lack of awareness of the 
difficulties involved in the application of town planning mechanisms in a disaster-
affected town that made formal adoption by the Urban Development Department 
possible: 
 
Luckily I feel we were not aware of the sector [urban]. So we got into it and 
we did not know or did not have the experience. Had we gotten the same 
experience which the other departments already had, we probably would have 
had our own resistance, knowing that the sector is complicated. We did not 
know that. So we jumped into it. We did not know the consequences. Slowly 
we realized the consequences.
188
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Planner of GUDC, the nodal agency responsible for the infrastructure 
development under GERRP, disagreed that the disaster context made the process 
easier: ―. . . government honestly will be interested for three, four, five months. 
Beyond six months, you have 1,000 other work to do . . .  and at the highest level you 
cannot monitor everything very closely . . . so yes, initially for sure . . . but after 
sometime, the interest dilutes.‖189 
 
Bureaucratic procedures involved in processes were time-consuming, so that even 
when measures were adopted in principle, it took time to produce visible results. In the 
case of projects as extensive as GERRP, where several institutional actors were 
involved, nothing happened on the ground for the first six to seven months. Hiring a 
contractor to implement the infrastructure project or a planning consultant to initiate 
preparation of the development plans took several months. Yet there was a lot of 
pressure to hire a contractor and for work to be seen on the ground. In the case of 
GERRP, since almost a year was spent in planning, questions were raised about what 
the government was doing, whether progress was being made, whether anything was 
actually being accomplished. Human suffering associated with the earthquake put a lot 
of pressure on state agencies responsible for the implementation of proposed 
interventions to produce fast results.  
 
In general, after disasters, there is initial impetus to adopt innovative solutions, 
but fear of failure often impedes adoption of atypical measures or ones without 
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precedents. Disasters do not always lower resistance to change, especially among state 
actors who are usually in charge of disaster response and long-term rehabilitation. 
Many people in the Town Planning Department of Government of Gujarat were 
opposed to the adoption of Development Plans and Town Planning Schemes in the 
urban areas for earthquake rehabilitation. They considered the longer duration taken 
for the implementation of these as a threat to the project.
190
 
 
Any radical change meant more responsibility and a lot more risk. A higher price 
would be paid for ―failing‖ because of the humanitarian as well as the political 
implications of the task, as elaborated by the GUDC Planner: 
 
In government, failing means charge sheeting. There is nothing like failing. If 
you have not done it on time, within the time, you‘ll be charge sheeted and 
hanged. So it‘s more risky if you are actually moving on an innovative path. 
Innovation, people in the government are always scared of, and innovation 
can happen only when someone at the highest level is driving it; and 
unfortunately people at the highest level always keep moving [getting 
transferred to other departments or ministries (with or without a 
promotion)].
191
 
 
The urban context of the disaster also made many government offices take a back 
seat. Line departments, such as Roads & Buildings and the Civil Supplies Board, were 
asked to implement GERRP in urban areas. However, these departments were largely 
unwilling to do what they were asked because they considered their mandate to be 
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broader than the urban sector. Many within the government were hesitant to get 
involved. They considered the urban sector to be complicated owing to high land 
prices and its already well-developed state, which would render physical restructuring 
complex and highly contentious. 
 
Despite the reluctance of other departments to take up GERRP, the Urban 
Development Department (UDD) spearheaded the urban component of the program. 
Humanitarian implications of a program that would reduce physical vulnerability of 
urban areas of Kachchh to future disasters as well as the opportunity to upgrade its 
infrastructure encouraged the UDD to get involved. This decision was also influenced 
by a lack of awareness of the complexities of such an exercise—especially in a post-
disaster context where swift recovery is the highest priority. 
 
Challenges to the Implementation of Plans 
 
After the earthquake, there was great pressure to release funds to the disaster-
affected, rebuild houses, and create new infrastructure as quickly as possible, as 
indicated by the following quote:  
 
―There is a serious pressure. It is a very palpable pressure to do things fast, to 
finish buildings, to finish roads, to act as fast as possible, and the media also 
contributes to that. Everybody is party to creating that pressure. People think 
that cities are being viewed by the foreign media, there are all kinds of hidden 
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issues here and there and unresolved problems, may be local governments 
have not been that efficient. You want everything to be cleaned up and 
finished in a year. And this was the responsibility at which their [bureaucrats 
and technocrats] political masters were after.
192
 
 
Working under pressure. Pressure to act swiftly also came from donors such as 
the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, which were financing housing 
reconstruction and urban infrastructure, respectively, in the form of their demands to 
release financial assistance to the disaster-affected households and infrastructure 
contractors as quickly as possible even when the plans were not ready or had not been 
communicated to the public. The authorities at the state level also pressed for a more 
rapid disbursement of funds.
193
 This led to the release of housing assistance to the 
earthquake-affected even before people took possession of land to construct houses, 
space was cleared, and the policies regarding reconstruction were clearly understood.  
 
TPS plans were not finalized, and therefore people did not know by how much 
existing roads would be widened, where new streets would be built, and how much 
land would be deducted from their plots. It was very confusing for the people of 
Bhuj.
194
 People often ended up building where they were not supposed to, 
undermining the fundamental idea on which the rehabilitation was centered: 
reconstruction based on improved standards of earthquake resistance and according to 
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urban planning principles. 
 
With regard to the larger policy framework, there were pressures about whether to 
rebuild and whether to relocate. These were handled at various levels by various 
people. But once the policy was made public in April 2001, what mattered was how 
well it was executed. The fast and early formulation of policies helped minimize 
further manipulations. The chances of manipulation could have been greater had the 
deliberations on policies been prolonged.
195
 
 
Questions were also raised about the duration of the program. The multilateral 
donors saw it as a three-year repair and rehabilitation program. However, such a short 
duration would have been inadequate to undertake planned rehabilitation that reduced 
future vulnerabilities to disasters. GUDC Planner elaborated on why it was unrealistic 
to implement GERRP as a three-year program: 
 
If you are defining a program which is of three years, under the ADB 
contract, it would mean that we need to do a DTR [Detailed Technical 
Report], detailed engineering survey, etc. which itself would take up to one 
year . . . you do detailing, you do surveying . . . it will take one year and then 
you float a contract which will take at least two months and then approval 
and all . . . so by the time the contractor is in place, it is almost 1.5 to 2 years. 
For doing a project of this kind, may be putting a cap of three years would 
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have meant they would already be putting pressure on closing [finishing the 
project] . . .  so if people were approaching us with issues, [and if more time 
was spent to resolve them] the project will not be seen as something very 
effective, because a three-year program went to six years. They see that the 
process has been delayed.
196
 
 
While deciding to go for a long-term program, the state actors (including 
government agencies and departments, and consultants) imposed very strict timelines 
on themselves. In the words of the GUDC Planner: ―It was like challenging yourselves 
. . . and we know that it‘s not realistic . . . but still we challenged ourselves and 
decided ‗let us do it‘.197 
 
Working with multiple agencies. Disasters, in general, tend to draw a large 
number of governmental and non-governmental actors with the mandate or desire to 
undertake activities ranging from immediate response and relief distribution to 
reconstruction and long-term recovery. Therefore, one of the key challenges in a post-
disaster situation is to establish mechanisms for coordination among the various actors 
for effective response and recovery. 
 
During the initial days of rehabilitation in Bhuj coordination at the district level 
was of three types: 1) among different agencies working in the district 2) with external 
agencies other than government agencies and 3) with state and central governments. 
During the relief phase, the key priorities were getting regular reports from different 
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parts of the district, channeling assistance to areas that needed the most help (to ensure 
that assistance did not get concentrated in a particular location but got evenly 
distributed throughout the district), and finding out the problems faced by people in 
remote localities and trying to immediately address those. Daily meetings were 
organized with government departments and agencies such as Health and Family 
Welfare, Roads and Buildings, Public Distribution System (PDS), Gujarat Electricity 
Board, Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Transportation. Regular 
interactions were also maintained between the district administration, and the state 
government, central government, multilaterals such as the World Bank and ADB, UN 
agencies, etc. Information regarding the progress of response and relief distribution 
was also disseminated through the media.
198
 
 
For long-term rehabilitation of earthquake-affected areas, coordination 
mechanisms (formal and informal) were established between the actors involved in 
GERRP.  In Bhuj, BHADA operated under the directives of the Urban Development 
Department and GSDMA. On matters related to infrastructure development, including 
repairs and reconstruction, it worked with GUDC. GUDC facilitated coordination 
among various departments, agencies, contractors engaged in infrastructure 
development, ADB (which funded urban infrastructure), and GSDMA (which acted as 
the clearing agency for funds).
199
 Coordination among these agencies also took place 
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through meetings of BHADA‘s governing body.200  
 
Micropolitics of coordination. The context of disaster rehabilitation with its 
broad humanitarian objective of vulnerability reduction allowed for openness as well 
as flexibility in communication among various agencies. Because it was an 
emergency, ―doors were more open and officials bothered less about protocols.‖201 
However, the rules of engagement were not always the same. Channels of 
communication among various agencies and actors were often created out of 
necessity. Interactions were unavoidable when implementing agencies needed 
clearance from other agencies or departments as part of the statutory or bureaucratic 
process associated with GERRP. Despite the state government‘s implicit endorsement 
of the superior quality of work done by GUDC and the consultants, ―processes needed 
to be followed.‖ Plans not only had to be accepted by the ADA as per the Town 
Planning Act, they also had to be sent by the ADA to the district collector to be 
forwarded to the state government for final approval. 
 
Proximity to power or power by virtue of association (with the decision-makers at 
the highest levels of state government—whether politicians or bureaucrats) not only 
allowed specific agencies to dictate the rules, but also make sure that the desired 
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outcomes were achieved. This power allowed agencies like GUDC to elicit 
cooperation from officials of other departments and agencies that were fearful of being 
―shunted out (or transferred)‖ if they did not cooperate.202 
 
At the local level, the newly created BHADA wielded power over local agencies 
and departments engaged in urban planning and infrastructure development and 
elicited their cooperation, primarily owing to the urgency of the project at hand. In the 
case of town planning, BHADA interacted   mainly with the Land and Revenue 
Department, City Survey, and District Inspector of Land Records (DILR).
203
 Because 
of its role as the nodal agency at the local level (mandated by the Town Planning Act) 
and in charge of the implementation of various plans, BHADA required line 
departments to consult with it on all aspects of implementation. This newly conferred 
power was a consequence of the particular circumstance of post-disaster planning 
where there was greater pressure to produce fast results. It was also the result of the 
complex nature of implementation in Bhuj that emerged from the state of land and 
ownership records.  
 
Local administrators had to make decisions at a very fast pace, sometimes without 
consulting their higher-ups and sometimes diverging from decisions made earlier. 
Such actions were unavoidable due to the time constraint. Whenever there were 
changes from what had been decided by higher-level bureaucrats or politicians in 
Gandhi Nagar, the community liaison person of the Collectorate, who was appointed 
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to be the GSDMA camp officer, assisted the CEO of BHADA in communicating the 
ground situations with GSDMA and other state agencies.
204
 
 
In Bhuj, GSDMA had its own independent mechanism to monitor the activities of 
the local authorities. Bhuj was an important place for the administration. A GSDMA 
camp office was set up in Bhuj for the state authorities to be informed of the 
happenings in the field. Inputs were regularly sought from NGOs as well as local 
communities. These were then communicated to the office in Gandhi Nagar. This 
mechanism proved to be helpful in fine-tuning earthquake rehabilitation policies based 
on ground realities.
205
 
 
When urban rehabilitation plans needed to be changed for ―practical‖ 
considerations, donors allowed the implementing agencies, such as GUDC, to make 
those decisions as long as they delivered the agreed results. The GUDC Planner used 
the analogy of an auditor to explain the extent of scrutiny done by donors with regards 
to details of plans: 
 
As far as ADB was concerned, they were more interested in the progress. 
They were not interested in the procedure part of it, the system part of it. To 
ensure that irregularities did not happen, contractors were appointed through 
the standard procedure . . . an auditor sees a few things in a report and he‘ll 
know whether the report is right or wrong . . . Same way ADB also reviewed 
three or four points at critical stages and I think they were very comfortable 
                                                                                                                                            
203
 C. Bhatt (personal communication, Bhuj, February 6, 2008). 
204
 B. Bhatt (personal communication, Gandhi Nagar, March 27, 2007). 
 157 
with us . . . they supported us. Because, basically the end for both us and 
them was delivery. And we have delivered.
206
 
 
For the delivery to be successful, it was crucial to have someone to drive the 
process in accordance with the plans and ensure its implementation. In other words, 
having the ―right‖ officer was as important as the effectiveness of the plans 
themselves. 
 
Having the “Right” Officer 
 
Many attribute the success of Bhuj‘s rehabilitation process to having the right 
officer at every stage of the process. Officers were handpicked at the state level and 
appointed to key positions, such as District Collector of Kachchh, CEO of ADA, 
Town Planning Officer of BHADA, whether they desired it or not. The GUDC planner 
elucidated the politicking involved in one such handpicking process as follows: 
 
Mr. Z [Town Planner of BHADA], he was fixed actually . . . it was not that 
he walked into Kachchh and said, ―I‘ll bell the cat.‖ All the positions, 
whether it was X, Y or Z, those decisions were taken in GUDC . . . they were 
identified in GUDC, and transfer orders were issued from GUDC. Mr. Z . . . 
when the first order came in, he went to the Minister as well as the Chief 
Minister and said that he didn‘t want to work here [in Bhuj] . . . he was in a 
lucrative position in another city. He said he didn‘t want to go. So the 
appointment file came back from the Minister. Minister asked, ―Why Z and 
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why not someone else?‖ We altered his decision through the Principal 
Secretary of UDD. She went to the Minister and told him, ―Nothing doing! 
Only Z and just Z.‖ We told him that if he wanted to win the election, he 
would have to get that person.
207
 
 
Among the key factors that made planned reconstruction of urban areas possible 
were the Principal Secretary of the Urban Development Department‘s familiarity with 
the urban context and difficulties in addressing urban issues due to lack of funds, her 
long stint in the department, and her openness to do something more than repair and 
rehabilitation. Her powerful position and the visibility that the reconstruction program 
offered the government allowed her to influence the state government‘s decisions on 
implementation of GERRP, including selection of the ―right‖ officers.  
 
Despite the formulation of policies, implementation is strongly affected by 
changes in the governance context. With the passage of time, some officers are 
transferred and the focus of the government shifts to other areas. At the state level, 
especially with respect to the Urban Development Department, which oversaw the 
entire town planning and infrastructure development, having the ―right‖ officer meant 
someone to drive the entire process, someone who understood the complexities of 
urban planning and governance mechanisms.
208
 Knowledge of urban issues and 
continuity in officers were critical for successful implementation of the plans. 
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What did it mean to be the ―right‖ officer in the context of earthquake 
rehabilitation of Bhuj? Implementing the plans required assertive officers who could 
drive the process at the local level, be pragmatic enough to solve ―the mess,‖ be tactful 
enough to handle adversaries who might sabotage the process of implementation, and 
yet be sensitive enough not to estrange the public. The ―handpicked‖ officers not only 
had to be able to handle the enormous work involved in disaster rehabilitation, but also 
be honest and not interested in earning a  name for themselves.
209
 The level of 
commitment required was enormous. It called for several personal sacrifices, 
including staying away from family and dear ones for a very long duration and 
working long hours.
210
 
 
During the initial days of the implementation of GERRP‘s urban component at the 
local level, the District Collector, the highest-level administrator at the district level, 
did not have a significant role to play. The processes were entirely controlled by the 
UDD. On the ground, there was absolute lack of clarity as to who was doing what, 
along with a total lack of ownership of the process by all the implementers. The 
GSDMA camp officer who worked closely with the District Collector before assuming 
the role of the camp officer elaborated on the situation as follows: 
 
Nobody really owned it [the process]. ADB took 10 months to setup their 
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office there. It is the usual government procedure. They worked under the 
Urban Development Department. The planners had no business facing the 
community and the District Collector had no role to play. District Collector 
did not control the Urban Development Company [GUDC] which was doing 
major infrastructure development work. He was considered just one of the 
actors . . . not really in charge of anything.
211
 
 
Yet these local administrators, especially the District Collector who was also the 
Chairman of BHADA, were in charge of implementing the plans and policies. The real 
breakthrough came in 2002 with the appointment of the new district collector. Though 
he was in that position just for a year, the new Collector brought an urban focus. First 
and foremost, he asked the Infrastructure Design Consultants to make a presentation to 
the media and to the Collector himself because they had not even done that. The 
Collector‘s office also pressured the consultants to bring the information on town 
planning to the public since people in the city were completely clueless. Although the 
housing assistance package offered a maximum of 1.5 lakhs (Rs. 150,000), most 
people did not understand the different stages of its disbursement or the eligibility 
criteria for each tranche.   
 
GUDC still continued to enjoy a near-autonomous role with respect to urban 
infrastructure development and the district collector was involved minimally. In 2004, 
the District Collector influenced the Government of Gujarat to make him the Joint-
Managing Director of GUDC. This allowed him to have greater say in decisions 
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related to infrastructure development, including expediting the development of the 
relocation sites in conjunction with the town planning processes. While district 
collectors by virtue of their power dominated the local decision-making process, they 
adopted various methods to incorporate local concerns, sometimes explicitly, while 
other times in consultation with specific local actors.
212
 
 
Risks were taken collectively, especially when it was expected to solve the 
problems created by town planning. This, along with the sense of sympathy towards 
the earthquake-affected, helped the local administrators transgress the boundaries of 
legality (with the tacit approval of the state machinery) when it came to 
implementation of plans. They were told: ―Whatever you want you do it, we want 
solutions, we don‘t want problems.‖213 
 
The humanitarian implications of GERRP drew many officers to Bhuj, even those 
who did not agree with the specifics of the intervention. The first CEO of BHADA 
explained why, despite his dissatisfaction with the implementation of TPSs to 
reconfigure Bhuj, he agreed to work there: 
 
When I came to Bhuj, 95% of the plans had already been prepared. My 
relationship [with the state government and the consultants] was neither good 
nor bad. I had decided not to interfere in their process. Jo bhi sahi, galat 
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karna hain, karo. [Whatever right or wrong, do it.] I worried only about the 
people of Bhuj. I was supposed to carry out [implement] only . . . two things 
were important . . . first I have to do it as quickly as possible...second, 
whatever was assigned to me should be done. This was the most important 
thing; whatever I was doing should be for the good of the people of Bhuj. It 
was a very difficult task because around 13,000  to14,000 properties were 
lost. Debris was not entirely cleared. If I had started opposing then, I would 
have been thrown out in the very beginning. So I thought let them do their 
work, I tried to fix the mistakes later.
214
 
 
The officers often pushed their limits of power, sometimes making powerful 
enemies in the process. As long as they stayed within the larger framework of the 
program and made sure ―things happened‖ they were given leeway. But their powers 
did not go unchecked. Their appointers possessed a powerful tool to make sure that 
they did not stray too much: the power to transfer officials.  
 
While being considerate of the needs of the public, many officials found it 
important to maintain distance from the people, including influential groups or 
individuals at the local level. This distance, along with powers delegated by the state 
government and the trust of the people, were considered important by these officials in 
being able to perform their roles effectively.
215
 
 
If the implementers were carefully chosen and controlled, the ―file pushers‖ were 
equally crucial to the project (Weber, 1947). Files related to town planning and 
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infrastructure development projects were very closely followed up by GUDC. Rather 
than leaving it to the system to get clearance, they used their influence or power by 
association to expedite the approval processes. The humanitarian cause attached to the 
decisions often lowered the resistance from approvers. 
 
Protecting the Project from Local Politics 
 
Proponents of decentralized governance claim that greater proximity of local 
government makes it more vulnerable to citizen pressure and makes it easier for 
citizens to become more informed and hence more demanding of good service 
(Tendler, 1997, p. 144-45). But what if the local government itself was considered 
responsible for the problem at hand, here the earthquake-related damages to the 
houses, infrastructure, and the people from uncontrolled physical development that led 
to a city highly vulnerable to earthquakes? The state government preferred to have 
complete control of the earthquake rehabilitation program in order to reduce the power 
of patronage by people in the municipality. BHADA, the newly created body, was 
given the responsibility to grant building permits. When the area outside the municipal 
boundaries (within the jurisdiction of BHADA) got urbanized, requiring extension of 
services and their maintenance, the municipal limits would be extended to include it 
within the Municipality. When this happened, BHADA was to be dissolved and the 
responsibilities handed over to the Municipality.
216
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The GUDC Planner elaborated on why it was important to keep municipal 
officials out of the process of earthquake rehabilitation:  
 
Typically municipalities are responsible for decisions pertaining to 
identification of how much of area is to be taken for water supply, which road 
is to be taken first, etc. . . . that councilor [elected representative from each 
municipal ward] will say my area is very poor, somebody will say this area . . 
.  somebody will say that area . . . so that area will never get finalized. Or 
even if it gets defined, it gets defined confined to interest groups. Then there 
are lots of conflicts as well. So in those conflicts, if even one person doesn‘t 
agree with the other four, the project does not get identified. That is one. 
Second is . . . they [the governing body of the municipality] have all the local 
contractors . . . Influential people, all contractors and builders or those 
associated with the contractors. . . . Public interest gets defeated in the 
process. Though it is good to give autonomy, if the intentions are not right, 
whatever happens, it will all go to waste.
217
  
 
Many state agencies adopted obscurantism as a strategy to ensure that local 
politicians and other interest groups did not interfere with or influence the urban 
infrastructure development and town planning processes.  
 
This is what was told to us as a joke, informally . . . don‘t project yourself 
high, keep a very low profile as if you are not doing anything . . . so we 
always kept a very low profile . . . we never got intoxicated by power. . . so in 
the process we never became a target, never got into a cross-fire. So nobody 
identified me till the entire thing [allocation of projects to contractors] was 
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over, four years.
218
 
 
Agencies safeguarded information about the people responsible for approving 
projects and determining areas for infrastructure development in order to minimize 
political influence over the appointment of contractors. The roles and responsibilities 
of agencies such as GUDC and GSDMA were unclear to most people. By the time 
various individuals figured out the details, 90% of the contractors were identified and 
contracts issued. 
 
Despite all these attempts to keep politics out of the equation, local actors wielded 
influence in ways that undermined public-minded goals of equity and efficiency. 
Though the same political party was in power at the local and state levels, factional 
politics within the party at the local level created problems for the administrative 
machinery in charge of town planning.  
 
One of the members of the State Legislative Assembly declared in a meeting in 
the walled city that town planning was not going to happen and that people could start 
reconstructing their houses. Although they lacked substantive power or the resources 
to prevent town planning later on, such actions affected implementation of policy 
decisions by encouraging public behaviors of inaction and non-participation. Many 
residents started rebuilding homes, often without adhering to the new regulations. 
Some of these homes were later removed to make room for new roads. It required a 
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strong intervention from the District Collector himself to check such misleading 
announcements from the local politicians in the future. However, when town planning 
process was initiated, other aspects of local politics entered the picture. 
 
Many local politicians were real estate developers or owned real estate agencies. 
As elected members of the municipality, they had access to government records 
regarding areas where development was likely to take place. That allowed many of 
them to buy land near these areas at a cheaper rate and reap the benefits later. This 
often happened in collusion with corrupt government officers who could make easy 
money from such land deals.
219
 
 
Planning consultants found themselves in the midst of the very politics of land 
that they thought their technical process was protected from. Various tactics were used 
to stop or stall the planning process, especially if a particular plot was going to be 
affected by a new road or if a building was about to be cut, entailing huge losses to the 
owner. In one such instance, individuals got together and attempted to sabotage the 
first public meeting organized by EPC, as explained by the executive director: 
 
I had just started my presentation. They stormed in with some 10 other 
people, grabbed the microphone from me and said, ―These guys are all bogus. 
There is a lot of politics behind all this. They are showing all these just to 
fool you, the decisions have already been made. All of you should get up and 
walk out,‖ and they all got up. The entire audience stood up. I didn‘t know 
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what to do. Fortunately some other fellow from the audience took the 
microphone back and said, ―What‘s wrong in listening? If we don‘t like it 
there are other methods to fight.‖ People sat down and I finished the 
presentation.
 220
 
 
There were several layers to these political protests. Depending on the situation, 
people with specific interests got together and attempted to influence the process to 
their personal advantage, though on the surface many such acts were camouflaged as 
other issues, including communal ones. Most times it boiled down to politics of 
land.
221
 
 
At the local level, there were two camps within the right-wing party, the BJP. One 
camp was always suspicious that town planning favored the other camp, although no 
interest in the planning process was shown. However, once the Development Plan was 
published and changes were made, there were demands to make specific changes. 
Such pressures were dealt with by the Town Planner of BHADA with assistance from 
the planning consultant, as explained below: 
 
… to his credit, he [Town Planner of BHADA] was as fair as possible. What 
he did was he came to EPC, he used the projector. We covered the wall of the 
conference hall with white paper and projected the plan onto it. We projected 
the AutoCAD plan. Then he would stand on one side and I would stand on 
the other, and we would discuss the alignments and solve issues . . . ―if we do 
it like this we can take more government land.‖ We took those decisions and 
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those decisions got implemented as we discussed. The AutoCAD fellow 
made changes to the maps. Then we went through several rounds. He said, 
―Don‘t ask me why but this has to be done like this.‖ I said okay. At that time 
there was a limit to the number of battles one could pick up.
222
 
 
The EPC Director recounted how changes were made to the road alignment 
outside the walled city to favor particular individuals: 
 
I cannot pinpoint any [changes], I just know it from back-door conversations. 
At least in the case of the Development Plan, we were out by then. That‘s 
when all these changes happened. To justify those changes they often blamed 
the mapping exercise we did as part of the DP preparation. So the errors in 
the mapping served as a convenient excuse to hide behind. In some cases the 
mapping genuinely had issues: lots of little things like adding one road or 
removing one has happened without any basis because somebody was getting 
affected and had sufficient influence to get that road removed from the plan. 
Those were variations and there is a provision in the act that provides for 
variations.
223
 
 
Despite their efforts to have a clean process, the donors found themselves caught 
up in the politics. The GSDMA Camp Officer gave an account of one such instance in 
Bhuj: 
 
The World Bank didn‘t have much to do with the urban areas. They helped 
the housing compensation. Now, ADB had a serious problem. What had 
happened was that, a lot of people on the Hospital Road had written to ADB 
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Manila, so it was a problem for their local office. It was a problem in the 
sense that, in today‘s world anybody can write to anybody. These donors 
overreact. So if there is a complaint about corruption in their local office and 
if it reaches their head office, they go crazy, which is what happened and the 
entire process was very messy, at least for donors. If you want everything to 
be neat and clean, it is difficult. At least the town planning, it was very 
messy, very hands-on and very messy. And there were actual corruption 
cases also. I don‘t know what ADB could have done about it rather than 
ignore it.
224
 
 
Politically powerful local actors continued to influence every step of the planning 
process. The extensive infrastructure development associated with town planning 
offered huge incentives for people to influence the processes. Builders who wanted 
plots to be allotted next to the new roads so that they could use it for commercial 
purposes were willing to pay Rs. 5-10 lakhs to ―get that done.‖225 The GSDMA Camp 
Officer narrated how these played out during the TPO phase: 
 
It [political influence] was there in all these decisions about which plot to cut 
and which not to cut. So there were these eight people, the eight TPOs to 
finalize the TP Schemes. So if you are a serious landowner, you definitely 
had access to them especially if you desired to influence them and some of 
them must have been influenced.
226
  
 
Dealing with communal politics. In 2002, while urban rehabilitation processes 
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were gathering momentum, Gujarat was engulfed in one of the worst communal riots 
in the history of India.
227
 Bhuj and other parts of Kachchh were much more peaceful 
than most other settlements in Gujarat. Historically, there had been little conflict. 
However, as demolition of structures began for the implementation of the 
Development Plan and associated infrastructure works, communal feelings 
manifested. There were accusations from both sides. The Rashtriya Swayamsewak 
Sangh (RSS) accused planners of specifically targeting temples and avoiding mosques 
(mazjid), mausoleums (dargah), and graveyards (kabristan). The Muslims made 
accusations that planners were deliberately targeting their religious structures and 
graveyards.  
 
The CEO of BHADA explained how it was unavoidable to demolish religious 
structures peppered all over the city: 
 
There were so many small temples everywhere and several of them were 
coming in the way of our roads. We avoided demolishing many, but when 
there are so many everywhere, we could not help removing some. Then the 
Hindu organizations came up saying, ―You being a Hindu, how can you 
remove our temple?‖ Our road alignments have equally affected the dargahs 
[mausoleums] and mazjids [mosques]. We have demolished that also. At least 
50 to 60 dargahs were removed.
228
 
 
The executive director of EPC explained how they dealt with such allegations at 
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the planning phase: 
 
We had to document and actually show both communities how many 
religious facilities were getting affected. We had to justify each and every 
case. It was a very touchy [sensitive] issue. We tried to avoid all religious 
structures as far as possible, but where we had to, we did it. But the point is 
that when the demolition started we sensed it that here were lobbies that cut 
across lines of religion. The whole communal politics was just a façade to 
other interests.
229
 
 
BHADA encountered opposition from other communal groups as well. Certain 
caste groups, such as the nagars and lohanas who were legally sound and politically 
strong, vehemently protested the demolition of part of the gateway to their temple. 
One of the ring roads within the walled city required demolition of part of the temple 
gate. Despite the strong protests, under the initiative of the then CEO of BHADA, 
protesters were convinced of the significance of widening the road and the gate was 
rebuilt after setting aside room for road widening.
230
 
 
Except for one altercation between the police and protestors, most of the 
demolitions happened calmly. The CEO of BHADA explained how this was dealt with 
by the administration:  
 
There was a little bit of issues here and there when we started [demolitions]. 
It is definitely the people of Bhuj . . . but it was also the boldness [of the 
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district administrator]. We never tried to deviate from the decision to 
demolish. We called the people, and with their help removed it. And people 
have cooperated . . . they didn‘t do much protest. . . .  Anywhere else if 
dargahs are removed, communal riots happen. But here so many were 
removed . . . we were also giving them alternatives. When we demolish a 
temple, we even asked donors to construct temples in the new location . . . in 
fact those structures are much better than the previous ones. So they used to 
accept it. . . . It‘s not by book that we have followed. Along with persuasion, 
we had to be practical.
231
 
 
Dealing with various community groups was considered a very ―sensitive‖ issue 
to be avoided by all means. The Chief Relief Coordinator explained why one should 
refrain from getting involved in such politics:  
 
One should not get into social issues too much, because it leads into other 
issues like caste issues . . .  So it‘s better that one deals with issues in a very 
professional way . . . the problems one has to address and the practicalities of 
implementation. People started to realize it and it was much easier to 
implement it too with the same quality of results. . . . In our discussions such 
references (about community groups with strong negative sentiments towards 
each other) were avoided. People also realized it and they never got into such 
discussions. Subconsciously everyone thinks about it, but in terms of 
expressing it, they were quite restrained from discussing it.
232
 
 
However, despite the local administration‘s efforts not to explicitly encourage 
community-wise relocation, one of the consequences of town planning was a 
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reification of community as defined by caste (in the case of Hindus) and other 
subcategories (in the case of Muslims and Jains). The GSDMA Camp Officer 
elaborated on how that happened: 
 
One thing that happened was that people stuck to their communities. When 
they relocated they relocated in groups, so some kind of a ghettoization as 
one might say took place. So in their sheris [street/neighborhood], they were 
mixed, now there is only one caste living. So there was a caste as well as a 
religious angle to it. Muslims ended up relocating less and less as they were 
not happy with any of the relocation sites. They also wanted to stick together, 
really wanted to be together. Even the riots happened during that time. So it 
made them stick together even further.  
 
But to the relocation sites, people moved in groups. Their lottery was done 
and the allotment software also allowed for that kind of group moves. It was 
through a lottery that it was decided which would be your plot. These people 
went in groups and they could decide among themselves who wanted to take 
which plot in that group. They were given settlements together. So that 
changed a lot. I am not making any judgments, but it changed the city.
233
 
 
Strategies for Successful Implementation of Plans 
 
Based on the narratives of various state actors engaged in the implementation of 
town planning processes in Bhuj, we find that disasters do not always make it easier to 
adopt urban restructuring projects even if they are meant to reduce vulnerability to 
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future disasters.
234
 Despite the initial political commitment and flow of funds, 
processes such as town planning in Bhuj require long-term financial and 
administrative support to make them work. The pressure to produce fast visible results 
after a disaster poses a significant challenge in preparing plans for rebuilding when 
those affected are trying to recover. Hence, decisions were often made in haste, and 
the problems associated with hasty decision-making ―fixed‖ later. While the extent of 
damage caused by the earthquake and the objective of vulnerability reduction helped 
justify the adoption of planning mechanisms, their implementation often curtailed the 
processes of recovery of the intended beneficiaries. 
 
In Bhuj, the context of disaster rehabilitation with its broad humanitarian 
objective of vulnerability reduction did allow for openness as well as flexibility in 
communication between various agencies, as channels of communication were often 
created out of necessity. Proximity to power or power by virtue of association not only 
allowed specific agencies to dictate the rules, but also make sure that the desired 
outcomes were achieved. Implementing the plans required assertive officers who 
could drive the process at the local level, pragmatic enough to solve ―the mess,‖ 
tactful enough to handle adversaries who might sabotage the process of 
implementation, yet sensitive enough not to estrange the public.  
 
Individual problem-solving was an important aspect of the success of town 
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planning in Bhuj as most of the problems were a creation of town planning itself, 
largely owing to outdated land and ownership records.  The ―handpicked‖ officers not 
only had to be able to handle the enormous work involved in disaster rehabilitation, 
but also had to be honest, not interested in making a name for themselves, quick in 
decision-making, sympathetic to earthquake victims yet be able to distance themselves 
from local politics, and not invite unnecessary public attention or get into conflicts. 
Many chose to keep a low profile or sometimes maintain anonymity. 
 
It would require more than just persuasion of residents and a techno-managerial 
approach of disaster rebuilding to make town planning work in Bhuj. We find that 
politically powerful local actors continued to influence every step of the planning 
process, including allocation of plots. Despite efforts to keep local politics out of the 
program, in Bhuj we find that local land lobby and commercial interests exercised 
their influence from early on in the planning process. Various strategies, such as 
preparation of plans away from the public domain and obscurantism, were adopted by 
the state actors to ―protect‖ the program from the influence of local politicians and 
other locally elected representatives, as well as to preserve the technical integrity of 
their projects. 
 
Risks were taken collectively, especially when it was expected solve the problems 
created by town planning. This along with the sense of sympathy towards the 
earthquake-affected helped the local administrators transgress the boundaries of 
legality (with the tacit approval of the state machinery) when it came to 
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implementation of plans. The humanitarian implications of the work drew many 
officers even those who did not agree with the specifics of the intervention. The 
officers often pushed their limits of power, sometimes earning powerful enemies in the 
process.  
 
Following Lipsky, policies were ―made‖ by implementers of town planning who 
interacted directly with the ―client‖ populations (Lipsky, 1980). In Bhuj, they 
expanded the general policies to address issues of differential access to resources and 
unfolding of multiple resiliencies. As far as they stayed within the larger framework of 
the program and made sure ―things happened‖ they were given leeway. But their 
powers were checked by their appointers using the power to transfer officials. 
 
In the next chapter, I examine how the post-earthquake town planning processes 
engaged with the people of Bhuj and allowed for a ―participatory‖ process by eliciting 
public opinion on various aspects of recovery and rehabilitation as well as seeking 
their active involvement in decision-making pertaining to town planning. Beyond 
bureaucratic procedures mandated by the Town Planning Act, what forms did public 
participation assume in Bhuj? How did those influence the recovery of the earthquake-
affected?   
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CHAPTER 6 
PARTICIPATORY PLANNING IN BHUJ 
 
 
In Bhuj, what forms of participation were considered legitimate and therefore 
permitted by the state? How did the specific context of post-earthquake urban 
planning for vulnerability reduction (where decisions were to be made faster than 
usual and those affected were in a hurry to rebuild) interact with the socioeconomic 
and political context of Bhuj and Kachchh in shaping the notion of participation, as 
well as the forms of it? In the following sections, I examine what participation entailed 
in the town planning processes in Bhuj, the factors that shaped it, and the forms it 
took. 
 
Factors Shaping Forms of Public Participation 
Implementers of the earthquake rehabilitation program in Bhuj considered the 
processes of urban planning to be one of the most participatory examples of post-
disaster reconstruction. They portray town planning mechanisms of Development 
Plans and Town Planning Schemes as democratic processes intended to further the 
public good, i.e., planned development of the urban area to minimize losses from 
future earthquakes. Other than the public hearings legally mandated by the Town 
Planning Act, these techniques of physical restructuring typically offer very little room 
for deliberations or interactions between planner and property owners. 
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For the state actors engaged in town planning in Bhuj, public participation carried 
different meanings and posed different challenges. Consider the following quotes on 
public participation from three important actors in the preparation and implementation 
of post-earthquake town planning interventions: 
 
Public consultation . . . yes, it should happen . . . it should happen in a 
positive way, it should be a continuous process . . . should not be consultants 
coming and going, making 20 public consultations . . . that will not work . . . 
let the consultant be there, put their spies around, let people barge into their 
offices . . . individually or in groups . . . let them [consultants] have a difficult 
time . . . let them [the public] say all kinds of things that they have to say, but 
that is how the public consultations should happen. But, public participation 
requires time . . . more time spent on decisions would also mean greater 
political interference.
235
 
 
In my opinion, public participation is very important. When people are 
involved and they know what‘s happening, there would be greater 
cooperation. I don‘t think it is possible to have public participation in 
decision-making processes right after the disaster because if there are 1,000 
people there will be 1,000 ideas/thoughts/opinions. Another possibility is to 
have a body of representatives who can take part in the decision-making.
236
 
 
When town planning was happening, we [state actors] never imagined that 
there will be so many problems. We didn‘t do much [about communication]. 
It had to be done very quickly. So I never allowed a single person in the city 
to discuss it [details of town planning] with us. I used to tell the consultants 
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that if anybody knew about this TP [town planning], I will hold them 
responsible. If we start meeting people, time will be wasted. Everybody will 
try to protect their interests. So, you finalize it and then we‘ll ask the people, 
but not during the process.
237
 
 
As the above quotes suggest, the purpose of public participation (to solve 
problems through interactions between plan makers and the people or to seek 
cooperation) and its form (communication, consultation or participation in decision 
making processes), were perceived differently by different actors. Another added, 
―one cannot wait for participation, you have to act in good faith and if people come 
along…good…‖238 
 
All four agreed on the need for participation in decision-making processes to 
varying degrees. It should be an ongoing process where there is opportunity for 
constant interactions between the planner and those for whom the plans are made. 
However, the duration and the timing were considered important parameters: ―Too 
much time spent‖ on ensuring public participation as well as getting the public 
involved in the planning/plan preparation process were not considered wise, indicative 
of the tension between the need to make faster decisions and the time required for 
active public participation. These quotes also resonate with the concern raised by those 
who oppose public participation—that it complicates the process by delaying it, 
overemphasizing the interests of active publics, and usurping the role of elected 
officials (Pearce, 2003, p. 218). Hence, decision-makers often acted in ―good faith.‖ 
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Pace, technical integrity, and sustainability of town planning. In the case 
of GERRP, the state government appointed planning consultants who gathered 
information and ideas from the people of Bhuj necessary for the preparation and 
implementation of plans. Their role was to understand the needs of those affected by 
the earthquake, and then ―separate the emotional from the technical‖ to arrive at a 
proposal. Their onsite presence was deemed necessary to share information as well as 
to gain public acceptance of plans. The proposals consultants prepared had to be 
technically sound, had to fit in the overall context of the program (GERRP), and also 
cater to the government‘s interests. These requirements necessitated formal and 
informal interactions with residents, local leaders, and representatives of various 
stakeholder groups. However, as the opening quote of this chapter indicates, the plans 
were made public only after they were prepared and that, too, as per the mandatory 
requirements of the town planning act (or sometimes to circumvent the requirements 
of the act). People were largely kept in the dark regarding the intricacies and the 
timelines of the processes. 
 
Even the communicative aspect of participation did not come into being until the 
District Collector asked for it as elaborated by the GSDMA camp officer who worked 
closely with the District Collector: 
 
The entire urban planning brought in professionals who didn‘t really have 
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any inclination to engage with the public or the community or even the 
district administration. They were planners and professionals who worked in 
their own way. They wanted to be protected from the entire political sphere. 
They spoke in a language that was not intelligible even to the District 
Collector. You are talking about plans and maps that are not conveying 
anything on their own, you have to explain them. So I remember even the 
District Collector used to say, ―It‘s confusing‖ and the institutional 
framework was also very complex.
239
 
 
In rural areas, the District Collector and the District Development Officer (DDO) 
were in charge of the process. The DDO was more familiar with the rural context. 
However, in the urban areas, because of the creation of the ADAs and the huge role 
played by GUDC in the infrastructure implementation, there was a complete lack of 
ownership at the district or town level.  
 
In Bhuj, the processes of seeking public responses to the Plans as required by the 
Town Planning Act and reconciling the Plans with the ground realities (problems 
arising from inaccurate damage assessment, mapping or land and ownership records) 
took place simultaneously. The state government made the plans public at various 
stages of its development. However, the versions that were shared with the public did 
not incorporate earlier suggestions. This resulted in massive confusion and a sense of 
disenfranchisement arising from the feeling of ―not being heard,‖ discouraging many 
people from taking part in future meetings or discussions. 
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The entire town planning exercise happened because of the earthquake, but as 
many residents pointed out, it was sometimes bigger than the earthquake. For most 
residents, town planning meant new roads, for which the planning authorities would 
deduct a small percentage of land from their plots. Once it was over they would 
rebuild or repair their houses and move back if they wanted to be in the walled city or 
move to a relocation site. But the reality was far from this. They were unaware of what 
would happen to their plots in the reconfiguration or the implications of using 
incorrect records for the preparation of plans. 
 
Town planning limited what people could do with their plots, their houses, or 
their housing assistance. Owing to the pace of town planning processes, the multitude 
of agencies involved, lack of understanding of the technical and procedural aspects of 
town planning along with processes of social, economic, and psychological coping 
distinct from physical reconfiguration, people of Bhuj often found it difficult to 
understand the changes that were brought about by town planning. Many could not 
fathom why their houses were being cut. Because the relocation sites were not ready, 
it was very difficult for them to decide what to do, whether to move to a relocation site 
or stay in the walled city. Even if they wanted to move to one of the relocation sites, 
they were often unsure about which site to go to; they also wondered whether they 
should decide individually or in groups. These were very trying times for the people of 
Bhuj, especially those who lived in the old city.
240
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Despite an understanding of the challenges town planning processes imposed on 
the recovery of affected households, it was practically impossible to get feedback from 
all the residents, as narrated by the planning consultant: 
 
It‘s not reasonable to expect to get feedback from people when they were in 
different locations and did not come back for different reasons. It was known 
that not everybody would be able to participate. It was not possible to locate 
each and every current resident or the property owner . . . from where do we 
find that out? There is no record, municipal records were bad [inaccurate and 
outdated], and city survey records were bad too.
241
 
 
Because of the sense of urgency and availability of resources, there was pressure 
from the state government to complete the task and ―not to drag it.‖ Where there was 
not much response or feedback from the residents on plans, the deadlines for various 
phases of the process (as dictated by the Town Planning Act) as well as the need to 
maintain technical integrity of the TP Schemes (all the TP Schemes had to be done 
together to maintain the continuity of roads and the integrity of the road network) 
rendered it impossible to give more time to the public to understand the implications 
of the plan and provide feedback. It was considered unwise to wait, from both a 
technical as well as an administrative standpoint, as explained by the planning 
consultant: 
 
If you don‘t do the TP Schemes together then how do you get continuity in 
streets? The plot configurations and the streets were together [changes to 
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plots would impact street pattern and vice versa]. I don‘t think it would have 
been wise to stretch the process. Stretching the process would have meant 
deploying the resources of the government over a period of time and that was 
not sustainable. The entire Town Planning Department was put on this. 
Everybody was working on the four earthquake-affected towns of Kachchh. 
It would not have sustained even a few months longer than what it took. This 
did a lot of damage to the rest of the state. The entire state machinery was 
focused on Kachchh.
242
 
 
Constraints were imposed and decisions made among the consultants and their 
clients (the Urban Development Department and GUDC) regarding when to involve 
communities or their representatives in the decision-making: 
 
 We are forced to find solutions; people are forced to compromise. . . . When 
architects sit down to design, you cannot design unless you impose 
constraints . . . very often the design emerges from exclusion as much as from 
inclusion. So that applies to most of this sort of situations. If you don‘t 
impose constraints and you say ―let‘s be creative, get the community together 
and let them think,‖ Nothing will ever get done. Nothing will get done. By 
putting the artificial constraints of time, resources, pace, and safety, you are 
forcing solutions. That helps to move ahead. You are forcing everybody to 
make choices. Anyway you have to do it faster, you make your choices much 
faster. These are all tradeoffs, you do your best to be an honest broker with 
due diligence.
243
 
 
Since the construction of houses could begin only after the plans were prepared, 
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there was greater urgency to finish the plans and ―fix the problems later.‖244 In 
addition, strict timelines mandated by the Town Planning Act as well as those imposed 
by state agencies in charge of urban rehabilitation, and the need to prepare all the 
TPSs together in order to preserve the integrity of the overall plan did not allow the 
planning consultants to wait for input from residents who could not be contacted. Fear 
of manipulation of plans by local politicians encouraged state actors to keep the details 
of the processes away from the public purview until they were finalized.  
 
Ineffectual local protests. When the state government announced its intention to 
undertake town planning, veteran politician Kundanlal Dholakia launched a fast in 
Bhuj to protest town planning.
245
 He demanded that indiscriminate demolition of 
people‘s homes should not be carried out for town planning purposes and that if 
houses needed to be demolished, it should only be done after alternate arrangements 
were made.
246
 
 
As an immediate response, the government announced that town planning would 
be suspended until further notice. Also, the Gandhi Nagar Committee for 
Rehabilitation, consisting of 10 prominent residents of Bhuj including the Member of 
Parliament (MP) from Kachchh, was formed. However, most members were 
uninformed of town planning processes and associated problems, and hence could not 
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contribute substantively towards shaping the town planning and rehabilitation 
interventions. 
 
In the absence of a clear understanding of what town planning entailed and its 
implications for the recovery of residents of Bhuj from the earthquake, articulation of 
coherent protests against specific aspects of the intervention or ability to engage in 
conversations about possible alternatives were limited. To make it even more difficult, 
there was a lot of uncertainty around whether the plans would ever be implemented or 
not. 
 
Many residents attributed the absence of local voices in post-earthquake 
rehabilitation processes to the ―culture of inaction‖ characteristic of Kachchhis, as 
expressed below: 
 
We Kachchhis are docile and laid-back. Here the mentality of people is such 
that if there is a government regulation which does not have positive effects 
on everybody, people will not oppose it. I‘ll think ―mujhe kya, bajoo wala 
karega‖ [what do I care? The next person will do something] . . . he‘ll think a 
third person will do something...so there is no awareness or thinking about 
understanding the effects [of government rules and regulations] on 
individuals and  what needs to be done to prevent the negative impacts. 
Today‘s rules would be valid for 10 generations. But people do not think 
about its implications . . . chalta hain . . . kya karega? [it goes, what could be 
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done?]
247
 
 
Others attributed this ‗inactive‘ nature of the resident Kachchhis‘ to lack of 
effective political leadership, absence of history of mass mobilization, and streams of 
migration of the enterprising Kachchhis because of the tumultuous nature of land and 
lack of economic opportunities.
248
 A resident noted: 
 
In Kachchh there are two kinds of people. The ones who were enterprising 
left for Bombay or someplace else, because of lack of water, and there 
weren‘t any industries . . . the ones who stayed back were completely 
inactive. Kachchh never had any good leadership. Whatever leadership has 
been here has come from outside. It‘s people from outside who have 
developed Kachchh. Those who migrate to other places do good work, but 
the very same people wouldn‘t do anything here. All the efficient ones are 
NRIs [Non-Resident Indians or people of Indian origin living in other 
countries] now; those who are inefficient are here.
249
 
 
Another resident of Bhuj illustrated the inability of Kachchhis to protest: 
 
There was a big banyan tree near the pavdi [diving platform on the periphery 
of Hamirsar Lake]. There was a small temple too. These people [BHADA] 
cut down the tree overnight. It was more than a 100 years old. Kutch Mitra 
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[the regional newspaper] even published articles on it. There was even an 
agitation. There was no Collector here at that moment. The District 
Development Officer (DDO) was in charge. I saw the group of people. They 
were about to take out a protest rally. It was lead by MP [Member of 
Parliament] of Kachchh. A few of my friends were there. They told me that 
they were going to protest the cutting of the tree. I joined them. We gave the 
memorandum to the DDO. The MP of Kachchh told the DDO that we were 
not opposing the move, but just wanted to communicate our feelings about it 
and that it shouldn‘t have been done. This is the way people protest here. If it 
were some other place, it would have been violent.
250
 
 
For most residents of Bhuj, the government-appointed officers and consultants 
were part of the state machinery consisting of outsiders who lacked local 
understanding or sensitivity and who had no interest in involving local actors in the 
processes. Others attributed the absence of public participation in town planning 
processes to the state and local government agencies‘ decision not to stipulate greater 
participation of local people in the processes as well as the inability of local political 
leaders to demand it. The editor of Kutch Mitra elaborated on this as follows: 
 
In my opinion, it doesn‘t matter whether people come from outside. It‘s 
mostly political people who make a big deal of it [the insider-outsider 
debates]. I think whether people come from outside or not, if they want to, 
they could involve local people in the process . . . it‘s the responsibility of the 
government to make sure that it happens . . . if outside organizations or 
people are required to do it, they will have to . . . and if we think more about 
this, ultimately it will come down to the fact that there is no effective 
leadership in Kachchh. . . . 
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Often when such a huge calamity occurs, leadership emerges . . . but here that 
didn‘t happen . . . it did happen in small villages with 30 to 40 houses . . .  
people had gotten together under their leaders. That didn‘t happen in towns or 
cities . . . there are several reasons for it—political, community-related, 
religious, and several such factors that resulted in lack of leadership.
251
 
 
If the docile nature of Kachchhis and their lack of strong leadership led to the 
absence of effective participation, town planning reduced the larger project of urban 
restructuring into individual problem-solving, limiting collective articulation of 
problems. Many residents attended the early meetings on how to rebuild their city and 
later frequented the ward offices set up by the consultants in the walled city to 
understand what was happening to their plots, to voice their concerns about the 
changes to their plots as per the new plan, and to resolve issues arising from incorrect 
land and ownership records.  
 
Even as they tried to resolve problems related to town planning, often they did not 
know which agency was in charge of solving a particular problem, suggesting that the 
obscurantism tactic mentioned by the GUDC Planner was successful: ―Here the 
administration was faceless . . . if you approach the Collector he will ask you to go to 
BHADA, Gandhi Nagar will say the grant is from the central government . . . so 
everything was faceless. . . .‖252 
 
                                                 
251
 K. Khatri (personal communication, Bhuj, July 21, 2006). 
 190 
One of the key responsibilities of BHADA officials was to solve each individual 
―case‖ without compromising the plans that had already been finalized. There were 
very difficult cases that could not be resolved. Owners of such plots as well as people 
who were not happy with the changes to their plots as per town planning were given 
the option of surrendering the plot in the walled city in exchange for plot(s) in a 
relocation site. Most problems were solved this way. As the Town Planner of BHADA 
noted:  
 
It‘s making people accept the solutions themselves using saam [act of 
pacifying], daan [charity or offering incentives], bhed [act of dividing], or 
dand [punishment or threat of retribution].
253
 
 
Finding solutions to the problems in more than 2,000 applications required 
administrators to be highly sensitive to the needs of people, especially because many 
of these problems were created by the town planning process itself and had an adverse 
impact on the recovery of the earthquake-affected. GDSMA along with BHADA 
organized several rounds of grievance-redressal sessions for each TP Scheme area in 
Bhuj. The GSDMA Camp Officer pointed out how despite such efforts problem-
solving was not always done in the most sensitive manner:  
 
. . . this was something that was not very neatly done. We are talking about 
very high order counseling skills, not just counseling skills but PR and 
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planning skills and that‘s where it didn‘t work and there must still be those 
open wounds.
254
 
 
In Bhuj, due to the long onsite presence of the planning consultants, many 
residents had the opportunity to understand how the plan would impact them, and their 
responsibilities and rights with respect to the plan.
255
 Conflicts between individual 
good and collective good played out in every case. The educational backwardness of 
the region acted as an impediment to effective communication between the residents 
and the implementers of the program and to the understanding of the legal processes 
associated with town planning. Lack of finances, loss of family members, being forced 
to live in a far off place, and other concerns also affected the extent of participation in 
the town planning processes and resolution of problems at a later stage. 
256
 Failure of 
the state to communicate the benefits of town planning to the public also contributed 
to the large number of problems.
257
 
 
State-Approved Public Participation 
 
 
In the aftermath of a disaster when people are in a state of shock and are more 
concerned about meeting their immediate needs, the articulation of public opinion in 
response to various plans and policies is extremely difficult. In Bhuj, for such a 
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discourse to take shape, a strong understanding of the legal and technical aspects of 
town planning mechanisms was critical. Committees formed after Dholakia‘s fast did 
not prove to be effective in the long run as they were advisory committees without any 
decision-making power and lacked adequate technical knowledge. There were no 
other fora where local people with expertise in these areas could organize and analyze 
the options. Yet it was important for the state government, consultants as well as 
donors, to gain local acceptance for their plans and also have them ratified in 
accordance with the Town Planning Act.  
 
Despite the large number of NGOs that came to Kachchh for earthquake 
rehabilitation, their presence was very limited in long-term rehabilitation of 
earthquake-affected towns such as Bhuj.
258
 The GUDC planner elaborated on why 
NGOs did not get involved in urban rehabilitation: 
 
[In urban areas] people are educated, therefore the influence is more. The 
land prices are high. If it is a village, I have 20 acres of land, if you take a 
corner, I have no problem, if you take a whole area for a road or a highway, I 
still won‘t have a problem, whereas in an urban area, even a few centimeters 
of their land get affected, people would protest.
259
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According to the Town Planner of BHADA, it was the greater flexibility and 
visibility offered by rural areas that attracted NGOs to get involved in rural 
reconstruction: 
 
In a village if you construct 100 houses, you can do it marvelously and 
everybody will commend you. Whereas inside the city, lots of buildings were 
standing and everybody won‘t be coming to you for houses, to reconstruct 
them. And even due to the complexity of the situation [institutional, legal, 
and technical issues associated with town planning in urban areas] they 
[NGOs] cannot convince people. So they were not willing to take it up. There 
are people who have done good work, but they were not truly interested in 
the city.
260
 
 
In urban areas, reconstruction was mostly owner-driven, which meant NGOs 
played a facilitator‘s role.261 High land values and politicization of the town planning 
processes by vested interests complicated processes such as beneficiary selection, 
allocation of land, procurement of building permissions, etc. which were crucial for  
reconstruction of houses. Lengthy bureaucratic procedures associated with 
reconstruction of houses could not be avoided since approval of plans as well as 
verification of records and supporting documents could only be done with the 
involvement of the local government. In the later stages of urban rehabilitation, when 
some of the local NGOs expressed interest in getting involved in the process they 
received a lukewarm response from the local administration. There were concerns that 
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if government allowed NGOs to intervene in urban areas as well then they would have 
nothing to their credit.
262
  
 
The involvement of Abhiyan, the local NGO consortium, in the rehabilitation of 
villages was seen as a threat by many government officials. Their power to influence 
the state and central governments earned them the enmity of many decision-makers 
and implementers of GERRP, especially those who wanted to have control over the 
entire process. Many bureaucrats saw them as an entity ―parallel to the state.‖ 
 
In the absence of NGOs acting as intermediaries between the government and the 
public (a role that NGOs have traditionally played), possible fora for public 
participation in town planning were: 1) town planning meetings conducted by the 
consultants during the preparation of the plans, and 2) public hearings conducted by 
the TPOs in the eight ward offices in the walled city for the implementation of Town 
Planning Schemes, as mandated by the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban 
Development Act. 
 
Town planning meetings. EPC, the planning consultant, acted as the interface 
between the government and the people. They organized meetings in each ward to 
resolve issues related to TPSs. The public was informed of these meetings through the 
local and regional newspapers. However, one had to be educated to read these 
announcements and attend the meetings, let alone get problems resolved. 
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Despite various meetings, more often residents felt that their opinions or concerns 
were not incorporated in the plans and that the meetings were a sham. The editor of 
Kutch Mitra shared this public sentiment: 
 
The planners earlier said that they will consult citizens and then decide on the 
course of action, but except for meetings ―just for show‖ I don‘t think they 
took into account people‘s opinions. They‘ll have photographs and video 
clips of meetings and then show to the government that they have consulted 
with people. Sometimes they have conducted meetings, but I don‘t think they 
ever made any changes to plans based on people‘s opinions . . . they had 
already decided on the plans and they didn‘t change them. I don‘t think in the 
process of town planning there was any participation of people.
263
 
 
During the preparation of the Development Plan, planning consultants conducted 
two meetings during the initial days of plan preparation to ―share‖ ideas with the 
public and get response. Later there were meetings with specific interests groups to 
prepare individual aspects of the DP. When it came to Town Planning Schemes, which 
had greater impact on residents, especially in the walled city, EPC set up ward offices 
to share the plans with the public, verify records, and make subsequent changes to the 
plan. This was followed by  public hearings conducted by the Town Planning officers 
(TPO) for each TP Scheme. 
 
An important aspect to remember is that none of these meetings was conducted to 
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debate the use of Town Planning Schemes or to deliberate on various options. Indeed, 
those decisions were made early in the process among a selected few state actors 
(primarily, Urban Development Department, GUDC, and the consultants). The 
meetings in the ward offices entailed communicating the plans to the residents and 
rectifying the inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the plans because of the outdated 
property records and incorrect damage assessment surveys. 
  
Hence, for most residents, meetings were about proving the legitimacy of their 
individual claims in the context of the plan rather than challenging the plan itself. 
Even then, people who were uneducated often did not understand what could be done 
if they were allocated a plot that they did not like or that was of smaller size. They did 
not raise their concerns in the meetings that were held in different parts of the city or 
make use of the ward offices to resolve town planning related issues. Many lost money 
in corruption. 
 
According to a community leader who ran a relief camp for poor Muslims in the 
walled city, people‘s participation in town planning meetings was very limited. It was 
mostly the educated people who attended meetings; others had absolutely no idea what 
was happening. They had different priorities, including getting relief materials.
264
 An 
associate of EPC explained why there was very little participation by residents in 
various meetings:  
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As far as the common man is considered, there were conflicting priorities. 
Participating in the plan preparations was not his top priority. He had lost 
quite a few things in the earthquake. Restoring livelihood was more 
important. So, people who had definite views or strong opinions might have 
participated once or twice and then realized that it was going to be a long 
process and not something that would be done in one or two meetings. There 
was a group of people who continued to participate. Others did not participate 
primarily because of conflicting priorities.
265
 
 
People often had very little idea about the role of TPOs in the process and the 
significance of their decisions. They were also largely unaware of the implications of 
the town planning processes to their plots and houses and also the procedures 
associated with it. In the legally mandated hearings for individual TP Schemes, many 
owners signed the forms next to the line that said ―No Objection,‖ without knowing its 
legal implications.
266
 Many residents who left the city after the earthquake had given 
the power of attorney to fulfill the town planning related requirements to a relative 
who then attended the hearings on their behalf. Others were unaware of the 
importance of attending the TPO hearings to verify if their plot had been demarcated 
correctly and get any problems resolved. Those who did not attend the meetings came 
to know about the changes to their plots (whether it had been cut or if allotted 
someplace else) when they got their property title (sanat) back after preliminary TP 
Schemes were prepared.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
264
 Bhuj being the chief transportation node received all relief supplies first. Source: I. Ghanchi, 
personal communication, Bhuj, December 20, 2006). 
265
 D. Parikh (personal communication, Ahmedabad, July 25, 2006). 
 198 
During consultation processes, concerns raised by residents mostly pertained to 
individual plots. If someone‘s entire plot or part of it was taken up and assigned as a 
reserved area (for sale by BHADA or open space or public purpose), or if there was an 
existing structure and that was being used for public purpose, the owners often raised 
objections. In most cases, BHADA offered property owners plots in relocation sites in 
exchange for those in the walled city that were used for town planning purposes or had 
problems that were hard to resolve, and most residents preferred to be in the walled 
city or near it. Hence, residents spent their energies in resolving their own problems 
rather than taking part in consultations regarding city-wide plans. 
 
Individuals also feared retribution from local authorities if they voiced objections 
or opinions regarding town planning. Even if they did, efforts were made to put 
pressure on them by further delaying resolution of their individual problems. So, 
people were largely apprehensive about voicing strong objections to the citywide 
processes that were unfolding. An elderly resident of Bhuj and office bearer of a local 
NGO explained why having a file on one‘s plot with BHADA restricted people‘s 
ability to question or challenge decisions about town planning: 
 
My advantage was that I had no financial interests; I didn‘t have a file that 
needed to be approved. Even for my ancestral property in Soniwad I was not 
going to approach CEO, even though he was a good friend. Only then I could 
voice my concerns. But if they were to adopt dirty tricks, even I would quit. 
Citizens were under duress. Nobody will come forward against the 
authorities. In meetings people will say things, but to do something in 
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concrete, nobody came forward, they were all afraid. A citizen‘s council 
would have been able to do a little better.
267
 
 
Meetings with donor agencies (World Bank and ADB) within the walled city to 
discuss problems faced by people were always done in the presence of local 
administrators. Hence, even when citizens wanted to express their disagreements, they 
feared retribution. Many felt that the earthquake-affected were being used as pawns to 
implement plans that the government found appropriate.  
 
Attempts were made by local NGOs such as Bhuj Development Council (BDC) to 
organize residents falia-wise. In a successful case of participatory planning process, 
residents of the Soniwad area, the worst-affected area within the walled city, 
organized under a falia samiti (committee) to make their recovery process faster. 
 
The Soniwad case. In the Soniwad area of the walled city, where two fault lines 
intersected, the damage was extensive. More than 300 people died in the earthquake 
and the vast majority of the houses suffered significant damages. Despite this, 
Soniwad was one of the first areas to rebuild. BDC Vice President and a key figure in 
the Soniwad rehabilitation process narrated the story of Soniwad‘s faster recovery: 
  
Though the entire area was devastated, people would come in everyday 
morning and evening to see their house, plot or something else . . . We talked 
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about a collective response . . . people were very excited about falia samiti 
and they would come for the meetings. The idea of land banking was 
suggested in one of the meetings—to consider this as a family disaster and 
rebuild without any government help. All plots would be pooled in and 
rebuilt as row houses using 75 m
2
 plots. Those with 300 m
2
 can keep 150 m
2
 
and the make the remaining 150 m
2
 available to those with less than 75 m
2
 
for purchase . . . then a uniform building design could be adopted and 
depending on the family size people could have more than one plot. It was 
communicated to the government, but they did not approve it. 
 
Though the idea of land banking was not accepted, we had decided to hire a 
single architect and a single structural engineer, buy materials in bulk and 
also take turns in doing supervision . . . since the plots were different we had 
to have different plans . . . but we hired one architect and during a time when 
architects were charging Rs. 20,000, we could get it done with Rs. 6000. 
 
When the town planning proposals were prepared by EPC, falia samiti members 
sat with them to discuss its implications on the community. Through the Soniwad falia 
samiti, people were able to raise their concerns, including the sense of disorientation 
and lack of connection with their own city if it were to be drastically reconfigured. 
The idea to retain the center line of older streets emerged out of these interactions in 
Soniwad.  
 
In Soniwad, the entire rebuilding process happened quickly because residents 
were well-organized, they understood the process, and they had all the required 
documents ready. Because they had similar plans for house reconstruction, they 
obtained building permissions quickly. They also had a strong leader who not only 
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educated them on various aspects of town planning but also organized them. He 
helped them arrive at solutions given the constraints imposed by town planning. 
 
Though Soniwad falia samiti played a significant role in organizing people and 
giving them a platform to engage with the planning and rebuilding processes, other 
falia samitis created following the Soniwad model were not successful.
 268
 The local 
and state government agencies did not grant formal recognition to these people‘s 
bodies. In an attempt to formalize falia samitis as a credible organization in the 
government‘s eyes, a Registered Trust for the Soniwad committee was created, Rs. 
5000 collected from each family, and the money remitted in a bank account.  
 
When the request to grant some form of legal status to the falia samitis was not 
heeded by the government, leaders of Soniwad falia samiti suggested that the 
government at least call the press and communicate to them that the falia samiti was a 
good initiative through which a lot of problems could be solved, and that the town 
planning process recognized the samitis as credible sources of data. Even this was not 
acceded to by state and local agencies. Without state recognition, the samitis began to 
lose credibility even among residents.  
 
Therefore, falia samiti, a neighborhood association, with the mandate of 
representing the households in a particular locality in interactions with the planners 
and the ADA and in ensuring that the plan for an area reflected their concerns and 
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interests, fizzled away. The lack of formalization of the samitis was a missed 
opportunity as echoed by the planning consultant: 
 
To try and create this [the samiti or such people‘s organizations] in a post 
disaster situation takes more energy and effort than if you already have it. So 
tomorrow if there is another earthquake in another part of Gujarat, the walled 
city fares the same way in Bhuj and if we were to go in there and do the same 
process, we would face same problems. Because we are wiser, we would 
know what problems to anticipate.
269
 
 
Even with official recognition, it is uncertain whether falia samitis would have 
been able to influence decision-making or handle pressure from strong interest 
groups.. However, in the absence of any other forum for voicing their opinions or 
getting guidance in the town planning and reconstruction processes, it seems more 
likely that falia samitis would have played a significant role in aiding residents in their 
recovery from the earthquake as testified by the Soniwad case.  
 
According to the planning consultant, the problem of inadequate participation is 
an institutional issue, arising from the lack of institutional structures in urban areas. In 
a rural setup, the unit of participation is the gramsabha or the general body of the 
village, constituted by voters of the village. With approximately 60% of the population 
being voters, the number of people participating in decision-making in a rural 
community is of the order of 3,000. However, in an urban settlement (with population 
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equal to or greater than 5000), the voting population for the equivalent body in a 
typical urban ward is nearly 50,000. With such large numbers, another legally 
mandated sub-unit of about 3,000 to 5,000 people would be necessary for genuine 
participation.
270
  
 
In Bhuj or any other urban area of Kachchh, the absence of such legally mandated 
units left no space for the active participation of residents in the town planning 
processes. However, as people struggled to resolve individual problems related to 
town planning, based on the strong recommendations of public-minded local leaders 
and inputs from the field staff of agencies such as the GSDMA, efforts were made by 
the state to provide some recourse in the form of the City Resource Centre or Swajan. 
 
City Resource Centre. In a joint venture, BHADA, GSDMA, and the local 
NGO, BDC, created the City Resource Centre (CRC) or Swajan to assist the citizens 
of Bhuj in resolving problems related to town planning. CRC assisted people who 
could not construct houses by facilitating loan applications, linking them with NGOs 
for house construction, and addressing town planning related grievances with 
BHADA. They were also able to assist people in getting plans prepared at subsidized 
rates and with filing various applications. They provided guidance regarding 
documents necessary for plan approval and many times expedited the approval process 
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by BHADA.
271
 CRC also organized a few melas (fairs) in specific relocation sites to 
disseminate information related to house construction and housing loans.
272
 
 
Getting housing assistance for tenants and gaining equal status for people who 
were affected by town planning as others affected by the earthquake were 
breakthroughs achieved by the CRC. As a consequence of the latter, people living in 
unauthorized settlements that came in the way of the Development Plan received 
compensation.
273
 
 
Originally, CRC was conceptualized as a collective endeavor involving BDC, 
Abhiyan, Kutch Mitra, and EPC with the objective of informing citizens of the town 
planning processes and providing them with a platform to get involved in the overall 
development of their city. However, owing to its late creation, this partnership did not 
materialize. CRC‘s focus was also narrowed down to finding solutions to individual 
problems due to town planning. Though some of the City Resource Centre staff was 
deputed from the municipality, the municipality never owned the centre. It was 
considered as an experiment initiated by GSDMA with BDC and BHADA. BDC, 
which was the active member of CRC, did not have the organizational or financial 
capacity to extend CRC‘s mandate to build the capacity of the municipality to assume 
similar roles in future. Within two years of its formation, CRC was dissolved. 
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Caste-based organizations. While caste-based community organizations 
played a significant role in temporary rehabilitation of the earthquake-affected, they 
often lacked the technical know-how and financial resources to assist members in 
long-term reconstruction.
274
 Typically, most caste-based organizations (samaj) 
organized religious or cultural events, mass weddings, and sporting events, and 
provided educational assistance and medicines to poor families in the community. The 
nominal membership fee paid by members was not sufficient to support such 
activities, and assistance was largely dependent on contributions made by affluent 
members of the samaj.  
 
Many of the caste-based organizations were effective in organizing their members 
in the establishment of temporary shelters. However, these organizations often lacked 
the financial resources or understanding of the bureaucratic procedures involved in 
town planning to assist their members in the rebuilding process. Yet, rehabilitation 
processes often reified or reinforced caste separations by identifying caste-based 
organizations (samaj) as the legitimate representative bodies of people belonging to a 
particular caste. This resulted in greater segregation and lesser tolerance among 
communities which earlier lived together in falias.
275
 BDC Vice President and a 
longtime resident of Bhuj explained how the emphasis on caste and religion was 
brought about by the implementers of the rehabilitation process: 
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It was made prominent by these people [implementers of town planning]. 
They started organizing people based on caste. Before [the earthquake], 
social activities were organized by community organizations. Other than that 
prior to the earthquake these organizations were not prominent. But when 
you [state agencies] took rehabilitation in that direction, calling up the 
community leader for everything, even the dormant ones became prominent. 
This has been a fallout of the policy. Everybody just called community 
leaders for everything about rehabilitation. No one seems to have quite 
thought of the future repercussions including disintegration of society . . . 
276
 
 
Apart from the emphasis on caste-based community leaders as legitimate 
representatives for solving problems related to earthquake rehabilitation and town 
planning, one finds intensified spatial segregation. Religious organizations such as 
BAPS built houses for their followers, creating pockets of homogenous groups based 
on religion and caste. If earlier in the falias people from various socioeconomic, 
religious, and cultural backgrounds lived together, after the earthquake with the 
emphasis on community-based relocation, people belonging to the rajgor, salaat, 
lohana, darji, and other caste-based groups created homogenous pockets, especially in 
the relocation sites. They now live amongst people from the same community, 
restricting interaction with people from other backgrounds. 
 
BDC had suggested that the festival committees in each locality (such as the garbi 
mandal and eid committees) be brought to the discussion table as these committees are 
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not segregated so much on caste. This could have helped retain the social structure of 
the falias, without being segregated based on caste.
277
 
 
Successful group moves to relocation sites, of families belonging to the same 
caste, were not always mediated by their samaj. In the case of rajgor community, 200 
families in khatri chakla area of the walled city (owners whose houses were in the G-5 
damage category) formed a committee after the earthquake. Though  20 families left 
the committee, the remaining 180 decided to stay together in one site and chose the 
RTO relocation site because its proximity to the city. Through their collective efforts 
they were able to figure out the procedures for surrendering their plots and getting new 
ones in the relocation site, resulting in faster allocation of plots by BHADA. Today 
they live in RTO relocation site, in four adjacent lanes, making them the single largest 
group in the site. 
 
Reliance on public-minded individuals. The District Collector and the CEO 
of BHADA were often responsive to people‘s needs and concerns. The Collector in 
particular used his authority and power of persuasion to expedite decision-making 
even in the face of stiff opposition from various interest groups. But there were few 
attempts to create fora for public participation in local decision-making processes. In 
the absence of a system to elicit public opinion and protect their interests, problems 
related to individual property or the implementation of DP- and TPS-related 
infrastructure work were resolved due to the personal initiatives of the CEO and the 
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District Collector. 
 
A resident of Bhuj, also a social worker, explained why it was particularly 
important to have local participation in post-disaster planning and implementation 
processes: 
 
Once a disaster has occurred there is not much time to study and go into the 
details. The necessary reach to the database and understanding that the 
officers should have had, that sort of data was not there. In any place where a 
disaster occurs, this sort of information can only be provided by the local 
people who have lived in this region for quite a long time. And every place 
has its own experts. In the case of Bhuj, there were 35 to 40 engineering 
professionals who had been working in the area of building design and 
planning. But they were not utilized; they were kept on the side.
278
 
 
Absence of effective means of local participation had consequences for the 
project. Several mistakes were made in infrastructure development such as inadequate 
drainage facilities or rain water outlets for roads. Many areas prone to flooding during 
monsoons were built up, information that any longtime resident would have been able 
to provide to the implementers (based on their understanding of the drainage patterns 
of the city). Lack of utilization of local building professionals including architects, 
engineers, and masons in the monitoring and supervision of town planning related 
infrastructure projects at the local level also led to such ―omissions‖ by the 
subcontractors, thereby affecting the quality of the newly developed infrastructure. 
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There were other issues arising from the distribution of commercial uses in the city 
and the differential pace of its development by the government. While most of the 
commercial spaces built on the new 36m-wide ring road lay vacant, in Bhid area 
where there was a need for shops, not a single shop was built by the government. 
These reinforced the significance of tapping into local knowledge and seeking active 
involvement of local actors with such understanding in the planning and 
implementation processes. 
 
Public Participation in Post-disaster Urban Planning 
 
 
Earthquake rehabilitation in Bhuj through town planning is touted by state actors 
engaged in the process as one of the most participatory processes in post-disaster 
planning. Many attributed the absence of demands for greater participation of local 
actors in town planning to a long history of lack of political mobilization in Kachchh, 
absence of effective leadership (migration of entrepreneurial Kachchhis), lack of 
education, inherent docile nature, etc. Among the state actors engaged in town 
planning, we find varying notions of participation ranging from communication and 
consultation to getting information (sometimes covertly) to help implement policies 
and plans. 
 
Efforts to institutionalize public participation through committees, as a response 
to protests against town planning, did not prove effective in shaping the planning 
process because of committees‘ lack of decision-making power and unfamiliarity with 
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the technicalities of town planning processes. Despite the partial success of Soniwad 
falia samiti in communicating the needs of residents to planners, and also facilitating 
faster rebuilding of their homes, this could not be replicated because of lack of official 
recognition. Many attributed the success of Soniwad falia samiti to the able leadership 
of a vocal social worker who was also an engineer and writer and had good leadership 
qualities. Such leadership did not emerge in other cases. Despite repeated attempts to 
get some form of formal recognition for falia samitis, the strong resistance from state 
agencies like the GSDMA reflected fears of the ―mob‖ taking over the process and 
delaying it.  
 
While efforts like the falia samitis and City Resource Centre were partially 
successful in ―bridging the gap‖ between the planners as well as implementers of town 
planning and the residents of Bhuj, rehabilitation processes often reinforced caste 
divides by identifying leaders and representatives of caste groups or caste-based 
organizations (samaj) as the rightful spokesperson of the particular group. This 
resulted in greater segregation and lesser tolerance among communities which earlier 
lived together in falias. While community groups played a significant role in 
temporary rehabilitation, they often lacked the technical know-how to get involved in 
long-term rehabilitation processes. 
 
To be successful in long term rehabilitation of the disaster-affected, it is 
extremely important to locate spaces for deliberation and decision-making close to 
those whose vulnerabilities are being reduced. This linkage between the grassroots and 
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the administrative machinery is very crucial, beginning with the distribution of relief. 
In Bhuj, there was no recognized body that linked the locally elected representatives 
(councilors) and the Mayor with the District Collector and other departmental heads. 
When such a linkage exists, policies are more likely to reflect local needs. In villages 
NGOs acted as a bridge between the state agencies and the people. However, in urban 
areas like Bhuj, the absence of NGOs due to owner-driven nature of reconstruction, 
complex bureaucratic processes associated with rehabilitation, delays in town planning 
related decision making, high land values, and the higher levels of education of the 
urban beneficiaries who wielded more power over the NGOs in comparison to their 
rural counterparts, contributed to the absence of effective fora for interaction between 
the state and the public.  
 
We find in Bhuj, a strong resistance from the state to formalize public 
participation in decision-making processes—along with the tendency to involve the 
public as and when required, without making any formal commitment to 
institutionalize such interactions. In the absence of NGOs or other organizations, in 
Bhuj, their appointers (from the Urban Development Department through GUDC) 
entrusted the planning consultants with the responsibility of acting as intermediary 
between the government and the public. During the town planning process, the 
consultants conducted meetings across the city that allowed many residents to verify 
their ownership records and resolve problems related to plot demarcation. Most people 
did not understand the implications of town planning until they got their land titles 
back after the preliminary schemes were approved by the state government and 
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infrastructure work began. 
 
Literature on public participation in development projects identifies participation 
as the means to achieve economic efficiency in development projects where non-
participation of citizens is an operational barrier, requiring a financial, educational, 
technical or administrative correction (Chinsinga, 2003). For others, participation 
could lead to open-ended development (Mohan, 2001), convergence of participatory 
development and participatory governance due to the transformational qualities of 
participatory approaches (Hickey and Mohan, 2004). It could also lead to democratic 
governance (Fung and Wright, 2003; Chavez and Goldfrank, 2004).
279
  
 
In the planning literature, discussions on participation emphasize the role of 
communicative rationality in collective problem-solving through democratic 
deliberation.
280
 Some have pointed out the disconnect between substantive and 
procedural aspects of planning in the discourse, calling for a re-evaluation of planning 
practice using the notion of  justice, yet failing to articulate how a just city can be 
achieved in actual political practice and process (Fainstein, 2000). In reality, few 
people will be satisfied with process alone, just as few people will believe that 
outcomes create themselves independent of political and planning processes.  
 
In Bhuj, the consultants who prepared the plans believed that the desirable 
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outcome of a planned city with new infrastructure and disaster-resistant houses could 
be achieved independent of political processes, as long as they incorporated the needs 
of various interest groups in their plans. Participation did not entail a process of 
democratic deliberation for problem-solving in the traditional sense of the term.
281
 
Yet, the planners interacted with local leaders, social workers, and community 
representatives to allow local needs to be reflected in the plans.  
 
For the administrators in charge of implementing the plans, mandatory 
requirements of public hearings associated with the regulatory mechanisms (such as 
Development Plans and Town Planning Schemes) and negotiations with residents to 
solve individual problems related to Town Planning Schemes constituted public 
participation. Public debates and negotiations were consciously avoided by the 
implementers of the program.
282
 Concerns about the inability of participants to 
envision the future beyond their immediate needs also discouraged them from 
allowing for public participation in town planning debates.
283
 
 
In a post-disaster scenario, there is great political pressure to both expedite 
preparation of policies and plans pertaining to recovery and reconstruction and to 
                                                 
281
 In this model of democracy, citizens discuss a problem together and attempt to persuade one another 
that the solutions they propose are the best, in the sense of most just, most effective, least costly, and so 
on (Hunold and Young, 1998, p. 86). 
282
 For discussion on dialogue, debate and negotiation as sub-processes of participation, see Forester 
(2009). 
283 
Master or Comprehensive Plans are prepared for 10 to 20 years. Very often individual concerns 
dominate discussions, especially in situations where there have been no prior experience of collective 
problem-solving. Groups that are better organized, articulate, and powerful often dominate meetings 
and shape decisions that were intended to be reached through a process of deliberation among all 
participants. 
 214 
produce immediate, visible results. Many have argued for faster formulation of plans 
if rebuilding efforts are to be successful in reducing future vulnerabilities of urban 
areas (Hein, 2005; Schwab, Topping, Eadie, Deyle, and Smith, 1998). For the 
architects and implementers of the earthquake rehabilitation program, the need for 
faster decision-making with minimal political interference from various interest 
groups presented itself as the reason for excluding local actors from initial discussions. 
  
Proponents of sustainable hazard mitigation have argued that for disaster planning 
initiatives to be effective in reducing future vulnerabilities, they should be built on 
community-based planning principles that allow for public participation in decision-
making processes (Mileti, 1999). Community-based planning as a decentralized form 
of planning calls for combining problem-solving with greater involvement of various 
interest groups, especially the residents of a community, through a process of 
consensus building. However, communities are neither homogenous nor static 
(Harvey, 1997). Also, exclusion is inherent in defining a community (Balibar, 
1994).
284
  
 
In the context of disaster rehabilitation, community-based local decision-making 
could also perpetrate or reproduce social structures of exclusion and inclusion (Geipel, 
1981). In Bhuj, implementers of the earthquake rehabilitation program called for 
community participation in planning processes where community was defined on the 
basis of caste and religion. Such a definition of community influenced spatial 
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restructuring of the city along caste and religious lines and along the lines of existing 
social relations among various groups. 
 
Participation in decision-making processes requires voices to be heard, so it 
requires engagement in dialogue. In these discussions, the disadvantaged should be 
insulated from the powerful or provided extra support (Hunold and Young, 1998). For 
this to occur a space is required, and so are tolerance and persistence, and qualities 
beyond techno-speak, policy promises, and pretty drawings (Blauert, 2004, p. 6). 
Trust, emotional safety, and language can act as ―carriers‖ for an effective 
communication and dialogue to occur (Blauert, 2004, p. 7).  
 
While it is extremely important to include existing representative bodies at the 
local level, such as municipalities and elected representatives, in discussions 
pertaining to policies and plans, alternative institutions in urban areas—sub-units that 
allow for greater citizen involvement—are crucial for effective participation in 
decision-making processes. It is equally important for representative neighborhood 
level bodies to exist prior to the disaster to be effective in getting involved in post-
disaster planning activities.
285
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 Suggests multiple ways a community can be defined (Pearce, 2003) thereby shifting the focus from 
categories themselves to the processes of categorization (Pierik, 2004). 
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 In Kobe after the 1995 earthquake, neighborhood planning organizations formed prior to the 
earthquake, called machizukuri kyogikai, played an important role in the reconstruction process, 
particularly in the land readjustment and redevelopment areas (Olshansky et al., 2005). Such an 
approach has also been blamed for the prolonged implementation of plans in the affected 
neighborhoods (Communication with Executive Director, EPC). 
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Post-disaster rehabilitation using urban planning tools, such as the Development 
Plan, Town Planning Schemes and Development Control Regulations in Bhuj, 
demanded understanding of the technical aspects of these measures in order to be able 
to engage in a meaningful discussion with the planners and the administrators 
regarding their adoption.. While local committees formed by the state to elicit public 
opinion regarding disaster rehabilitation had neither adequate technical knowledge nor 
decision-making power, inclusion of local architects, engineers, masons, and urban 
planning professionals could have allowed these fora to inform discussions pertaining 
to urban planning of local conditions, building practices, and needs.  
 
The state could constitute local technical bodies of professionals who could not 
only provide technical support to post-disaster urban planning and policy formulation 
but could also play an important role in quality assurance of housing reconstruction 
and infrastructure development projects. Since the local populations rely on the 
expertise of these professionals for building construction, their involvement in urban 
planning processes could have a positive impact on adherence to newly adopted 
measures in future. They could also perform the ancillary function of capacity 
development and advisory-services provider for the local municipalities who have a 
mandate to regulate the built-form and maintain the infrastructure (by granting 
building permits consistent with the regulations and plans and by approving 
infrastructure projects). 
 
Given the preceding discussions on varying notions of participation in post-
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earthquake town planning processes and forms of it or the lack thereof, I now turn to 
how changes to the physical form brought about by town planning influenced recovery 
of the earthquake-affected. The next chapter provides a brief overview of the 
unfolding of multiple resiliencies in post-earthquake Bhuj, seen through the 
perspective of residents. Given the institutional, technical, and sociopolitical aspects of 
town planning, the chapter tries to capture the important factors that shaped re-
establishment of homes and other aspects of recovery in post-earthquake Bhuj.  
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CHAPTER 7 
RESILIENCE AND THE REARTICULATION OF BHUJ 
 
How does a city recover from a disaster of great social and physical magnitude, 
and what exactly does it recover? Earthquakes do not just shake buildings and 
infrastructure—the physical city. There are often multiple reverberations ranging from 
political and economic to social aspects of the city (Davis, 2005).  And cities are not 
just built environments: They are composed of people, social, and political 
institutions, and economic activities with histories and symbolic meanings. They 
generally are internally differentiated in social and spatial terms, so that different parts 
of the city often host different concentrations of these attributes or activities (Harvey, 
1997; Massey, 1992) rendering the city vulnerable to different risks as well as 
unfolding of different processes of recovery (Davis, 2005; Kirshbaum and Sideroff, 
2005).  
 
In Bhuj, struggles related to procurement of housing (or the re-establishment of it) 
represented modalities of coping in a highly uncertain and unequal setting after the 
earthquake, largely set forth by the ensuing town planning exercise. What did the 
massive rehabilitation program which many refer to as ―the second earthquake‖ mean 
for the residents of Bhuj? How did they experience post-earthquake town planning 
while re-establishing their own homes? Given the overview of town planning 
processes in Bhuj, this chapter looks at the multiple resiliencies associated with the 
physical restructuring of the city. 
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Traditional use of the term ―resilience‖ implies a fast return to ―normalcy‖ after a 
devastating event. The faster the return, the more resilient a place is said to be. 
However, there are multiple facets of the return to normalcy: restoration of 
livelihoods, reconstruction of homes, re-establishment of institutions of governance, 
emotional and cultural recovery, and more that have different yet mutually intersecting 
trajectories (Kirshbaum and Sideroff, 2005). In the following sections, I begin with a 
brief discussion on the perceptions and experiences of residents with regard to post-
earthquake town planning and then proceed to elaborate on the processes of recovery 
associated with housing reconstruction and the factors that shaped it. I then look at 
some of the key aspects of changes to sociocultural and economic spaces in the walled 
city and its surroundings, in an attempt to understand how they influenced the 
processes of recovery. 
 
Earthquake as Blessing in Disguise 
 
Many people saw the earthquake in 2001 as a blessing—not only for Bhuj but for 
the entire district of Kachchh. Town planning would not have happened without the 
earthquake. Many remarked, ―Bhuj has now become a real city,‖ mostly in reference 
to the extensive infrastructure development, especially the new road network. An 
elderly resident of Bhuj elaborated on the advantages of the new road network and its 
implications for property values: 
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The road network, now you can get out of Bhuj in 10 minutes . . .  if I want to 
go to the airport or railway station I can get there without any traffic.  Roads 
were built for the next 50 years. The new roads have increased property 
values. People do not always understand the significance of roads. Those who 
lost half of their property in road cutting now have their prices quadrupled. 
The properties on roadside have a very high demand and hence have high 
prices, too.
286
 
 
Despite the new infrastructure, such as the road network and utilities, the ability 
to rebuild homes in their original locations or move to relocation sites was dependent 
on the resolution of ownership-related problems with siblings (or other family 
members in case of ancestral properties). For many, the earthquake was a blessing in 
disguise. Where there had been irreconcilable differences between siblings or family 
members, the government policy to financially compensate or provide plots in 
relocation sites in exchange for plots in the walled city proved to be a great 
opportunity to go separate ways in an economically beneficial manner. Yet not 
everyone could reach an amicable settlement. The government policy required all 
owners of a plot to make a joint application to the local planning authority (BHADA). 
So in cases where siblings could not agree, the opportunity to claim multiple plots 
could not be realized. 
 
Many young women (daughters-in-law) expressed the desire to move out of joint 
families to have their own nuclear families. Although some were deprived of the 
support they received earlier from family members for childcare and other household 
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 A. Thacker (personal communication, Bhuj, January 8, 2008). 
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activities, they considered the new-found social and economic freedom and greater 
decision making power with regards to matters of family and children worth the 
additional burden.
287
  
 
Property owners who had rented out houses and shops to tenants for several years 
at extremely low rents (rates decided several decades before) could now reclaim their 
properties because the rights of tenants ended when buildings collapsed (or were in the 
G-5 damage category).
288
 
 
The housing assistance package for tenants allowed many who could not afford to 
buy land in pre-earthquake times to become homeowners. Several NGOs constructed 
houses in the relocation sites for tenants and low-income homeowners, thereby 
creating a permanent asset for these families. Many who owned apartments before the 
earthquake could ―fulfill the dream of having an independent house on the ground,‖ as 
they qualified for a plot in one of the relocation sites if their apartment building had 
collapsed or was badly damaged. People who owned property in the walled city but 
lived in dilapidated, old ancestral homes, sometimes as small as 20 to 30 ft
2
, benefited 
from access to new infrastructure and homes rebuilt to withstand future earthquakes. 
 
Most of the residents in relocation sites expressed a greater sense of safety due to 
the openness, wider streets, and stronger buildings. ―It is very quiet and peaceful 
                                                 
287
 In contrast, displacement and distance from one’s native land may provide necessary ingredients to 
perpetrate gender power structures and patriarchal relations and ideologies (Moghissi, 1999).  
288
 The tenants were protected by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act of 1948. 
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(bahut shaanti hain),‖ they said. Others enjoyed the double advantage of getting away 
from the haunting memories of the earthquake and getting a bigger plot in a better 
location.  
 
Most residents agreed that the implementation of TP Schemes had resulted in 
better circulation and more open space in the walled city. If another earthquake 
occurred, people could get out of their houses to the new wider streets with ease. The 
new ring road system also helped to reduce the flow of vehicles through the walled 
city and its vicinity. 
 
Recovery through Housing Construction 
 
Town planning exercises did not engage directly with the reconstruction of houses 
other than by the approval of house designs by the planning authority, BHADA. 
However, the physical restructuring exercise along with institutional aspects of urban 
planning intersected with strictures of land ownership and tenancy to determine if, 
when, and how people could re-establish their homes, a significant aspect of recovery 
after the earthquake. The processes of earthquake rehabilitation were situated in 
complex interagency interactions, and technical and administrative procedures were 
often obscure and incomprehensible to a vast majority of the local population. In 
urban Bhuj, such processes challenged residents‘ abilities to deal with uncertainty and 
change. The restoration of homes was influenced by financial constraints, the nature of 
land tenure, and type of ownership. 
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Financial constraints. All new construction built after the earthquake had to 
comply with the improved Development Control Regulations (DCR). This meant use 
of stronger earthquake-proof building materials and construction techniques in a 
reduced built area. Homeowners found the housing assistance provided by the 
government to be insufficient to pay for even the labor charges.
289
 
 
In the case of several of the low-income tenants from the walled city, after a long 
period of waiting, houses were built by a few NGOs either for free or through a cost-
sharing mechanism. Many residents resorted to sale of property or other tangible 
assets (including jewelry and household articles), took loans from banks, or borrowed 
from acquaintances, friends, or relatives. Many used the death compensation of their 
family members. Although loans were made available by several banks to the 
earthquake-affected to build houses, those who owned small businesses or worked as 
daily wage laborers and therefore did not have a regular source of income (which was 
important to be able to pay the monthly interest) found it hard to access such loans. 
Documents such as receipts of property tax payments were necessary for procuring 
loans for house construction. Economically weaker families who had not been paying 
taxes before the earthquake could not qualify for such loans.   
 
The timing of the housing assistance installments also affected the ability of 
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 Maximum of Rs. 1,50,000, and decreased proportionately based on the built area. 
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households to rebuild their homes. Government housing assistance was provided in 
three installments for each phase of construction, spread over a long period of time. 
The government released the first installment in 2001, before town planning was 
announced, and the next in 2002 (to those who met the requirements). Economically 
weaker families spent the first installment on subsistence needs, including food, with 
the hope that when the government gave the next installment they would be able to 
build their houses. However, because of their inability to meet the conditions 
associated with the first installment, they were unable to claim subsequent 
installments, and therefore could not construct houses with the money. Even the 
housing assistance many received came with the price of bribes to government 
employees, including those in BHADA to ―push‖ the file. 
 
Among the earthquake-affected, government employees fared better. The security 
of their jobs made it easier for them to apply for loans. Even in cases where they were 
economically weak and had used their first installment of housing assistance for 
sustenance, they could still get loans which could then be used to construct up to 
plinth level to be eligible for subsequent installments.  
 
Many people who were in a state of shock because of the loss of their dear ones 
did not fill out forms or claim compensation within the deadlines. While availability of 
resources was a major factor determining one‘s ability to rebuild, the nature of land 
tenure, and whether one was an owner, tenant, or an illegal occupant affected the 
process in significant ways. 
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Land tenure as a determinant of recovery. In post-disaster planning and 
reconstruction, the nature of land tenure and ownership determined one‘s ability to 
take advantage of government housing-assistance packages. How one fared in the 
entire rehabilitation process including the reconstruction of houses was dependent on 
whether one was an owner, tenant, illegal occupant, or squatter. In addition, the nature 
of ownership agreements determined whether one was a legal property owner or not.  
 
Owners. In general, owners who had title to a piece of land as well as permissions 
to build on it were in a position of relative advantage. They had more options to 
choose from in available housing locations, either in the walled city or the new 
relocation sites. Though one could either construct a house or purchase one, housing 
assistance could be used to purchase a house only if it had been constructed after the 
earthquake. However, it would be incorrect to say that all owners were equally 
advantaged.  
 
There was an implicit push towards de-densification of the old city. Hence, those 
owners who desired to move to one of the relocation sites received greater support 
from government officials who expedited the process. This was not always the case 
with those who desired to stay back in their previous location in the old city.
290
 The 
slower implementation of Town Planning Schemes further complicated this process of 
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rehabilitation in the old city.  
 
At the level of individual plots, despite the desire to rebuild fast, nobody could 
build until the Preliminary Schemes (Physical Plan for a TP Scheme) were approved 
by the Urban Development Department of the state government. Many believed that 
the delay was intentional, as indicated by the following quote from a long time 
resident of Bhuj and a social activist: 
 
They kept the planning of the inner city for later. They played with the 
psychology of the people and conveyed a feeling that it might take five years. 
And they did it slowly, saying that it was very complicated and all that. So, 
most people went outside to various relocation sites.
291
 
 
Residents of the walled city, who wanted to continue staying there, faced several 
challenges with regard to resolution of problems with their plots. They often felt that 
they were being penalized for their unwillingness to move to the relocation sites and 
thereby somehow interrupting the overall planning process. Many times, despite their 
desire to continue living in the previous location, town planning left them with fewer 
options, as described by this walled city owner: 
 
I was going to live here [in the walled city]. But the plot that was given to us 
after the cutting was of such a shape that it was not possible to construct a 
house there. That is the only reason why we decided to surrender the plot; 
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 This differential treatment towards those who wanted to stay back was expressed by several owners 
in the walled city. 
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otherwise I would have never left that land.
292
  
 
As part of the reconfiguration exercise in the walled city, people who were 
allotted plots away from where they used to be, conflicting with their religious and 
social sensibilities, often surrendered their plots to the government in exchange for 
plot(s) in a relocation site. 
 
Among owners, many could not take advantage of the option to surrender their 
plots in the old city and move to a relocation site. One of the contributing factors was 
the nature of land ownership and title of the plot. In the case of joint ownership among 
siblings, BHADA required all the owners to make a claim jointly to be eligible for 
plots in the relocation sites. If the joint owners had subdivided the plot (even when 
they all lived under the same roof) and had had it recorded in the City Survey records 
(the government agency that maintains records of land parcels within the city 
boundary) each one was eligible to make a claim for a plot (Winchester, 1992).
293
 
However, if the division of property was not documented and City Survey records 
were not updated to reflect the joint ownership, the entire plot was considered as one 
for town planning purposes. This meant that the deductions to the plot as per the town 
planning norms would be applied irrespective of the subdivisions, resulting in uneven 
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 N. Upadhyay (personal communication, Bhuj, February 4, 2008). 
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 A. Ajani (personal communication, Bhuj, October 25, 2006). 
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 For joint families, if each household had a separate kitchen and ration cards, even if the title deed 
was in the name of the father, the sons could make separate claims provided the City Survey records 
indicated that the property had been subdivided. Even if they hadn’t subdivided it at the time of the 
earthquake, if they could prove that there were separate households living in the same house with their 
own ration cards, then BHADA allowed them resurvey the plot, legally subdivide it, and make separate 
claims. 
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deductions across subdivisions. Even if the owners decided to surrender the plot, they 
were eligible for only one plot in the relocation site, although the difference in prices 
would be paid to the owners. 
 
Owners who had rented out their multistoried houses at the time of the earthquake 
faced a unique dilemma. If they were to claim housing assistance and reconstruct the 
house, they had to accommodate all the tenants or reach an agreement regarding 
monetary compensation, as the housing assistance check was issued in the names of 
the owner and the tenant(s). At the same time, if the owner had to abide by the revised 
building control regulations which forbid construction beyond two floors and enforced 
new setbacks, it was practically impossible to accommodate all the tenants. The 
housing assistance was often not enough to reconstruct the house to accommodate a 
few and then compensate the rest. Several such owners did not rebuild their houses for 
many years.  
 
Tenants. At the time of the earthquake, 40% of the residents of Bhuj were 
tenants. If the houses in which tenants had been living were badly damaged in the 
earthquake (G-4 or G-5 category), their right to continue living there ended. Although 
policy recommended that tenants should be accommodated in the reconstructed house, 
it was entirely up to the owner to rebuild the house or allow the tenants to live in the 
rebuilt house, since it was not required by law.
294
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 According to the Tenancy Act, the tenant rents the structure/building and not the land. So if the 
structure is destroyed, then the tenants’ rights cease to exist. In cases where the owner rebuilt the house 
with assistance money, yet did not allow the tenant to live there, if a tenant wanted to establish his/her 
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After town planning, BHADA gave possession of the plots back to the owners as 
per City Survey records and did not want to be involved in verifying who the tenants 
were. If the landlord of a house in the G-5 damage category decided to avail himself of 
the government‘s housing assistance and rebuild a damaged house, the tenant had the 
right to continue living in the newly constructed house for a marginally increased rent. 
The outcomes of this requirement were two: 1) several owners decided not to receive 
the government housing assistance for the fear of having to accommodate their 
previous tenants in the newly constructed houses, and 2) owners and tenants jointly 
received the compensation and reached an agreement according to which the tenant 
would not make claims for continued residence in exchange of a monetary 
compensation. In Bhuj, a majority of the owners did not give possession of rebuilt 
houses back to their previous tenants. 
 
If the owners and tenants failed to reach an agreement and therefore did not claim 
housing assistance, then the money stayed with the government. If the tenant wanted 
to rebuild the house using housing assistance from BHADA, he/she could not get the 
money without the owner‘s approval. Getting approvals from original owners was 
difficult because in many cases the tenants or caretakers did not have the contact 
address of the owners (especially those who had left the houses with caretakers several 
decades earlier). 
                                                                                                                                            
claim, the tenant was asked to settle the matter in court and not through BHADA. The litigation was a 
very lengthy procedure and often would take a minimum of five years, although on rare occasions the 
judgment was made quickly. BHADA did not get involved in such cases. 
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In order to assist tenants whose landlords did not give them back possession of 
their houses, the allocation of plots in relocation sites was extended to these tenants. 
They could purchase plots at a subsidized rate (slightly higher than the rates for 
owners) in one of the two relocation sites, Rawalwadi or Mundra Road. Later this was 
extended to the fourth relocation site at GIDC. The tenant was responsible for 
constructing the house (either using their own money or loans), although in certain 
cases NGOs came to the assistance of lower-income groups.
295
 They could also 
purchase or rent another house in a desired location. However, in that case they were 
not eligible for any assistance from the government. 
 
As indicated in the previous section, most tenants paid nominal rents set several 
decades earlier that were grossly non-reflective of market prices at the time of the 
earthquake. Before the earthquake, the majority of tenants, despite continued 
insistence by their landlords to vacate their houses or pay higher rents, had refused to 
oblige and were protected by the Rent Control Act. At the time of the earthquake, 
some of the tenants even had houses elsewhere in the city that had been rented out. 
Others had purchased land illegally on the periphery of the city through transfer of 
land title of an illegally encroached area or an area authorized for agriculture (that 
does not have the right to be built upon) and built a small house. 
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 Some NGOs catered to specific social groups, as in the case of beneficiaries of Hindu Samaj Britain. 
They built 92 houses in GIDC primarily for Hindus but later extended these to others as they did not 
have enough beneficiaries who met all the requirements. 
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While some people constructed houses in informal areas on plots without legal 
land title (purchased before or after the earthquake), others moved to houses they 
already owned in an informal area, rented one, or encroached upon an area and 
constructed houses.
296
 These choices have not been static. Even during the period 
2003-2008, people resorted to one or more of these options, which one depending on 
changes in their economic status, overall development of the city after town planning, 
distance to work place, social affinities, communal relations, and other factors. 
 
Informal settlers. Despite the fact that over 40% of the urban population of Bhuj 
lived in slums and provided labor to the city, the earthquake rehabilitation and 
reconstruction processes did not adopt any measures for the improvement of these 
informal areas. However, considering the large number of informal settlers in Bhuj, 
state actors agreed to extend housing assistance to the occupants of illegal houses that 
were damaged in the earthquake (G-5 category). Since structures in most informal 
settlements in Bhuj were mostly single storied and much smaller in size, the extent of 
damage was significantly less than the damage to the high-density formal settlements 
in the old city.
297
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 The last of these was least common. 
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 In 2001, the total slum population was estimated to be approximately 70,000, or 42% of the 
projected urban population of 165,000, primarily in municipal wards 9-12. There is a wide variation in 
density of the settlements. Densification of older settlements is taking place as well, especially where 
there is no vacant land in close proximity. They are often segregated on the basis of religion and caste. 
Houses vary from pucca (permanent), semi-pucca to kachchha (temporary) mud houses. Most of the 
houses are single storied with one or two rooms per house. Most of these settlements have access to 
good peripheral roads. The internal roads are often unpaved or kachchha. They lack adequate water 
supply, sanitation, sewerage, and garbage disposal systems. Most of the households have a metered 
system of electricity. Source: BHADA, 2001a. 
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If occupants of informal settlements whose houses had been damaged presented 
proof of residence, such as utility bills or tax receipts (if they have been paying taxes), 
they were eligible for an assistance of Rs. 40,000-50,000 (approximately US $800 to 
1,000). However, in reality, this assistance was extended only to those whose houses 
stood in the way of roads proposed by the Development Plan and had to be 
demolished. Occupants of such houses were eligible for plots in the fourth relocation 
site in GIDC that functioned as the temporary relocation site after the earthquake 
(known as hungami awas or temporary abode). Abhiyan, a regional NGO based in 
Bhuj, constructed nearly 100 houses, while Hindu Samaj Britain built and gave away 
92 houses free of charge. However, many of the beneficiaries did not move into the 
new houses or stayed there for a little while before going back to their previous 
locations. 
 
The non-occupancy of houses constructed for lower-income groups some distance 
from their original places of residence posed an ethical dilemma to the NGOs. On one 
hand, the legal title to a house reduced economic vulnerability of the beneficiary. On 
the other hand, there was a question of the appropriateness of creating new housing 
which might not reflect actual demand. Stigma attached to sites where low-income 
groups were being resettled posed additional challenges.  
 
Beyond the officially ―mediated‖ process of relocation and rebuilding as part of 
the earthquake rehabilitation project, there were other processes of physical 
rebuilding. After the earthquake, many people encroached on vacant government land 
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and built permanent or semi-permanent structures; people also moved to existing 
informal settlements. 
 
There was also significant in-migration after the earthquake. Some of the migrant 
laborers continued to live in the temporary shelters vacated by others in various sites. 
Others moved into existing informal settlements. Yet the option of making land 
available at affordable rates to those who had a legitimate interest in living in the city 
was not considered by the government. The town planners were hesitant to allot plots 
to them as indicated below: 
 
Current residents of these houses [temporary shelters in the fourth relocation 
site] are mostly people who have come from outside or staying on rent, who 
do not have anything in Bhuj. They are demanding the allocation of plots but 
do not have any legal status to make such a claim. We have given plots to 
tenants, apartment owners, and encroachers, but these people do not fall into 
these categories. There are even people who have come to live in Bhuj for 
employment. They have to vacate because this was a temporary arrangement 
and we have already allotted plots to those who are legally entitled.
298
 
 
State actors feared that if the government provided plots to economically weaker 
sections of the population (including migrant laborers) it would spur further in-
migration. Setting a precedence of extending land ownership to ―non-residents‖ was 
avoided to eliminate the possibility of similar demands in future.
299
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 C. Bhatt (personal communication, Bhuj, February 6, 2008). 
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After the earthquake, there were several demands from informal settlers to get 
land regularized. The Chief Minister of Gujarat during his visit to Kachchh promised 
(―gave his word in writing‖) that those living in slum areas, even those unaffected by 
Development Plan roads and other rehabilitation projects, would be regularized in-
situ, once all other earthquake rehabilitation projects were implemented. However, 
even in 2008 no such initiatives had begun.
300
 
 
Despite their willingness to pay for the land (and also property taxes upon 
regularization) in exchange for legal ownership and extension of basic facilities, most 
people lacked the technical know-how or financial resources to go through the lengthy 
procedure. Such households were largely dependent on their community leaders or 
political representatives to facilitate the process. Individuals with financial resources 
went to Gandhi Nagar, the state capital, and got their land regularized. 
 
The government‘s earthquake rehabilitation program largely stayed away from 
addressing the problems faced by informal settlers. Encroachment encouraged by 
economic interests was another deterrent.
301
 Those who were affected by DP roads 
were given the option of purchasing land at subsidized rates in GIDC relocation site, 
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 A. Dhar (personal communication, Ahmedabad, February 8, 2008). 
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 M. Pandya, Founder and President of Bhuj Chhoppadpatti (slum) Action Committee (personal 
communication, Bhuj, January 20, 2007). 
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 In many cases, businesses that needed space to store their stock used existing structures (or even 
built new ones with help of encroachers) in the informal settlements instead of purchasing land from the 
government and constructing a storage facility. The informal settlements also had a thriving real estate 
business patronized by several affluent people who constructed buildings or houses in slums and rented 
them to others. This was seen by these ―developers‖ as an easier way to make profit without the hassle 
of developing a formal housing society and then collecting installments from the residents. (Source: 
Ibid.) 
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even when they had illegally encroached upon government land.  
 
 Socioeconomic Changes in the Walled City 
 
In the preceding sections of this study, using the parameters defined by the state 
—such as damage category, type of tenure, and legality with regard to 
landownership—I discussed the multiple resiliencies of residents of Bhuj in re-
establishing their homes under the earthquake rehabilitation program. There are also 
other, less tangible aspects of recovery contingent upon processes of physical 
restructuring of a city—such as economic, social, and emotional recovery. Efforts to 
re-establish one‘s home were dependent on other forms of resilience associated with 
the physical city, the sociocultural lives of its residents and institutions, its economy, 
and its institutions of governance. These processes of resilience were shaped by both 
the earthquake and the planning exercise that followed, often referred to by the 
residents as the ―second earthquake.‖302 The following sections look into some of 
these processes of recovery, which were equally as important as the rebuilding of 
houses.  
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Many residents used the term ―the second earthquake‖ to refer to the post-earthquake town planning 
process implying its disruptive nature as well as the lack of control and state of powerlessness they 
experienced. 
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Changes to the walled city economy. How did post-earthquake town 
planning and city-rebuilding processes interact with the walled city economy, on 
which the livelihoods of most residents of Bhuj were dependent? 
 
As policy-making and planning processes unfolded, economic rehabilitation was 
addressed separately from the development of housing and infrastructure.
303
 While 
plots were given and housing loans made available to the earthquake-affected, urban 
rehabilitation was devoid of livelihood options. Also, restoring the regional economy 
was prioritized over the local economy.
304
  
 
The market areas of the walled city occupied a significant position in the 
socioeconomic fabric of the city. In Bhuj, prior to the earthquake, the main markets 
supplied agricultural products to the entire region of Kachchh.
305
 Nearly 20,000 to 
25,000 military personnel in the city also contributed to the customer base. Non-
residents Kachchhis, living in Europe, America, and other parts of the world, during 
annual visits to their ancestral homes (in different parts of Kachchh including the 24 
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 The government built approximately 350 temporary shops in two locations for shop owners as well 
as tenants whose shops had been fully damaged (G-5 category) and gave the use of them free of charge. 
However, owing to their inappropriate location, far away from all major residential sites, the shops were 
not utilized very well. Shoppers who used to go to the old market did not go to the new location just 
because the businesses moved there. Therefore, while most owners kept these shops, as far as possible 
they rebuilt in the old location whenever they could. The temporary shops were demolished later by the 
government (BHADA). 
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 During the Meiji Restoration of Tokyo, according to Carola Hein, ―Governmental policy was to 
create first and foremost those buildings and urban structures crucial to industrial development and 
modernization—such as factories, ministries, and infrastructure—leaving most of the city, particularly 
neighborhoods and the homes of ordinary citizens, relatively unchanged or only transformed under the 
influence of private investment‖ (Hein, 2005). 
305
 The markets were regularly frequented by people from neighboring villages to buy produce and 
consumer goods. Bhuj had a floating population of approximately 30,000. 
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villages surrounding Bhuj) frequented the markets, contributing significantly to the 
local economy. 
 
Decongestion of the walled city. The pre-earthquake urban fabric (along with 
its population distribution) actively preserved a local economy, the restructuring of 
which had detrimental effects on small businesses and craftsmen financially 
unequipped to adapt to changes brought about by town planning processes. 
Decongestion of the walled city following the development of new residential sites led 
to a drastic decline in clientele.
306
 Several government offices were relocated from 
inside the walled city to make room for land reconfiguration and de-densification 
efforts as part of town planning. This meant a loss of clientele for small businesses 
around these offices as well as nearby markets. 
 
Delays in finalizing the town planning schemes in the walled city led to disruption 
of businesses. This, along with the emergence of new commercial centers in other 
parts of the city, significantly challenged the viability of many of the businesses in the 
old bazaars of the walled city. Several of the gold and silver shops, banks, sweet meat 
shops, paint shops, as well as shops selling luxury goods, shifted to more lucrative 
locations such as the Hospital Road. With several new and bigger shops on the main 
thoroughfares outside the walled city, people from the nearby housing societies (as 
well as the relocation sites) did not have any incentives to go to the old markets when 
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the same products and services were available in closer proximity. Shoppers from 
nearby villages who used to arrive at the bus station on the western periphery of the 
walled city before proceeding to the old markets now preferred to go to the big stores 
on Hospital Road or Vaniawad or the new ring roads.
307
   
 
Shops in the bazaar that were reduced to make room for town planning needs 
suffered loss in business from the reduction of shop size.
308
 Others were allocated 
plots far from the original location of the shop as part of the Town Planning Scheme 
reconfiguration exercise, even when plots were available adjacent to the original 
ones.
309
 Certain businesses, such as medical suppliers and pharmacies, moved outside 
of the walled city to the new shopping center constructed in one of the relocation sites.  
 
Effects of the new road network. The new road network altered the viability 
of businesses based on their location with respect to main roads. While shops located 
on the new ring roads or radials saw a tremendous increase not only in property values 
but also its clientele due to better access, those located away from these and those 
towards the northern side of the city struggled to keep the businesses running. The 
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 It was mostly people from the four municipal wards who used to shop in the old markets, the same 
wards that suffered maximum damage in the earthquake and were subsequently decongested as part of 
town planning. 
307
 Vainiawad area, located along the southern part of the walled city, is dominated by the trading 
community of Jains. 
308
 Due to delays in arriving at the Final TP Scheme layout (where property values and compensations 
are finalized), many owners who had their shops cut for widening roads did not get compensated for a 
long time. 
309
 Due to the dramatic appreciation of property values of plots adjacent to the main roads and their 
commercial potential, people with political clout or financial resources often pressured the local level 
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shifting of the wholesale grain market from the Bhid area in the northern part of the 
walled city to a new location outside of it led to loss of clientele for the old bazaars 
nearby as people from neighboring villages no longer came to the walled city to 
purchase grains. After the earthquake, since Bhuj was completely destroyed, many 
wholesale businesses moved to less affected places such as Naliya, Nakhtarana, and 
Mundra, and they set up shops there. 
 
Within and around the walled city, construction of new roads as well as widening 
of existing ones encouraged commercial use along them. Dramatic appreciation of 
property values, an indirect outcome of the implementation of town planning schemes, 
made property on the new roads affordable only to wealthy businesses. Real estate on 
the new ring roads now constitutes prime commercial property in the walled city area, 
resulting in a significant change from residential to commercial uses. People with plots 
next to the ring roads saw property values skyrocket after the re-evaluation of property 
values as well as construction of new roads. Many found it economically beneficial to 
construct shops and rent them to wealthier businesses who could afford the high rents. 
 
Government assistance to businesses. Under the 60-40 scheme, government 
gave loans with a 40% subsidy to shop owners and tenants whose shops were 
categorized as G-5. These subsidies were offered in order to start businesses. There 
was no assistance, however, to rebuild shops. A tenant‘s rights were terminated after 
                                                                                                                                            
state machinery or the TPOs to get such plots in lieu of their original plots located somewhere in the TP 
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the earthquake and the possession of the property reverted to the owner. So if a 
shopkeeper who had operated a business from a rented facility wanted to resume 
business in the same place, he/she had to reach an agreement with the owner. The 
other option was to purchase a shop at any of the relocation sites on a 99-year 
lease.
310
The higher costs of these shops and their location away from the main market 
areas discouraged many people from buying them. 
 
Despite the availability of a special assistance package for trade and commerce, 
small businesses could not benefit from it. There were charges of corruption in the 
beneficiary selection and allocations of funds. Many small businesses, especially those 
that operated from rented facilities, did not get any of the loans and therefore had to 
take high interest loans just to keep their businesses going. Others who could not get 
loans adapted to the dire financial situation by shifting to the sale of lower-value 
goods, shutting down their own businesses, working for others, or seeking other forms 
of employment that paid less than what they were used to. 
 
Vulnerabilities and resiliencies of walled city businesses. The earthquake 
also exposed certain hidden vulnerabilities of small enterprises engaged in gold and 
silver jewelry making. In the case of gold and silver craftsmen (karigar), the 
merchants used to leave gold or silver (undocumented, referred to as ―black‖) with the 
                                                                                                                                            
Scheme area. 
310
 The possession of the property will be with BHADA. In the case of properties on lease, there is no 
sale, but just the transfer of lease. BHADA will be the owner of the property. 
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artisans.
311
 When the earthquake hit, most artisans found their precious metals stolen 
or they were unable to retrieve it from the debris. Merchants insisted that the gold or 
silver be returned to them before they would give the craftsmen more work. Since 
most gold and silversmiths failed to do so, they were unable to procure any more 
work. In the absence of economic help, many could not re-establish their businesses 
and in turn their employees often had to become daily wage laborers or return to their 
villages. 
 
While restoration of livelihoods could have been expedited by making 
commercial spaces available faster and by resuming businesses in the markets before 
individual issues were dealt with, due to the unrealistic deadlines for the completion of 
urban rehabilitation work efforts to re-establish the markets and the livelihoods did not 
succeed.
312
 Some who were ―fortunate‖ to enjoy the patronage of beneficent 
administrators were successful in re-establishing their businesses after a long struggle. 
Many who ran businesses from rented facilities or informal temporary shops or cabins 
around the street corners on government land or public streets could not purchase the 
piece of land which they had earlier occupied or something adjacent to it. They could 
buy a shop in one of the relocation sites or a commercial plot in the walled city (where 
the rates were lower) or illegally occupy public land. In the new town planning 
scheme, there was no room for such small businesses. 
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  N. Joshi (personal communication, Bhuj, May 29, 2007), and D. Pomal (personal communication, 
Bhuj, May 31, 2007). 
312
  N. Tewari (personal communication, New Delhi, March 22, 2007). 
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The economic recovery of the walled city was also influenced by the prominent 
business communities. Despite their move to the Noor Foundation housing society, 
Bohras continued to do business in the walled city. On the other hand, Khatris, a Sunni 
Muslim community engaged in the craft of tie and dye, or Bandhani, largely stayed 
back in their pre-earthquake locations or moved to locations north of the walled city 
(formal and informal housing colonies). Shops selling Bandhani (tie and dye) 
mushroomed, especially along the ring roads. There has been an influx of other 
communities into the business. Despite the initial slowdown caused by the earthquake, 
these artisans received significant exposure to an international market. But while their 
clientele expanded from the pre-earthquake days, most families who were in the 
business before the earthquake hardly catered to the local market. The Bandhani 
artisans recovered faster from the earthquake since they did not require tools or 
machinery like other craftsmen. 
 
Although the wholesale grain market moved from the Bhid area, many claimed 
that it was cheaper to run business from the Bhid than from the new, distant 
location.
313
 Despite setting up shops at the new site, businesses belonging to the 
Lohana community of Hindu traders, with its monopoly over the wholesale grain 
business, began resuming their business in the Bhid bazaar.
314
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 Under the initiative of the District Collector, land was given by government for setting up the 
wholesale market at a rate of Rs. 800-900 per m
2
. Shops were constructed with individuals’ own money 
on 50, 100 and 200 m
2
 plots. Some were reserved for businesses from the old city market. 
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In the absence of data regarding changes to the economic performance of walled 
city businesses, it is premature to conclude that the commercial significance of the 
walled city will come to an end soon. Despite indications of reduced commercial 
activity in the older markets, certain segments of the old market area, like the 
Bohri/Danda bazaar, continues its dominance in the supply of certain goods. Many 
referred to Danda bazaar as the ―backbone of the market.‖ Its faster recovery and 
continued operation have contributed to the economic viability of nearby businesses. 
 
Alteration of sociocultural spaces. What implications did the physical 
restructuring of the city have on the sociocultural spaces and the relationships 
embedded in them? Consider this quote from a resident who lived in the walled city 
prior to the earthquake: 
 
Makaan tau ache bane hain… sadkein ache bane hain, lekin dil alag ho gaye 
[good houses have been constructed, good roads have been built, but hearts 
have grown distant]…falia sanskruti is completely lost. If you go to Soniwad 
today…everyone would be sitting in their own homes, no one would talk to 
their neighbors…315 
 
The reification of caste-based communities by the town planning processes 
influenced the falia culture (neighborhood culture), as narrated by a long-time resident 
of Bhuj:  
                                                                                                                                            
314
 20-25 tenants who ran businesses from shops owned by the Memon community (Sunni Muslim 
trading community) prior to the earthquake are rebuilding the shops with their own money with consent 
from the Memon Community Trust. A. Memon (personal communication, Bhuj, June 21, 2007). 
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In a falia, right from entering the major street into one‘s falia, one would 
know each and every person of the falia, his economic status, his family 
business, his vices, and his poverty. Everybody was part of a larger family. 
Now that falia culture is gone. What cardinal mistake they [government 
agencies] committed was, in the relocation sites they encouraged to go 
community-wise, though in the falias all communities lived together. It was 
the fabric of the city. Now what has happened is that again people are living 
just in their own communities, observing the same rituals and customs. 
Earlier Muslims and other communities were there. Now communities have 
been compartmentalized. This has far reaching implications for the character 
of the city.
316
 
 
In the walled city, public areas were of utmost importance as they were essential 
to maintaining the quality of life in a neighborhood and to the way in which people 
perceived and identified with their community and neighborhood. They often took the 
form of open chowks (squares) and/or community halls. Families belonging to a 
particular community used to have their communal gatherings, wakes, weddings, and 
other festivities in their community halls or open spaces in the falia/sheri 
(neighborhood/street).  
 
Elements of the built form like the courtyards and otla (sitting platforms adjoining 
the compound wall or the building façade) were part of a hierarchy of social spaces 
that allowed for different levels of interactions with members of the family, 
community, and neighborhood. Festivals like Navratri, Diwali, and Muharram often 
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 A. A. Munshi (personal communication, Bhuj, January 11, 2006). 
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involved rituals of public participation. The falias and chowks brought otherwise 
separate individuals into a common civic space.
317
  
 
One of the key decisions made by EPC, the planning firm, was to provide street 
access to each and every house. Since there had been no planned development in the 
city, the streets were extremely congested. As part of the town planning process, a 
significant number of traditional gathering places (many garbi grounds) were used to 
decongest neighborhoods and make way for new streets.
 318
 In Bhuj, ―deli‖ (cluster)  
type of construction was very common. Each deli had four or five houses with a 
common entrance and a courtyard. In order to widen streets, EPC also used the 
courtyard in delis.
319
 An elderly resident of Bhuj explained why it was important to 
have these communal gathering spaces:  
  
Removal of chowks poses a great danger to society. Community activities 
have gone astray now. The kids used to play there. When such spaces 
disappear kids and youngsters start getting engaged in other activities. The 
structure of society has been altered. Now Bhuj has become a society with all 
independent houses. The 400- to 500-year-old culture of the city has been 
destroyed in town planning.
320
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
316
  N. Upadhyay (personal communication, Bhuj, April 2, 2008). 
317
 Yet they can also be the focal points for group assertion, communal disputes and sectarian 
contestation, reflective of existing intergroup cleavages or intragroup divides (Varshney, 2002, p. 181-
182).  
318
 This is a traditional dance form performed by both men and women during Navratri, a Hindu 
festival, which brought together people from all walks of life, across communities and religions, into 
the neighborhood space. 
319
 This in turn led to another set of problems, particularly with regard to entrances. Sometimes 
entrance was given through kitchens. Some lost staircases to make room for the entrance, etc. 
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With the implementation of Town Planning Schemes with their regularized plots, 
many of the neighborhood spaces have been eliminated, and new spaces reserved for 
public use were demarcated. Some of these were used to resolve issues related to TP 
Schemes, while others were sold by BHADA. Many residents expressed concerns 
about how the land readjustment with the reorganizing of the housing layout, street 
network, and hierarchy of semi-public and public spaces has torn up ―close-knit 
communities.‖ In several cases, new streets crisscross earlier residential precincts 
(falias and the sheris), reducing them to a collection of houses from a vibrant cohesive 
community. It is mostly the middle-aged and the older generations who miss the social 
interactions offered by the falia, strong ties, mutual support, and security that it 
afforded.
321
 
 
Dispersal of neighborhoods. De-densification of the walled city carried out by 
the state under the rubric of post-earthquake urban planning and rehabilitation 
processes led to dispersal of families and neighborhoods to various relocation sites as 
well as other settlements in the city. This had significant social and economic 
implications for people‘s abilities to interact with extended family members and 
neighbors, earlier afforded by the dense urban form of the walled city, as indicated by 
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 N. Upadhyay (personal communication, Bhuj, July 7, 2007). 
321
 In the context of recovery and rehabilitation, sociologists (Bolin and Stanford, 1998) cultural-
anthropologists (Oliver-Smith, 1986; Oliver-Smith and Hoffman, 1999; Torry, 1986; Turton, 1977) 
indicate the positive role of social and community interactions and associations in community recovery. 
Recovery, adjustment, and sustainability of communities after natural disasters are all founded on a 
very deep sense of place attachment and meaning (Altman and Low, 1992; Marcus, 1997 as cited in 
Macatol, 1999). 
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a resident of one of the relocation sites: 
 
Earlier when someone died or if there was a wedding in the family, one could 
go around the neighborhood and inform others, whereas now you‘ll have to 
hire an auto-rickshaw or use your own vehicle to inform people. With 
everybody dispersed, you‘ll have to go all over the city and that has become a 
very time consuming and expensive ordeal.
322
   
 
Despite the physical distances and the exorbitant costs involved, individuals and 
families are bound by social obligations, the sense of ―jaana tau padega‖ (have to go). 
However, the demand on time and financial implications of traveling to distant 
locations restrict their participation in community gatherings. In the relocation sites, 
residents negotiated with their changed circumstances, as indicated by the following 
quote from a resident of Rawalwadi relocation site: 
 
Socially, it‘s very different from how we used to live before the earthquake. 
Everybody lived next to each other; there was the chowk [neighborhood 
square]…kya kar sakte hain? Jo mila hain usse jeena tau padega na? [what 
can we do? We would have to live with whatever we got, right?] We cannot 
leave this place and go. It‘s definitely not like what it used to be in the falia. 
But there are facilities here, roads, water, light, gutter lines. Inside gam 
[walled city] where we used to live, these facilities were not available. Water 
wouldn‘t come, there was no gutter connection . . . roads were not there . . . 
these facilities are available here.
323
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 Resident of Bhuj (personal communication, Bhuj, January 28, 2007). 
323
 Resident of Rawalwadi relocation site (personal communication, Bhuj, August 28, 2006). 
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Residents of Bhuj dealt with the changes to the built form and the social fabric in 
various ways. Older men and women who felt ―attached‖ to the walled city frequented 
it to interact with their old friends, relatives, and neighbors, as well as to buy materials 
in bulk from the old city‘s markets. Many left their homes in the relocation sites in the 
morning and returned in the evening. Despite the city bus service that connected the 
relocation sites with the walled city, regular trips turned out to be expensive for lower-
income families and retirees. 
 
From the youth, there was a mixed response to such changes. Many missed the 
sense of togetherness and support that most falias offered. Younger men who used to 
gather after dinner in their neighborhoods now rode their motorbikes to meet up with 
old friends who moved to different parts of the city after the earthquake. Among 
residents of the relocation sites, those who had been living outside the walled city 
prior to the earthquake did not share the same sense of isolation as those who had 
previously lived in the walled city. Many were optimistic that with time the adaptive 
nature of human beings would allow those who moved from the walled city to 
overcome their sense of isolation and that new forms of association would be created 
in the relocation sites. 
 
Despite his faith in people‘s abilities to deal with changes to their socio-cultural 
lives, a resident of RTO relocation site and retired government employee explained 
why it might take a while before stronger social ties are established between residents 
of the new relocation sites: 
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Now it‘s hard to have that kind of emotional attachments. Now here we have 
to create our own circle. But in order to create new relations, you need time, 
there must be trust. Here our neighbors who are of our own caste and might 
even be relatives, there is not the same kind of attachment. Also this is a 
housing colony. Here, when the gate to one‘s house is closed, there is no 
access. People stay inside their homes. It‘s not the same as in the gam, 
especially in the falia system. 
 
In the above quote, the resident alludes to some of the factors that shaped the 
associational ties that existed in the falias of the walled city, such as its embeddedness 
in the urban form, and its genesis in quotidian interactions based on familiarity and 
trust developed over several years. It also indicates that these ties were not just defined 
by caste or religion, but often transcended them. Hence, such associations could not be 
simulated in the relocation sites amongst members of the same caste or religion with 
no shared history and whose only common characteristic was their familial ties, caste, 
or religion. 
 
Many residents observed an increase in impersonal relationships. In most 
relocation sites, temples (along with some public parks) came to perform the function 
of social spaces. Plots reserved for community purposes (sarvajanik or public plots) as 
per the new layout plans of the relocation sites were largely vacant. People adapted to 
the changed physical settings by redefining social boundaries as they resettled in the 
new locations, even when it was with members of the same community.  Post-
earthquake Bhuj entered into a phase of change. 
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Emotional coping. Despite acknowledgement of the psychological effects of 
the earthquake on affected populations, the dialectic relationship between physical 
resilience and emotional coping were largely overlooked by the state. While faster 
rebuilding and restoration of livelihoods can have a positive impact on emotional 
coping (restoring a sense of normalcy), uncertainties posed by post-earthquake town 
planning and reconstruction processes complicated the emotional coping processes.  
 
Traditional use of the term resilience in a disaster context implies restoration of 
livelihoods and economy, reconstruction of homes and infrastructure, as well as 
physical and emotional recovery. While restoration and development of urban 
infrastructure might indicate resilience of the city, it does not necessarily imply 
individual and societal resilience and well-being. In Bhuj, the different yet mutually 
interacting trajectories of these forms of resilience indicated variations in not only the 
ability to recover from the disaster but also in the uncertainties that the rehabilitation 
process itself posed. 
 
Emotional recovery is an important aspect of dealing with various instances of 
loss as well as change (Marris, 1974, 1996).  Immediately after the earthquake, many 
of the residents of the walled city used to visit their damaged homes regularly to 
grieve the loss of family members and their homes, and this continued for several 
years. For many it had the effect of a ―pain killer.‖ While economic conditions 
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improved (asset creation through new plots and structurally safe houses) and the city 
was rebuilt with improved infrastructure, many who had lost family members were not 
able to recover from the trauma. Despite several camps and trauma centers run by 
NGOs and other organizations, lack of emotional recovery was a persistent problem. 
Families that continued to live together or in close proximity found it easier to adapt to 
their new surroundings. The differential nature of emotional recovery and adaptive 
capacities of individuals in different spatial and social settings underscores the 
significance of socioeconomic interactions afforded by the built environment in 
shaping people‘s abilities to cope with disasters. It is yet another indication of the 
dialectic relationship between physical, social, and emotional recovery. 
 
Invisible violence. One of the distinct outcomes of post-earthquake spatial 
restructuring processes was the absence of Muslims in the relocation sites. Most 
families that owned land in the old city retained ownership of their plots. Very few 
applied for plots in relocation sites. Among those who were allotted plots, most sold 
their plots as such or sold them after constructing a house. By and large, Muslims 
preferred to stay close to their own community members either in the walled city or in 
areas in the northern part of the city outside the wall.
324
 Organized and affluent 
Muslim communities such as the Memons and Bohras built new housing colonies 
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 Loyalty to one’s home ground after being struck by disaster has been observed as a common 
sentiment among survivors (Wolfenstein, 1957, in Oliver-Smith, 2001, p. 101) often manifesting in a 
strong sense of attachment to the place along with tendencies to idealize the lost place (Marris, 1974). 
Resistance to relocation, a defense and shoring up of threatened identity, is constituted as an affirmation 
of  identity and a defense against cultural collapse (Hansen and Oliver-Smith, 1982). However, others 
have pointed to the dynamic and adaptive nature of identity beyond its ―rootedness‖ in a place (Malkki, 
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(mostly formal). Economically backward communities either stayed back in the old 
city (if the houses could be repaired) or stayed in the temporary relocation site or in 
rented facilities until they were able to rebuild their homes in the old city. Others 
moved to informal settlements in the northern part of the city. Educationally 
backward, poor Muslims suffered the double disadvantage (interlocking oppressions) 
of lack of economic opportunities for self-improvement as well as reduced bargaining 
power with the state. 
 
Efforts by the state to avoid ―ghettoization‖ of Muslims yielded the opposite 
effect. The proposal submitted by the planning consultant to develop one of the 
relocation sites in the northern part of the city was rejected by the state government to 
prevent the creation of a site with a concentrated Muslim population. Yet, Muslim 
families who could not rebuild in their previous locations moved to both formal as 
well as informal areas with existing Muslim populations. A site with planned housing 
and infrastructure facilities would have significantly improved the living conditions of 
economically backward Muslims and other socioeconomically backward populations 
who lived in formal and informal settlements in the northern part of the city in 
deplorable conditions. 
 
Muslims largely preferred not to stay in any of the three relocation sites because 
of perceived lack of social safety. Some articulated it as a conscious rejection of 
relocation sites by a large number of Muslim families. However, the decision to 
                                                                                                                                            
1992; Gupta and Ferguson, 1997) and how such dynamics were entangled with larger economic 
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relocate or stay with people of the same community had been influenced by communal 
tensions after 2002. Creation of a critical mass was seen by many Muslims as a form 
of security against future aggression.  
 
Hindu-Muslim engagement in the old city and its business life explains why, 
despite shocking riots in other parts of Gujarat and some incidents in Kachchh, the old 
city remained relatively peaceful.
325
 ―Ankh ki Sharam‖ (a look of shame in the eye, 
especially when engaging in a wrongful deed to someone familiar)—owing to 
familiarity and quotidian interactions facilitated by a dense urban form where 
communities that lived in physical proximity even though with very distinct 
sociocultural practices and without any formal associational ties maintained a sense of 
tolerance and civic interactions—was a major factor for the absence of communal 
tensions. And not all falias were coherent entities either. Over the years, different 
communities moved in and out of the neighborhoods as far as they were within the 
―tolerable‖ limits. 
 
The small size of the city, its social fabric, and its dense urban form rather than 
the structure of its economy had nurtured inter-communal engagements resulting in a 
climate of tolerance. In the informal sectors, many transactions are still carried out 
without any formal contracts, yet they are not always inter-religious transactions. 
                                                                                                                                            
development and cultural preservation schemes (Sorensen, 1997; Wilmsen, 1989). 
325
 Gujarat has the highest per capita rate of deaths in communal incidents at around 117 per million of 
urban population (Varshney, 2004). However Kachchh has been relatively peaceful. Despite being a 
BJP stronghold, Kachchh did not experience any violence except for a few incidents in Anjar (Yagnik 
and Sheth, 2006). 
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Though the city has a majority Hindu population, businesses whose clientele spread 
across religious lines have proactively avoided communal flare-ups.  
 
Although there has been an absence of inter-communal conflicts, especially of a 
violent nature, a sense of social marginalization and separation is prevalent. One finds 
signs of growing mistrust among people even in areas of the walled city where both 
Hindus and Muslims had lived in close proximity for generations. This is manifested 
in various forms, including the propaganda in Soniwad area of the walled city, located 
adjacent to the Muslim neighborhoods. The propaganda is that Muslims have been 
consolidating their hold over the walled city by purchasing all the plots in the area and 
that a time would come when all the properties would be owned by Muslims.
326
 
Earlier, if the socioeconomic characteristics of the population defined the North-South 
divide, with the absence of Muslims in the relocation sites and their consolidation in 
the formal and informal settlements in the North, the North-South divide has taken a 
religious tone. 
 
The state‘s act of distancing itself from the socioeconomic realities of 
marginalized groups and its lack of recognition of the inter-communal relations 
embedded in the urban form in the processes of spatial restructuring spurred processes 
of resilience that negatively impacted social relationships and long-term social and 
physical vulnerabilities of marginalized populations. Its efforts to avoid spatial 
concentration of religious minorities (the Muslims in particular) led to greater 
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  N. Upadhyay (personal communication, Bhuj, February 4, 2008). 
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consolidation, perpetrated the notion of ―invisible violence‖ against Muslims, and led 
to greater religious segregation in the city. 
 
Earthquake Rehabilitation and Multiple Resiliencies 
 
In Bhuj, residents‘ processes of recovery—re-establishing their houses as well as 
economic and sociocultural recovery—were contingent upon processes of physical 
alteration of the city in the aftermath of the earthquake. The town planning process 
with its preoccupation with physical planning separated itself from socioeconomic and 
cultural aspects of recovery of those affected. Measures taken to reduce physical 
vulnerability to future earthquakes were not linked with policies and programs for 
restoration of livelihoods or the economy of the city. This meant that even when most 
people had in principle multiple options for housing under earthquake rehabilitation 
packages as well as town planning,   instability in their livelihoods meant they could 
not benefit from this choice. 
 
Strict deadlines, need for supporting documentation, and uncertainty regarding the 
implementation of town planning (compounded by lack of clear understanding of the 
implications of town planning measures on property values, the urban form, and  the 
social fabric of the city) affected recovery. In addition, the spatial restructuring 
processes did not leave room for longer and more painful processes of emotional 
recovery from trauma due to the loss of dear ones as well as altered economic 
circumstances within the family.  
 256 
 
The changes to the walled city brought about by town planning had direct 
implications for the economic recovery of residents. Reconfiguration and 
decongestion of the walled city associated with implementation of town planning, 
infrastructure development, and subsequent increases in land values had significant 
impacts on businesses—including higher rents, loss or gain of businesses based on 
location vis-à-vis main thoroughfares, loss of clientele from the walled city, etc.  
Small businesses or artisans who were victims of hidden vulnerabilities in their 
particular trade (such as goldsmiths and silversmiths) not only had to find alternative 
livelihoods but also left those dependent on them for employment without any safety 
nets.  
 
Although attempts were made by local administrators to create commercial spaces 
in relocation sites, these were often unaffordable to lower income residents. Others 
who still depended on the networks and connections in the walled city had to run their 
businesses from the walled city, even if it meant commuting to the city every day from 
the relocation sites. In addition, widespread corruption in the beneficiary selection and 
allocation of commercial assistance packages deprived many people of the resources 
to rebuild their shops or re-establish businesses. Yet, for many who could access loans 
or other financial resources or influence the allocation of plots to their advantage, the 
earthquake and ensuing town planning led to significant economic gains in terms of 
access to property or land at subsidized rates and sudden increase in their property 
values.  
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Disaster, per se, does not result in an increase in land prices; however, the 
expectation of subsequent physical development often fuels speculation.
327 
In the case 
of the walled city, as part of the town planning process, land values of the Final Plots 
(after reconfiguration and deductions for new roads and reserved plots) were re-
evaluated to account for the increase in values by virtue of better shaped plots with 
access roads and new infrastructure. The differences between pre- and post- town 
planning land prices were significantly large. These increases were justified on the 
basis of the lower pre-earthquake prices as recorded in land revenue records that were 
not reflective of actual market prices (a conscious strategy adopted by property owners 
to minimize taxes and the registration fee, proportionate to the value of the land or 
property in transaction).
328
 
 
Reserved plots created as part of the town planning scheme process were 
auctioned by BHADA.
329
 The first auction that took place in Vaniawad, the prime 
commercial area in the walled city, led to sale of plots at extremely high prices owing 
to their commercial potential. These prices were then used as the baseline to determine 
or readjust prices of adjacent plots, setting a trend for the rest of the city. While 
increase in land or property values was seen as a positive outcome for owners, these 
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 After the earthquake there was a significant increase in rents due to shortage of safe, habitable 
houses that survived the earthquake and also a moratorium on construction within the walled city until 
the TP scheme preparation was completed.  
328
 During the evaluation process, if someone wanted to contest   government prices, such claims had to 
be substantiated with records of sales of their own property or sales in the neighborhood indicating 
property sale values consistent with the claim. 
329
 This policy was not crafted by the state government, but decided among the CEO, District Collector, 
and Town Planner. It was opposed by the Gujarat High Court. 
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land value increases were reflected in the betterment charges that individual owners 
were required to pay to the planning authority. The tremendous rise in land values 
often limited or even deprived economically backward families access to land, making 
it extremely difficult to buy land adjacent to their houses for extending the house or to 
be used as a workshop (especially in the case of artisans and small enterprises).
330
 
 
Most residents of Bhuj considered the earthquake a blessing because of the 
ensuing physical development of the city characterized by the new road network, 
improved services, better houses with street access, and economic development of the 
region through industrialization. With the option of buying plots in the relocation sites 
in exchange for their plots in the walled city, many families were able to resolve 
property-related family in-fighting, attain greater economic freedom from joint 
families, escape from traumatic memories of the earthquake, and improve their living 
standards. Allocation of plots in the relocation sites increased homeownership 
significantly. Many homeowners who had rented their houses for several decades got 
rid of their problematic tenants since the tenants‘ rights were terminated when the 
building they occupied collapsed. 
 
However, the long journey from temporary shelters to permanent houses 
depended on availability of financing. Government employees fared better in getting 
access to loans. The time interval between release of first and second installments of 
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 As part of the town planning process, once the final plots were handed back to the owners after 
deductions, any additional land they needed, even when that need was a creation of planning process 
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housing assistance meant that economically weaker families, who had spent the first 
installment on food and basic sustenance, did not get to claim subsequent installments 
and therefore were unable to use assistance money to construct houses. How one fared 
in the entire rehabilitation process including the reconstruction of houses also 
depended on whether one was an owner, tenant, illegal occupant, or squatter.  
 
Post-earthquake town planning processes in Bhuj demonstrate that while policies 
were framed along generalized categories of damage, ownership, land tenure, type of 
building, etc. recovery from the earthquake did not fall neatly within the categories 
defined by the state. Also, they extended beyond the physical reconstruction of houses. 
Recovery was influenced by the availability of resources, property title, availability of 
credit, informal loans from relatives or through patron-client relations with community 
groups, lobby favors amongst competing politicians, type of tenure as well as the 
ability to resolve issues related to ownership and tenancy (Geipel, 1991; Winchester, 
1992). It also depended on wide-ranging and often dynamic physical as well as 
socioeconomic factors in society.
331
  
 
                                                                                                                                            
that relied on outdated records and inaccurate damage assessment, had to be purchased from the local 
authority at market rates from the plots reserved for sale. 
331
 General indicators used to understand why certain groups may be vulnerable include: management 
capacity (to deal with one’s own affairs and to meet one’s own needs, physical or mental), resource 
availability (wealth, income, insurance, etc.), cultural attitudes and values (different expectations of 
help, religious, or ethnic attributes that may require special attention or which may separate a person 
from the broader supportive community), access to services (language barriers, literacy, geographical 
distance), social isolation (having poor social networks, being marginalized in society), pre-existing 
stressors (previous exposure to a disaster). Existing networks in communities through provision of 
support and assistance may enhance resilience of vulnerable groups by instilling a sense of 
community—individual’s sense of identity and belonging within a group (Wositzky, 1998). While 
membership of a cohesive group generally enhances resilience, it can, under certain circumstances, have 
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Various accounts of rebuilding homes in the walled city and relocation sites, by 
owners and tenants, formal and informal settlers demonstrate not only the different 
experiences faced by residents defined by the categories of tenancy and land 
ownership, but also differences within each category. Ambiguities in ownership and 
tenure could have detrimental effects on individuals‘ abilities to benefit from recovery 
programs.
332
 Restoration as well as creation of tangible assets, such as urban 
infrastructure, might suggest resilience of the physical city, yet does not necessarily 
indicate individual and societal resilience/well-being or its varied and unequal nature. 
Along with the changes to the physical form, changes to the social and economic 
characteristics of the built environment can have a significant influence on the 
collective sense of well-being. 
 
In urban areas like Bhuj that suffered extensive destruction, physical 
reconstruction is an important indicator of resilience yet not the only one as physical 
reconstruction is not necessarily recovery, or vice versa (Davis, 2005, p. 261). 
Different processes of coping (that vary with time), reflect not only the efforts to 
adjust to a changing material world but also how the relationship between material and 
non-material aspects of coping are negotiated and prioritized. Processes of coping or 
recovery have distinct physical, emotional and cultural dimensions (Kirshbaum and 
Sideroff, 2005). While certain forms of coping might be recognized and enabled by 
the state, others may be ignored or even inhibited.  
                                                                                                                                            
the opposite effect—for instance, cultural characteristics which advocate emotional suppression can 
increase stress vulnerability (Paton et al., 2001). 
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Although ―natural‖ disasters are said to provoke overall compassion without 
anyone having to take sides, compared with war reconstruction, which is morally 
charged (Hein, 2005), disaster responses including relief are intertwined with 
questions of legitimacy. Whether it is cash doles for earthquake-affected people in the 
immediate aftermath or financial assistance for rebuilding houses, such measures are 
inextricably linked with questions of the authenticity of claims. With passage of time, 
the ―rigor‖ of such verification processes accentuates. While many residents were able 
to negotiate with relief suppliers on humanitarian grounds even if their ration cards 
were not updated to reflect their current family size (or even in some cases were lost 
or buried in the debris), lack of ―proof‖ was a significant impediment to gaining 
monetary assistance to rebuild homes or prove eligibility to purchase a plot. Ration 
cards were re-issued for many who lost them in the debris. 
 
During the course of the six years following the earthquake, when reconstruction 
was in full swing, policies and plans underwent changes with changing socioeconomic 
and political realities. The techno-legal machinery that guided and regulated 
development (institutions, tools, and techniques), availability of funds and resources, 
political interests, (public and private interests), the nature of stakeholder participation, 
cultural aspects of rebuilding (physical and non-physical aspects to be preserved or 
modified) political commitment, propensity to change and cooperation, along with 
processes of social and economic recovery influenced the physical restructuring of the 
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 Complex property rights issues require considerable time to resolve, often delaying the recovery of 
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city.
 333
 
 
While de-densification of the city is inextricably linked with population dispersal, 
physical restructuring processes do need to pay greater attention to existing social 
relations (both inter- and intra-communal relations embedded in neighborhoods) and 
to articulate ways to preserve specific aspects of the built-form that afforded such 
interactions. Specific experiential qualities of space that render a sense of continuity is 
important in dealing with change. Nevertheless, reproduction of specific elements of 
the built-form in isolation is less likely to recreate the social interactions that these 
forms afforded in a particular sociocultural, economic, and political context. 
Understanding of the sociocultural and economic fabric, inter- and intra-communal 
relations, distribution of uses as well as location with respect to each other, density 
and scale of settlements that allowed certain elements of the built form to afford 
particular social interactions (for example, the relationship between a pedestrian and 
the street compared with a motorist and a street, or a cul-de-sac compared to a 
thoroughfare) are crucial to retain the essence of such interactions.  
 
The experiences of residents of Bhuj challenge the current mode of disaster 
rehabilitation characterized by separate treatment of physical, social, and economic 
aspects, with an emphasis on physical reconstruction at the expense of social and 
economic rehabilitation of the affected. However, post-disaster urban planning 
                                                                                                                                            
those affected (Olshansky et al., 2005). 
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processes intended for long-term vulnerability reduction could do this while enhancing 
the inherent coping capacities of those affected. In the case of Bhuj, additional actions 
would have allowed people to benefit from the physical rehabilitation process: greater 
attention to the restoration of livelihoods and local economy along with options to 
diversify, creation commercial spaces/economic options in relocation sites for small 
businesses and services, the timely release of housing assistance along with guidelines 
for their effective utilization, and socio-technical facilitation of in-situ house 
construction or in relocation sites. Socio-technical facilitation of recovery of affected 
households would have allowed residents to make more informed decisions regarding 
reconstruction (in-situ or in relocation sites) based on better understanding of the 
technical aspects of planning and reconstruction processes. Faster physical and 
economic recovery has a positive impact on emotional recovery.  
 
The adoption of existing regulatory mechanisms such as the Development Plans 
and the Town Planning Schemes allowed the state to restructure the physical city and 
its unregulated built form (with structurally unsafe buildings that had been shaped 
largely by real estate and commercial interests). These measures provided the 
institutional and legal framework to guide physical recovery and long-term risk 
reduction (using an existing mechanism) where there was immense pressure to 
produce faster results. However, the application of these physical planning measures 
to guide earthquake rehabilitation and reconstruction in an already urbanized area 
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 This is referred to as convergence behavior, characterized by a sense of solidarity and shared loss 
resulting in willingness to make sacrifices for the common good when overwhelmed by an event of 
massive proportions (Fritz and Mathewson, 1957). 
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requires that the state provides affected households with support systems for socio-
technical facilitation of physical rebuilding as well as economic recovery. NGOs, civil 
society organizations, and technical agencies/building professionals could work in 
collaboration with local actors, including local governments, in setting up such 
facilities.  
 
In order to be effective in influencing the decision-making process (by informing 
such processes of realities on the ground and the needs of the affected populations) 
and also to gain public acceptance (as credible means of participation in recovery and 
rebuilding processes and information exchange), it is important that these fora have a 
legal standing and are linked with local governance systems dealing with recovery 
planning and implementation, disaster assistance, building regulations, provision of 
basic services, livelihoods restoration, etc. It is equally important that they are set up 
early in the process, so that they can help formalize, strengthen, and sustain the 
convergence behavior exhibited by the disaster affected for deliberations on policies 
and plans. This is also crucial for the incorporation of long-term risk reduction 
measures (especially that of the marginalized) in recovery plans and policies that are 
typically difficult to achieve with the passage of time. 
 
In the long term, as policies and plans related to recovery are translated into 
action (or ―made‖) by its implementers at the local level, the proximity of the fora to 
those affected allow them to capture the multiple resiliencies and make suitable 
adjustments to policies and plans. In addition, their permanent status and state 
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recognition enhances their legitimacy in the eyes of the public as a legitimate platform 
for sustained interactions with the state. Such interactions also help inculcate a sense 
of ownership in local actors, including the earthquake-affected, of the plans and 
policies, thereby increasing the chances of their acceptance and adherence. For smaller 
urban areas that face systemic problems of inaccurate or badly maintained records 
(including land and property records), such units can allow for local validation of 
records, which then forms the basis for planning interventions. Engagement of local 
government in such processes also provides opportunities for local officials to enhance 
their understanding and build capacities in dealing with recovery and long-term 
development. 
 
The socio-technical facilitation units cannot replace other legitimate means of 
public articulation of opinions, needs, and grievances (including public meetings, 
debates, and protests), the role of media, local governments or that of elected 
representatives. However, through the involvement of NGOs (with strong local 
presence and experience with recovery processes), organizations and individuals 
informed of the local context and physical planning and rebuilding processes, and 
local government  (and linkages with higher levels of government), such units can 
play an important role in finding ways to facilitate physical recovery of the disaster-
affected in association with options for livelihood generation and economic recovery, 
while being sensitive to processes of emotional recovery.  
 
Given the discussion of multiple factors that shaped the recovery of the 
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earthquake-affected in the context of disaster rehabilitation and town planning 
processes, in particular, the final chapter will bring together the complexities of 
rehabilitation of urban areas through town planning mechanisms and the multiple 
resiliencies associated with such processes. It discusses the institutional changes 
brought about by GERRP and situates these in the larger context of techno-legal 
regime of disaster management in India. The implications of these changes on post-
disaster recovery and vulnerability reduction are discussed, and suggestions are made 
for enhancing the coping capacities of disaster-affected and facilitate their faster 
recovery. 
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CHAPTER 8 
DISASTER AS OPPORTUNITY FOR VULNERABILITY 
REDUCTION 
 
In this final chapter, I synthesize the findings from the preceding chapters on the 
complexities associated with the application of town planning processes for 
earthquake rehabilitation in Bhuj, as well as the multiple trajectories of various aspects 
of the recovery of the city and its residents. Following this, I discuss the institutional 
changes in urban governance and disaster rehabilitation brought about by GERRP and 
situate them in the larger context of the techno-legal regime of disaster management in 
India. I conclude by suggesting ways in which post-disaster urban planning processes 
intended for long-term vulnerability reduction could also enhance the inherent coping 
capacities of those affected.   
 
With the influx of funds, political commitment from the state, and the 
―opportunity‖ to use existing urban planning measures for earthquake rehabilitation, 
GERRP was largely successful in a number of ways: expanding and improving the 
physical infrastructure of the city, providing housing options to owners and tenants 
(thereby increasing home ownership), enhancing circulation within the walled city to 
allow for emergency response, and ensuring construction of houses compliant with 
building regulations to render them earthquake-safe. It was also successful in 
decongesting the walled city by reconfiguring it, as well as developing relocation sites 
where plots were made available to those affected by various town planning proposals 
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and others who wanted to relocate.  
 
However, the rational planning model adopted by the architects of the program 
hesitated to engage with the political realities of the affected population and denied 
legitimate means of participation, making the processes of recovery long and painful. 
By framing assistance packages according to categories defined by the state, the policy 
framework redefined the identities of the affected population based on land tenure, the 
damage category of the buildings they occupied or owned, and legality of 
landownership—rendering those outside these categories illegal and hence ineligible 
for government assistance. 
 
The program‘s strong emphasis on housing reconstruction and infrastructure 
development, along with the disconnect between various components of economic and 
social recovery, prevented several residents from benefiting from the housing program 
for lack of resources or difficulties in resolving ownership related problems. This was 
especially true for the socioeconomically marginalized. It reflected the dominant 
approach of urban planning prevalent in India, which treats physical, social, and 
economic aspects of urban planning separately and often with an emphasis on the 
physical.
334
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 Urban planning in most developing countries, a legacy of colonial planning laws—with its emphasis 
on physical aspects—is an extension of design-based disciplines such as architecture and civil 
engineering, and is more often shaped by bilateral and multilateral funding agencies or indigenous 
varieties in response to it (Sanyal, 2005). Rational comprehensive planning is the prevalent type of 
 269 
Disaster as Opportunity for Development 
 
The narratives of residents as well as state actors reveal that many considered the 
earthquake and the ensuing town planning processes a ―blessing in disguise,‖ not only 
for Bhuj but for the entire district of Kachchh. The earthquake presented the 
opportunity to undertake extensive infrastructure development such as the road 
network, water, and sewer systems, along with restructuring of the congested walled 
city and development of new sites, all of which required massive funding and 
mobilization of the state apparatus that are typically hard to come by for smaller towns 
such as Bhuj.
335
  
 
Under the leadership of the state government, GERRP was formulated to utilize 
earthquake rehabilitation to modernize a socially and economically backward region 
by checking clientelism (social relationships based on patronage) in the local 
administration and establishing new institutions for long-term planning, 
reconstruction, and disaster management. There was also immense political pressure 
to rebuild fast. The extent of damage and human casualties had invited media 
attention, with every action of the state brought under public scrutiny. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
planning where planning practice separates and regulates land uses through various regulatory measures 
(Mahadevia, 2001). 
335
 Despite the large number of smaller towns and villages that are urbanizing, local administrations 
lack adequate resources to undertake planning and infrastructure development. A significant move to 
alter this has been the introduction of the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission 
(JNNURM) in 2005 which allows towns with varying levels of urbanization to apply for funds from the 
central government for undertaking infrastructure development subject to a set of mandatory and 
optional reforms in urban governance. For details of JNNURM see: 
http://jnnurm.nic.in/nurmudweb/toolkit/Overview.pdf  
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Decisions about spatial planning in the context of earthquake rehabilitation were 
framed within the larger politics of land, where private developers dominated land and 
housing markets in the absence of government provision.
336
 The land readjustment 
policy adopted in the inner city along with the massive infrastructure development 
fuelled speculation, causing tremendous increase in land values. Since the government 
rates for land were high after the town planning exercise, private developers began 
demanding even more. With new ring roads, land was opened up for development and 
land around the ring roads was ―cornered‖ by real estate developers.337 The post-
earthquake years saw the mushrooming of several real estate firms, many of which run 
schemes to attract lower- and middle-income families.
338
 
 
Those who purchased plots in relocation sites at subsidized rates saw their value 
appreciate severalfold.
339
 The government‘s decision to use only public land for 
relocation sites led to significant appreciation of privately owned lands surrounding 
these sites. Despite the availability of land, owing to high values, many families 
continue to live in multistoried buildings (including several that are structurally 
unsafe).  
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 In the 1960s and 70s, the Gujarat government allotted land to cooperative housing societies. 
However, since the 1980s the allocation of land for housing societies was very limited and was difficult 
for lower- or middle-income families to get land for housing societies.  
337
 Land values along the ring roads have increased tremendously, though near areas in the North of the 
city primarily resided by Muslims and backward communities the increase is not as high as others. 
338
 The local newspaper reports incidents of extortion where the operators of a scheme disappear with 
their money, leaving the subscribers more impoverished. 
339
 Among the three relocations sites, prices in RTO relocation site are the highest: 100m
2
 plots 
purchased for Rs. 32,000 (US $720) were sold for Rs. 600,000 (US $13,340) after five years, indicating 
a 20 time increase in prices. 
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Urban rehabilitation through town planning. Unlike earlier programs of 
earthquake rehabilitation, GERRP did not directly undertake housing 
reconstruction.
340
 Instead, it adopted the approach of restructuring urban areas through 
existing planning mechanisms (such as the Development Plan and Town Planning 
Schemes) and infrastructure development. Formulation and implementation of these 
planning mechanisms in Bhuj demonstrated the complex nature of urban rehabilitation 
arising from higher land values (due to greater demand and real estate speculation), 
various formal and informal arrangements that constitute land ownership and tenure, 
state of land and ownership records as maintained by the local agencies as well as the 
strong nexus between real estate developers and the local administration. In addition, 
the disaster context as well as the magnitude of human and material loss suffered 
evoked a sense of urgency to produce tangible outcomes, thereby putting immense 
pressure on those in charge of preparing and implementing policies and plans.  
 
After a major disaster, the strong desire to return to normalcy is manifested in 
demands for faster re-establishment of homes and livelihoods. Hence, any attempt to 
undertake urban restructuring through planning is often challenged by an 
overwhelming pressure from politicians and the media to formulate plans and policies 
as soon as possible. Bhuj, being the capital city of the worst affected district of 
Kachchh, drew a lot of attention from the national and international media and other 
observers who scrutinized every action of the state. This condition of being constantly 
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 Under earlier earthquake reconstruction programs funded by the World Bank, houses were rebuilt 
for its occupants as part of the program. For details of earthquake reconstruction programs, see Mexico 
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in the limelight, along with political manipulation of issues, put a lot of pressure on 
officials to produce faster, more visible results. The predominant strategy, therefore, 
was to ―Do it now, and fix the problems later‖ before the window of opportunity shut. 
Implied in this attitude was reliance on the irreversibility of the overall plan (whether 
Development Plan or Town Planning Scheme, except through the process of variance), 
which according to the planners offered greater ―sanctity‖ to the town planning 
endeavor. This sense of urgency often resulted in spending more time later rectifying 
errors, modifying original plans, and making the plans work by employing tactics 
ranging from persuasion to coercion.  
 
Despite the modernist, rational planning tradition prevalent in India, a legacy of 
British town planning laws, in Bhuj we find planners and administrators acting in 
―good faith,‖  preparing Development Plan and Town Planning Schemes based on 
inaccurate and outdated land records (City Survey and revenue maps)—which is 
antithetical to rational, comprehensive planning principles. Policies would later be 
―made‖ de facto by the local bureaucrats who used their discretionary powers to fill 
the information gap.
341
 
  
Making plans work. The town planning policies and plans of Bhuj resonated 
                                                                                                                                            
City (Inam, 2005), Los Angeles (Comerio, 1998, Inam, 2005), and Marathwada , Maharashtra, India 
(Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation, 1998, Vatsa, 2005).  
341
 People who deliver services to the public through their behavior ―make policy‖ (through their power 
to exercise discretion) by translating the policies into action and in this process, they redefine the 
policies as perceived by the public. By exercising their discretionary powers, they also negotiate with 
the ―system‖ to find ways of accommodating individual grievances and hence are constantly involved 
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with a techno-legal approach to disaster management. However, the conditions of 
civic engagement and awareness and adherence to disaster management practices that 
were necessary for faster recovery and long-term vulnerability reduction, were largely 
absent.  
 
Traditionally, political and economic interests severely curtail implementation of 
―rational‖ plans. While the disaster aided adoption of a statutory planning mechanism 
like the Town Planning Scheme for post-earthquake urban rehabilitation, its successful 
implementation was not ensured. To solve problems related to town planning and 
thereby achieve ―desired‖ outcomes, the implementers used several tactics ranging 
from persuasion to coercion, employed arguments invoking morality and social 
consciousness, reinforced the need to live in safe environs, and offered incentives 
which did not clearly fit in the existing legal framework of town planning. 
 
In addition, it was crucial to have ―file-pushers‖ who constantly followed up with 
the bureaucratic machinery till decisions pertaining to town planning and 
infrastructure development were approved, thereby providing the plans and policies 
with legal sanctity.
342
 In order to minimize political interference, the state government 
agencies such as GUDC adopted the strategy of obscurantism, maintaining a ―low 
profile‖ or even anonymity. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
in the re-interpretation of the public policy. See Lipsky (1980) for a detailed discussion on strategies 
adopted by street-level bureaucrats in public services in the US. 
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Following the reconfiguration exercise and associated reduction of plot area 
(―cutting‖), many residents found their plots too small to serve their purpose, too far 
away from the original location or in shapes unsuitable for rebuilding, and sometimes 
with no adequate/proper access. In order to rectify such problems with the physical 
plans, BHADA officials often encouraged residents to surrender their plots in the 
walled city and move to relocation sites or purchase additional land from BHADA.  
 
Increase in land values as a result of town planning processes and subsequent sale 
of plots in the TPSs allowed the state government to generate revenue to repay 
substantial portions of the loans. Ironically, adoption of TPSs in an earthquake 
rehabilitation project turned out to be a financial success in generating revenues 
whereas historically TP Schemes had been unsuccessful in financing infrastructure 
development within the scheme area.
343
  
 
While GERRP defined the institutional framework for the creation and 
implementation of policies and plans, creation of a new local agency such as BHADA 
for planning and implementation was intended to minimize the involvement of local 
elected bodies and allow state agencies and departments to maintain control over the 
rehabilitation program. Hence, attempts were made by the state to circumvent the self-
interested behavior of local politicians and  to ―protect the project‖ from being 
sabotaged or manipulated by local interests that had failed to regulate growth and 
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 For a discussion on file-pushers in bureaucracies, see Weber, ―The theory of social and economic 
organization,‖ translated by Henderson and Parsons (1947). 
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speculative real estate development that resulted in the creation of an unsafe built 
form. 
 
The narratives of planners and other stakeholders reveal a differentiated view of 
planning practice, which does not fit into the neat frameworks offered by top-down or 
bottom-up explanations of planning. At the local level, where policies were ―made‖ by 
its implementers, individuals and public-minded actors worked in conjunction with 
local decision-makers to minimize the negative influences of policies and plans or 
even make them more inclusive. However, for these actors to be able to influence 
decisions, they had to be knowledgeable and educated enough to understand the 
policies and plans and their implications, perseverant, rational, secular, committed, 
without any personal interests or gains, and willing to work from within the 
institutional framework of rehabilitation/town planning without challenging them 
explicitly. This space for deliberations was not always present and was largely 
dependent on the openness of local level administrators, such as the District Collector 
and the CEO of BHADA. 
 
A strong sense of empathy towards the ―victims‖ and the desire to minimize 
future loss of lives presented compelling reasons for institutional actors to push the 
limits of political and bureaucratic structures that shaped or even restricted the nature 
of interventions that would result in long-term vulnerability reduction.  People who 
were affected by the earthquake, for whom the rehabilitation packages were created 
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 For review of reasons for the failure of TP Schemes of Gujarat to meet its self-financing condition 
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and town planning efforts undertaken, were often reduced to a statistic—a 
combination of an administrative category based on their relationship to the house as 
well as the land (an owner, tenant or an illegal occupant) and a damage category of the 
structure (G-1 to G-5). However, in the local offices these statistics assumed a human 
face as people struggling to reestablish their lives, often eliciting ―sympathetic‖ 
responses from local administrators. 
 
The post-disaster context allowed technocrats and bureaucrats to expand their 
professional boundaries and navigate the political system as long as this helped solve 
problems associated with the plans and therefore worked toward the completion of the 
program. The rationale for restructuring the walled city as part of earthquake 
rehabilitation did not elicit support from many bureaucrats who considered it 
inappropriate for the situation at hand and unjustified. Some even considered town 
planning proposals (as prepared by consultants) to be the source of all problems. 
Therefore, they were more receptive to individual problem solving associated with the 
implementation of policies and plans. Despite the attempts by the state government at 
Gandhi Nagar to control the process, this sentiment allowed decentralization of 
decision making to the local level often through deliberate efforts of particular 
bureaucrats.  
 
Because of the need to gain ―public acceptance,‖ especially in the initial stages of 
rehabilitation, the state government allowed for such actions, yet severely curtailed 
                                                                                                                                            
see Theckethil (2005). 
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them in the later stages. The political-bureaucratic machinery at the state level often 
checked the powers of the administrators using the tool of transfers. Also, with the 
passage of time, mechanisms for rationing services were adopted, such as reducing 
intake hours, requiring applicants to provide additional documentation of eligibility, 
restricting allocation of plots at the relocation sites, etc. (Lipsky, 1980, p. 104). 
 
“Participatory” rehabilitation. We find in Bhuj a strong resistance from the 
state to institutionalize participation, thereby preventing the formation of legitimate 
fora for public articulation of responses to planning interventions beyond the 
bureaucratic procedures mandated by the Town Planning Act. State agencies feared 
that opening up the processes to public scrutiny would not only cause delays in 
decision making but also result in political manipulation that might undermine the 
underlying rationality of plans and policies. Technocratic approaches to keeping 
politics out of town planning left many deprived of legitimate ways to raise their 
concerns or voice their opinions and often forced those who did not understand or 
were skeptical of the procedures to adopt precarious and unreliable means to recover 
from the earthquake, as well as from town planning. 
 
Following large-scale destruction associated with disasters, people move to safer 
locations, making it difficult to participate in meetings and bureaucratic procedures as 
well as meeting deadlines. The town planning exercise reduced the city to a collection 
of plots, where solving individual problems assumed greater importance than 
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deliberations on how the city should be rebuilt. The burden of establishing legitimacy 
of claims for housing assistance or resolving problems arising from town planning 
(based on inaccurate records) fell upon individuals, who often felt themselves to be at 
the mercy of the state to solve their problems and feared repercussions if they opposed 
these plans. This, along with a history of absence of political mobilization, deterred 
participation in larger discussions or formulation of any collective public opinion on 
the course of development of the city.  
 
Adoption of Town Planning Schemes, a planning mechanism used to reconfigure 
larger agricultural plots on the peripheries of urban areas, to reconfigure an earthquake 
-devastated dense urban core was itself seen as a testimony to the lack of sensitivity as 
well as high-handedness of the state government that controlled the rehabilitation 
program. Such claims were indicative of a larger sense of disenfranchisement felt by 
the earthquake-affected because of their lack of involvement in the decision-making 
processes and the long and painful processes of recovery. 
 
By emphasizing a ―community-based‖ relocation approach, the program‘s 
implementers further solidified divisions based on caste, allowing better- organized as 
well as economically and politically powerful communities to benefit from the 
program and also manipulate the system to their advantage. Despite the partial success 
of people‘s collectives like the Soniwad falia samiti in influencing town planning 
processes and rebuilding faster with greater participation of the residents, attempts to 
get formal acceptance from the state for falia samitis as a legitimate forum for 
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people‘s participation in the planning process was not heeded for fear of ―the mob‖ 
taking over the process and delaying it. Therefore, in the absence of adequate 
representation and participation of the earthquake-affected, especially those with 
fewer resources, in decision-making processes regarding post-disaster planning and 
rehabilitation and the lack of support mechanisms to aid their recovery (physical, 
economic, and emotional), we find in Bhuj the unfolding of multiple resiliencies of its 
residents. 
 
Responses to state plans: multiple resiliencies. Narratives by residents of 
Bhuj about their experience of town planning reveal multiple resiliencies with regard 
to rebuilding homes in the walled city and relocation sites. Although the disaster risk 
reduction rationale provided the state with the moral high ground to adopt town 
planning, multiple resiliencies of the affected populace many times challenged the 
public-good argument of the plans. The application of an existing planning mechanism 
to mitigate future disasters posed a compelling model for post-disaster rehabilitation 
and long-term risk reduction where individual grievances were reduced to sacrifices 
made in the short-term for greater public good. 
 
The separate treatment of physical, social, and economic aspects of vulnerability 
significantly affected people‘s abilities to re-establish their lives in the aftermath of the 
earthquake, especially those with fewer resources. The gap in the release of first and 
second installments of housing assistance led to many people using the first 
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installment for basic sustenance and therefore not qualifying for subsequent 
installments. Those with regular sources of income, especially government employees, 
could procure loans to supplement the housing assistance or in many cases build up to 
the plinth level to be eligible for the second installment. However, households with 
fewer resources were unable to procure loans due to unavailability of necessary 
documents or inability to pay loan interest for lack of adequate and steady income. 
While availability of resources was a major factor determining one‘s ability to rebuild, 
the nature of land tenure, whether one was an owner, tenant or an illegal occupant, 
affected the process in significant ways. The categorization of the physical area of the 
city into the walled city, area outside the walled city, and relocation sites for town 
planning purposes, with different interventions for each, added another dimension to 
the recovery process. 
 
Many Muslim residents of Bhuj expressed the view that the properties of Muslims 
had been disproportionately affected by town planning processes. Demolition of 
several graveyards, mausoleums, and other religious structures were seen as a sign of 
disrespect for the religious sensibilities of a minority population in a state notorious 
for state-sponsored blatant marginalization of religious minorities.
344
 The state 
government‘s rejection of a fourth relocation site in the northern part of the city, where 
majority of Muslims lived, to avoid the consolidation of Muslim population in the 
                                                 
344
 See Mukta 2003, 1990, Shah et al., 2004, Lobo and Kumar, 2009, Yagnik and Sheth, 2006, Breman, 
2002. 
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northern part of the city yielded the opposite result.
345
 
 
Due to a combination of factors, such as economic reliance of Muslims on the 
walled city, sense of insecurity after the 2002 Godhra riots, higher property values in 
the walled city compared to relocation sites, and long commute from relocation sites 
to mosques for daily prayers, we find in Bhuj what was referred to as ―a rejection of 
the dispersal tactics of the Hindu state.‖ While most Muslims who owned plots in the 
walled city retained them, those who got plots in the relocation sites in exchange for 
those in the walled city sold them later. This led to greater consolidation of Muslim 
populations in existing formal and informal settlements mostly in the northern parts of 
the city as well as development of several new formal housing projects to 
accommodate the middle-class Muslims. 
 
The techno-legal disaster management approach largely excluded illegal settlers 
and those who could not establish the legality of their claims, thereby restricting the 
scope of a program focused on vulnerability reduction. Except for compensations to 
informal settlers whose houses had to be demolished for the implementation of the 
Development Plan, no attempts were made to extend assistance to residents of 
informal settlements, or regularize them by providing tenure or extending 
                                                 
345
 Within the government, this was seen as an effort to prevent the creation of another naroda patia, the 
Muslim neighborhood in Ahmedabad that was subjected to the worst massacre by the right-wing Hindu 
mob during the 2002 Gujarat Communal Riots. Naroda Patia has become a metaphor for the risks 
associated with the creation of a vulnerable minority settlement.  
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infrastructural facilities.
346
 Government agencies were apprehensive that if the 
government gave plots to lower-income families, especially informal settlers, it would 
spur further in-migration. Setting precedents was therefore avoided to prevent future 
claims for land. 
  
Post-earthquake rehabilitation processes addressed economic rehabilitation 
separately from housing and infrastructure development. Physical changes to the 
walled city including the new road network and subsequent changes in land values, 
decongestion of residential areas near the markets, reconfiguration of commercial 
spaces, and relocation of government offices to outside the walled city had a 
significant effect on the viability of businesses in the walled city, especially those with 
fewer resources. In addition, hidden vulnerabilities of artisans emerging from informal 
arrangements with bigger merchants, inability to benefit from the commercial 
assistance packages (due to corruption), and lack of assistance to rebuild shops also 
affected restoration of livelihoods, in turn affecting reestablishment of homes. 
 
Physical restructuring of the city also affected the sociocultural spaces and the 
relationships embedded in them. As part of the town planning process, in order to 
provide street access to each and every house in the walled city (that had grown 
organically with cul-de-sac streets and high density residential precincts), elements of 
the traditional built-form such as the chowks, otlas, and courtyards were used to design 
the new layout. Removal of these gathering spaces and dispersal of population from 
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 For a historical analysis of the evolution of this political culture of authoritarianism in Gujarat, see 
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the walled city to various relocation sites as well as other settlements in the city 
(especially community-wise relocation to government sites) had an impact on the 
social ties between members of the same community, as well as of those belonging to 
different castes/religions. 
 
The analysis of town planning processes in Bhuj demonstrates how processes of 
recovery of its residents in the aftermath of the earthquake—re-establishing their 
houses as well as economic and socio-cultural recovery—were contingent upon 
processes of physical alteration of the city. In addition to the physical restructuring 
and infrastructure development of the city, GERRP served as an opportunity to 
intervene in the urban sector that had been sidelined in the past due to lack of revenue 
generating capacity of the sector (and therefore, fewer resources), and lack of 
understanding of  the complex issues associated with urban areas and their governance 
systems. 
 
Institutional Changes in Governance and Disaster Rehabilitation 
 
 
If we hadn‘t made the Development Plan, we wouldn‘t have known the mess, 
we wouldn‘t have gone into these reforms and land management or a unified 
state level agency doing a total station survey . . . cleaning up the mess, 
creating another Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), allocation of funds for it. . . 
347
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Mukta (1990, 2003).  
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The earthquake became a ―blessing in disguise‖ to intervene in the urban sector, 
which had always been on the backburner owing to lack of understanding about the 
sector as well as its inability to generate revenue. The urban sector was primarily seen 
as a social sector, with extension of services such as water supply, sewer lines and 
therefore it was not considered a revenue generating sector. Typically, it ran on 
subsidy and very little government allocation.
348
 However, to undertake large-scale 
planning in urban areas governments required large sums of money which could only 
be made available by multilateral funding agencies or International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs). In 2000, Gujarat had begun the first set of reforms in the urban 
sector under the World Bank-funded Gujarat Urban Reforms Project (GURP).
349
 As it 
was making progress, the earthquake happened and the entire focus was shifted to 
rehabilitation, with an emphasis on urban areas. 
 
In Kachchh, the town planning process was also a response to ―rectify‖ problems 
associated with the existing system of urban governance. Owing to the lack of 
credibility of existing institutions of local governance and skepticism about their 
capability to deal with issues of long-term planning and development, earthquake 
rehabilitation efforts resorted to more centralized forms of functioning, even if that 
meant undermining basic tenets of decentralization. The creation of new local 
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 A. Dhar (personal communication, Ahmedabad, February 8, 2008). 
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 In the case of Gujarat, the total allocation for 117 municipalities of the state was approximately Rs. 
20-40 crores, Rs. 1 Crore = US $200,000 (Source: Ibid.) 
349
 The key reforms under this project included: repealing Rent Control and Land Ceiling Acts, area-
based property tax, rationalization of stamp duty rates, collection of user charges, and double entry 
accrual based accounting system. With a total project cost of US $150 million, Urban Development and 
Urban Housing Department of Government of Gujarat was identified as the implementing agency and 
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authorities for the preparation as well as implementation of plans reflected these 
concerns. 
 
As part of the City Assessment and Development Strategy (CADS) under the 
Gujarat Urban Development Program (GUDP), GUDC advised the state government 
to make it mandatory to prepare Development Plan, so that in the process the cadastral 
maps, base maps, land revenue and city survey records would get updated.
350
 Under 
the project, it also proposed to create a unified agency that would develop cadastral 
information at the state level, update the information and make it available to people.  
 
Many attributed the speedy recovery of Kachchh to the implementation of the 
program through autonomous institutions like the newly created GSDMA, BHADA, 
and existing ones like GUDC and not by the routine departments and agencies.
351
 
ADAs were designed to handle the earthquake rehabilitation process and were 
expected to be dissolved when the program ended. Nevertheless, many, including state 
actors, feared that the outcomes of the project would be unsustainable once ADA, the 
local authority who was primarily responsible for the entire project, was dissolved and 
responsibility to maintain the infrastructure as well as to ensure the adherence of new 
construction to earthquake safety standards was transferred back to the respective 
                                                                                                                                            
GUDC, formed in 1999, the nodal agency. This project was dropped in 2001 following the earthquake 
(Sources: http://gudc.com/gurp, World Bank Report). 
350
 GUDP is a US $300 million World Bank-funded project launched in 2009 with the objective of 
implementing capital investment projects and urban reform initiatives at both city and state levels in 
Gujarat. First step of the process consists of carrying out detailed studies on reforms streamlining, urban 
planning and land management which would then get translated into infrastructure projects and specific 
reforms. 10 towns have been identified to carry out city level component of the program called CADS. 
GUDC would act as the nodal agency for the program. For more information see http://gudcl.com/gudp  
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municipalities.  
 
In urban areas, the Urban Development Department of the state government 
controlled the Area Development Authorities and superseded GSDMA with regard to 
funding allocation power. Municipalities in the towns had very limited involvement in 
the process, except for the engineer who was consulted by BHADA and GUDC.
352
 
Once the infrastructure was built, it was transferred from the ADAs to the respective 
municipalities. Information related to the housing layout and infrastructure, including 
AUTOCAD drawings, plans, and GIS maps, was made available to the municipalities 
as part of the hand-over process. However, the maintenance of the newly built 
infrastructure and monitoring future development were major concerns for all those 
who were involved in the design and implementation of the project. 
 
A majority of the state actors expressed skepticism about the ability of municipal 
officials to maintain the infrastructure when the newly built services were to be 
handed over to them. Municipalities lacked the required technical staff. And, due to 
the political nature of the body and the constant arguments between ward councilors 
on allocation of funds to their respective wards, very little work was done. Prior to the 
earthquake, municipal bodies were unable to maintain even the existing services under 
their jurisdiction.
353
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 V. Thiruppugazh (personal communication, Gandhi Nagar, March 26, 2007). 
352
 In case of Bhuj, the main engineer of the Municipality at the time of earthquake rehabilitation 
program, who worked closely with GUDC and the consultants, left after two years. 
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The lack of technical capacity, highly bureaucratic way of functioning, and its 
control by the combined political and—real-estate-developer lobbies were cited as 
reasons for not involving local municipalities in the rehabilitation process. But many 
believed that the municipalities could have prioritized people better, and could have 
been more accessible to the public since people knew their ward councilors. They did 
not know the planner who spoke a different language, who was an ―outsider.‖ The 
ADA had no representatives from the city in its governing or advisory boards. 
 
Despite the influx of funds for GERRP, capacities of municipalities were not 
strengthened. It was not GSDMA‘s mandate to build the capacities of municipalities. 
They focused on local people, dissemination of information regarding safe 
construction of houses, and retrofitting measures to make existing houses disaster 
resistant. GSDMA provided the funds for the construction of roads and other 
infrastructure development (which was implemented by line departments under the 
supervision of GUDC), approved their projects, and oversaw the implementation of 
the programme.
354
 None of the four Area Development Authorities were mandated 
with building the capacities of municipalities or engaging them in the rehabilitation 
process.
355
 The pressure to produce faster results was such that it was easier for the 
newly created agencies to implement the program themselves than to build the 
capacities of municipalities to undertake the program implementation.
356
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 C. Bhatt (personal communication, Bhuj, February 6, 2008). 
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 M. Sahu (personal communication, New Delhi, March 23, 2007). 
355
 N. Tewari (personal communication, New Delhi, March 22, 2007). 
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Multilateral funding agencies such as the Asian Development Bank wanted a 
more ―clean and technical body‖ to implement their projects, which also contributed to 
the non-involvement of municipalities in the rehabilitation processes. In addition, 
there were concerns of financial mismanagement and corruption if the municipalities 
were involved. 
 
In 2008, BHADA was still in charge though the state government‘s original intent 
at the time of creation of ADAs was to dissolve them in three to five years. The 
municipality is neither familiar with (due to lack of involvement in the process), nor 
has any reason to want to own the extensive infrastructure that was created as a result 
of the earthquake rehabilitation and town planning exercises. While BHADA by and 
large ensured the adherence of the newly built houses to safety standards, accretions to 
those houses as well as seismic safety of houses constructed in future are critical 
aspects of physical vulnerability reduction.  
 
In the absence of efforts to strengthen the capacities of municipalities and reform 
the processes related to building permissions and monitoring of adherence to 
standards, the fundamental issues that led to widespread damages to buildings and 
infrastructure in the city, unregulated development and non-compliant built form, 
persist.
357
 However, for BHADA to hand over all its responsibilities to the 
municipality, adequate technical and administrative expertise of the municipality to 
manage the new revenue and taxation systems, and maintenance and future expansion 
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of the infrastructure was necessary.
358
 
 
In case of Bhuj, instead of dissolving BHADA, this organization would be 
replaced by a new authority, Kachchh Development Authority (KDA), with the power 
and resources to maintain the services that have been created under the earthquake 
rehabilitation programme as well as to regulate future development. The proposal to 
form the KDA was submitted to the state government by the District Collector in 
2007. According to the proposal, in addition to Bhuj, the new authority would also be 
responsible for all areas of Kachchh other than Anjar, Gandhidham, and Mundra.
359
  
 
In Bhuj only 50% of the roads proposed by the Development Plan were 
constructed by GUDC under GERRP. Therefore, the proposal suggested that the KDA 
supervise the construction of the remaining 50% of roads, as well as undertake future  
implementation of infrastructure projects, preparation of Development Plans and TP 
Schemes (along with sale of the reserved plots from the TPSs to finance new 
infrastructure), and other development activities in the district. Although the 
government considered the option of creating a municipal corporation for Bhuj, 
because of its small population, in order to meet the minimum population requirement 
for a municipal corporation, the nearby village of Sukhpar (15km from Bhuj) would 
have to be included. The difficulties in servicing such a vast area discouraged state 
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 N. Tewari (personal communication, New Delhi, March 22, 2007). 
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 V. Thirppugazh (personal communication, Gandhi Nagar, March 26, 2007). 
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 According to this proposal, Area Development Authorities of Anjar and Gandhidham would be 
merged and a new authority would be created for Mundra. 
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officials from adopting that option.
360
  
 
Upon conclusion of GERRP and having learned lessons from Bhuj, GUDC 
initiated the process of bringing about systemic changes to urban planning and land 
management through the World Bank funded urban reform project. This included 
streamlining existing processes related to urban planning and land management by 
reviewing the legal framework, urban planning practices, and land information 
systems, followed by preparation of policy papers, draft legislations, planning 
guidelines/manuals, restructuring of institutions, and setting up land information 
systems.
361
 
 
GUDC, under the urban reform agenda, has initiated the process of creating a 
Commissionerate of Municipalities, consisting of IAS officers who would control all 
the municipal corporations and municipalities, replacing an earlier directorate of 
municipalities which was non-functional. It indicates a shift from the state 
government‘s earlier approach of ―trying to improve municipalities by establishing a 
presence in them so that work happened‖ to ―exercising greater control over the 
municipalities and superseding it in order to minimize the influence of local politicians 
on decisions related to urban development.‖ 362 A new paradigm of urban development 
is being crafted by GUDC where through government it is creating a platform for 
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 C. Bhatt (personal communication, Bhuj, February 6, 2008). 
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 B. R. Balachandran (personal communication, Ahmedabad, July 28, 2006). 
362
 GUDC is faced with a lot of resistance from the political spheres, but not a strong opposition as they 
are the nodal agency who receives funds and oversees the implementation of projects. In addition, 
GUDC is a company, with employees from the private sector, over whom no minister has direct control 
or influence. 
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other companies to invest and implement projects. GUDC‘s role would be that of an 
intermediary to lend the government‘s credibility to those companies that deserve it 
because of their credit worthiness.
363
 
 
The de-politicization myth, the belief that exercising more centralized forms of 
bureaucratic and technocratic control over local governance institutions would check 
the powers of local politicians and lead to more efficient urban development devoid of 
any political interference, continues beyond earthquake rehabilitation. The earthquake 
would further the establishment of more centralized forms of political control by 
taking power off the hands of local elected bodies such as municipalities. GERRP is a 
now a successful case of how disasters can be used as an opportunity to transform 
urban areas using existing planning mechanisms and improve governance through an 
independent authority. The program was also reflective of a larger process of 
transformation at the national level with regard to disaster management—from a 
response-oriented approach to that of risk reduction through a new techno-legal 
regime.  
 
A techno-legal disaster management regime. Single events often influence 
discourse and national and international policies and practice.
364
 The Gujarat 
earthquake was a watershed moment in the disaster management regime in India. 
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 A. Dhar (personal communication, Ahmedabad, February 8, 2008). 
364
 The International Decade of Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) was hugely shaped by the 
occurrence of several earthquakes and subsequent emphasis on technological solutions to minimize 
earthquake risks (Blaikie et al., 2004, p. 22). 
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While India has faced several earthquakes in the past, including the earthquakes in 
Uttarkashi (1991), Latur (1993), Chamoli (1999) as well as in Kachchh (1819 and 
1956), most of them occurred in rural areas.
 365
 The 2001 earthquake was the first 
major earthquake to hit an urban area in the last 50 years.
366
 The earthquake brought 
about significant changes to the institutional aspects of disaster management at the 
national level. Government of India carried out a review of the disaster management 
mechanisms. In 2001, based on the recommendations of the High Powered Committee 
on Disaster Management, the Disaster Management Division was shifted from the 
Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Home Affairs (Bandopadhyay, 2007). 
 
At the state level, it brought about significant changes to the institutionalization of 
disaster management.
367
 The Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA) 
was created immediately after the earthquake and played a key role in the 
rehabilitation process. In 2003, a Gujarat State Disaster Management Act was passed. 
Under the Act, all districts are required to have their own District Disaster 
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 The two earthquakes in Kachchh were of magnitude 8.0 with 1,500 deaths and magnitude 7.0 with 
115 deaths respectively (Jain et al., 2002); Geological Survey of India has recorded two more 
earthquakes in Kachchh in 1845 and 1903 of magnitudes 6.3 and 6.0 respectively. The earthquake of 
16
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 June, 1819 placed the Kachchh peninsula within the seismic tract of India. The shock was felt over 
a radius of 1600km from Bhuj and an area 50 miles long and 10 miles broad was raised up, blocking the 
Indus waters flowing through Kachchh and depriving Lakhpat area much of the water it had been 
getting (Gazetteer of India, 1971). 
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Todd and Palakkudiyil (2003). 
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Management Authorities and Disaster Management Plans.
368
  
 
Emergence of disaster risk reduction as a national agenda. Prior to 2001, 
disaster management activities were largely response-oriented, with a focus on 
provision of relief and financial assistance to the disaster-affected for reconstruction. 
At the national level, the Disaster Management Division within the Ministry of 
Agriculture was responsible for disaster management. In the 1990s, influenced by the 
International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) efforts were initiated at 
the national level to shift the focus from relief to preparedness.
369
  
 
In a significant step towards institutionalization of disaster management in the 
country, in 2005, in response to the increasing human and economic costs associated 
with disasters,
370
 the Government of India enacted the National Disaster Management 
Act. In the same year, the national government launched a new initiative to reduce 
disaster vulnerability.
 371
 The new techno-legal regime, ―proceeds from the conviction 
that development cannot be sustainable unless disaster mitigation is built into the 
development process‖ (GoI, 2005, p. 4). Although this highlighted the shifting focus 
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 While the statute would dictate the implementation, preparation of plans is carried under a UNDP-
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 In 1989, the United Nations General Assembly declared the decade 1990-2000 as the International 
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 4344 people lost their lives and about 30 million people were affected by disasters every year in the 
decade, 1990-2000 (GoI, 2004). 
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of the Indian state from relief and rehabilitation to mitigation and risk reduction, the 
new regime, technocratic in scope and imagination, and a legacy of the IDNDR, 
underscores engineering and other physical protective measures to be supplemented 
with legislative measures regulating land use, urban planning, and construction of 
buildings. 
 
Towards reducing the vulnerability of the building stock, the report made 
recommendations for amending the existing legal framework including Town and 
Country Planning Act, development control regulations and building bylaws for safety 
against natural hazards and called for stricter enforcement of regulatory measures 
(GoI, 2005). The Ministry of Home Affairs, the nodal ministry for disaster 
management in the country, recommended that state governments and the union 
territory administrations adopt these. Despite the comprehensive nature of the 
recommendations, the new approach maintains silence about the highly politicized, 
complex social and spatial settings, within which various regulatory mechanisms are 
operationalized (Mileti, 1999, Green, 2005).  
 
The techno-legal regime also maintains silence regarding measures for reducing 
vulnerability of marginalized groups, low income residents, and other minority 
populations—including informal settlers who live outside the legal framework of the 
state and who lack resources to follow regulations suggested by the state (Narasimhan, 
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2003, Das, 2002). In a country like India, where more than a quarter of the urban 
population lives in slums and informal settlements (38% for cities over 1 million)
372
 
and 60% of the landmass is prone to earthquakes of various intensities (GoI, 2004, p. 
3), the claim of the regime to reduce vulnerability to disasters needs to be challenged 
as the majority of the population, often those most affected by disasters, lives in areas 
outside the legal framework. The new regime, formally adopted in 2005, uses 
regulatory power of the state to enhance safety of the urban areas against future 
disasters.
373
 
 
Another significant outcome of the Gujarat earthquake rehabilitation is the 
emergence of disaster management as a national agenda with the inclusion of a chapter 
on the same in the 10
th
 Five Year Plan (2002-2006).
374
 The plan emphasized the need 
for development processes to be sensitive to disaster prevention, preparedness, and 
mitigation to minimize periodic shocks to development efforts. Despite the plan‘s 
emphasis on ―mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into the process of development 
planning at all levels for sustainable development‖, the 11th Five Year Plan (2007-
2012) noted that it is yet to be carried forward across sectors through actionable 
programs for achieving the desired result.
375
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 Task Force on Housing and Urban Development, Shelter for the Urban Poor, (Part IV), Planning 
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Town and Country Planning Act of 1960 was modified to incorporate disaster management. The new 
regime made it mandatory, for regions in Seismic zones III, IV and V (based on Modified Mercalli 
intensities VII, VIII and IX or more respectively) to adopt the techno-legal framework.  
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 Prepared by the Planning Commission of India (with the Prime Minister as the Chairman), Five Year 
Plan is a key economic policy instrument through which decisions regarding setting of national 
development goals and allocation of national resources to different development sectors are made 
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Earthquake Rehabilitation and Urban Planning: Bhuj 
 
The earthquake rehabilitation of Bhuj demonstrates that while disasters can 
influence the development patterns of an area, disaster response and recovery 
processes do not always address root causes of vulnerability due to a variety of 
political, social, economic, administrative, and legal reasons. In addition to the large-
scale physical rebuilding of the earthquake affected areas, state-led interventions after 
the earthquake extended the domain of domestic and global capital to Kachchh—a 
region that had been marginalized in the development agenda of the state. The 
earthquake was a blessing in disguise because it ―opened up‖ Kachchh for 
development, though without much attention to associated socioeconomic 
marginalization and environmental degradation. While particular development models 
that prioritize capital accumulation and economic efficiency over equity and 
environmental sustainability could accentuate existing vulnerabilities and lead to 
disasters, disaster rehabilitation can also serve as the ―window of opportunity‖ to 
apply the very same models of development.   
 
The town planning model adopted in Bhuj is an example of the rational, 
modernist planning practice in India—with its emphasis on physical planning and its 
lack of engagement with social, political, and economic processes, often leading to 
worsening of existing forms of socio-economic marginalization or even creating new 
forms. The depoliticized planning exercise relied heavily on bureaucratic procedures 
of public participation. Its predominantly technocratic orientation masked the highly 
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political nature of planning process and associated deal making—and presented it as a 
rational decision-making process conducted in the interest of the greater public good.  
 
Vulnerability reduction cognizant of socioeconomic processes of 
marginalization. Disaster vulnerability reduction practices need to be informed of 
processes of social and economic marginalization associated with technocratic 
planning and disaster management practices, and they need to take a strong social 
justice stance that explores the public good argument of various initiatives. There is a 
strong need for an explicit emphasis on minimizing vulnerabilities of populations by 
building their assets and improving their access to social safety nets and services. 
After a disaster, the pressure to produce results on the ground quickly warrants faster 
formulation of policies and plans. In the case of Bhuj, risks were taken collectively by 
state actors, especially when actions was expected solve the problems created by town 
planning. This, along with the sense of sympathy towards the earthquake-affected, 
helped the local administrators transgress the boundaries of legality (with the tacit 
approval of the state machinery) when it came to implementation of plans. 
Nevertheless, policies and plans should reflect the socioeconomic and political context 
of those affected and need to be flexible enough to help reduce their long-term 
vulnerabilities. Both substantive as well as procedural aspects of these measures 
should allow the affected to be informed as well as engaged in the process. This would 
allow them to weigh various options and prioritize those in an informed manner that 
would help them recover from the impacts of disasters. 
 
 298 
Recognition of multiple aspects that shape recovery from disasters. 
Recovery is influenced by the availability of resources, including credit as well as 
informal loans from relatives or through patron-client relations with community 
groups, ability to lobby favors amongst competing politicians, type of tenure and 
property title as well as the ability to resolve issues related to ownership and tenancy 
(Geipel 1991, Winchester 1992). Ambiguities in ownership and tenure can have 
detrimental effects on individuals‘ abilities to benefit from recovery programs. The 
ability to recover also depends on wide-ranging and often dynamic physical as well as 
socioeconomic factors. Various accounts of rebuilding homes in the walled city and 
the relocation sites by owners and tenants, as well as formal and informal settlers, 
demonstrate not only the different experiences of residents in those categories as 
defined by tenancy and land ownership, but also the ambiguities in such categories 
themselves. Recovery of the physical city does not always imply socioeconomic 
recovery of the disaster-affected. Changes to the physical city can have significant 
implications for the sociocultural lives of residents, including communal relations and 
sometimes lead to disintegration of social relations that are embedded in the built 
form. Hesitation of state actors to engage with the social realities of the disaster-
affected, whether through the rejection of a relocation site in the northern part of the 
city or its mixed response towards facilitation of communal living in the relocation 
sites, can have detrimental effects on long-term vulnerability reduction of 
marginalized groups as well as their economic recovery.  
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Decentralized decision-making to facilitate faster recovery. In the case of 
large disasters with extensive loss to lives, livelihoods, and assets, the response and 
rehabilitation efforts involve various levels of government, from the national to the 
local. However, for recovery and long-term vulnerability reduction initiatives, local 
governments/agencies play a prominent role because of their proximity to the site of 
implementation of policies, plans, and decisions pertaining to disaster rehabilitation. 
While policies and plans related to disaster rehabilitation (formulated at local, state or 
national levels) might apply uniform rules/standards to a population which has 
unequal access to resources (often creating the illusion of an egalitarian approach 
where same laws and regulations apply to all the citizens), their implementation at the 
local level is inextricably linked with dealing with differences in access to resources, 
differences in governance systems and their inherent systemic vulnerabilities, and 
particularities of the socioeconomic and cultural contexts. Therefore, in the context of 
vulnerability reduction, understanding the dynamics of such processes at the local 
level, especially its impact on households, would help bring a human dimension to 
disaster management practices. Attention to the processes of recovery of households 
and adaptation of plans and policies to be supportive of such processes are crucial in 
ensuring that any action or intervention contributes to the well-being of people, 
especially those with fewer resources.  
 
Need for institutionalization of public participation. Participation in 
decision making needs to be institutionalized so that such processes could be 
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undertaken in ways that enhance the inherent coping capacities of the affected 
populace, especially the marginalized groups, without compromising on the need to 
rebuild individual homes as well as a disaster-resilient city. While vulnerability 
reduction measures might warrant drastic changes to the built form or other aspects of 
people’s lives, it is important more so in a post-disaster context (where people are 
coping from trauma and changes to their lives) for people to be informed of the 
changes and their impacts on their lives to make informed choices regarding recovery 
and reestablishment of their lives. Without exacerbating existing divisions, creation of 
representative forms that reflect the social relations embedded in the localities should 
be encouraged and recognized by the state and other actors and these should be 
engaged in the processes. It is equally important to ensure that the needs and voices of 
marginalized groups are represented in such fora.  
 
Strengthening capacities of local governance institutions. In the aftermath 
of a major disaster, due to the pressure to produce quick results, often new agencies 
are created rather than building on the capacities of municipalities to undertake a 
program‘s implementation. In the context of disaster response as well as overall 
vulnerability reduction, sidelining existing institutions of local governance from 
decision-making processes related to disaster rehabilitation and recovery due to their 
lack of technical expertise or their political nature could only be a temporary solution 
to vulnerability reduction and effective recovery. While large-scale disasters bring in 
resources and attention that allow for major infrastructure development and planning 
initiatives, local governments are responsible for development decisions in the non-
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disaster times, which would reduce the vulnerabilities of the people and their assets. 
Also, in the case of smaller disasters and emergencies (annual floods, storms, 
epidemics, fires, etc.) many of which are recurring in nature, it is the local 
governments that are responsible for undertaking response and recovery.
376
 Hence, 
instead of replacing them with ―technical‖ agencies for planning and development, it 
is necessary to strengthen their capacities by providing adequate manpower with 
required technical skills, financial resources, and building systems of accountability.  
 
Limitations of the Study & Suggestions for Future Research 
 
Limitations of this study. This study looked at the institutional aspects of post-
disaster town planning and processes of recovery associated with spatial restructuring. 
It did not collect data on asset creation at the household level of various income 
groups or access to services, which are important for long-term vulnerability 
reduction. Although household-level surveys were conducted in three places—the 
walled city, relocation sites, and informal settlements of the city—the focus was on the 
process of town planning and recovery associated with the re-establishment of homes.  
 
Questions of livelihood restoration, a key aspect of recovery, were largely asked 
in the context of town planning and re-establishment of homes. There is a need to 
understand the impacts of programs such as GERRP on businesses and artisans, 
                                                 
376
 Under the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments, the Village Panchayat (rural local body) and 
the Nagarpalika or the municipality (urban local body) have the powers to initiate preparedness, 
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especially how the new infrastructure including the road network and expanded 
residential areas, have influenced their viability in the long term. The continued 
significance of the businesses in the walled city and attempts by many small 
businesses and artisans to move back to the walled city warrant a longitudinal study of 
coping mechanisms adopted by them in an altered physical and economic setting. 
 
The city of Bhuj has undergone a dramatic change in its physical form compared 
to pre-earthquake days. While this study looked at the physical alterations to the social 
spaces, especially within the walled city, the evolution of social spaces and changes to 
inter- and intra-communal relations need further analysis, including the ways in which 
urban spaces are generated in social relationships and how social relations take distinct 
spatial forms in cities (Jewson and MacGregor, 1997, p. 1). Although the positive role 
of social and community interactions and associations in community recovery is 
widely recognized, the interaction of the physical and the social aspects of recovery at 
the level of neighborhoods and cities is largely unexplored.
377
 
 
An important limitation of this research is its single-case study method. While this 
particular method allowed for a detailed analysis of the case that is crucial to 
understanding the nuances of post-disaster town planning processes, the lessons are 
drawn from an urban context and a large rehabilitation program in a particular region. 
It does not allow drawing generalized lessons on institutional and governance-related 
                                                                                                                                            
mitigation, recovery and rehabilitation initiatives. 
377
 Ethnographic study of the social transformation in Yungay after the 1970 Peruvian earthquake and 
mudslide illustrate social amplification of risk (Oliver-Smith, 1986). 
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challenges in recovery and rehabilitation programmes in different socioeconomic and 
political settings. Nevertheless, the research demonstrates the challenges of 
undertaking a detailed analysis of a rehabilitation program in a city in the absence of 
process documentation, where the ―bits‖ had to be pieced together through extensive 
interviews of all institutional actors, document analyses, and household surveys over 
an extended period of time to arrive at a coherent description of the processes 
involved.  
 
Suggestions for future research. Recovery and rehabilitation after disasters 
are long, drawn-out processes that require analysis spread over a long time period. 
These processes need to be understood from the perspectives of institutional actors as 
well as the people for whom the program were implemented (and those who were 
excluded). There is a dearth of systematic studies that critically analyze post-disaster 
planning processes especially in the urban areas—policies and plans—their 
formulation, implementation, and evolution in response to the ground realities. 
Although policies and plans might be formulated at higher levels—with or without the 
involvement of local actors—the analyses of their impacts need to pay close attention 
to the ways in which they are translated into action at the local level by their 
implementers. Analysis of these actions would not only demystify the technical 
aspects of urban planning measures, but reveal the political nature of such processes 
including the value-laden nature of policy debates without dismissing the challenges 
associated with post-disaster rehabilitation and long-term vulnerability reduction 
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(Douglas, 1985).
378
 Such an analysis, when done in conjunction with household 
analysis of multiple resiliencies of the disaster-affected, would help identify how 
disaster risk reduction initiatives could enhance the inherent coping capacities of those 
affected and allow for their participation in the processes. Acceptability of disaster risk 
reduction measures by the households in the long-term also needs to be understood. 
 
Of particular significance is the ways in which people influence decision-making 
to yield favorable outcomes—individually and collectively. Social, political, 
commerce/trade-based, and communal (caste/religion/ethnicity) organizations and 
their ability to influence processes of disaster rehabilitation and recovery and to 
articulate needs and aspirations of their constituencies, need further exploration, 
especially in the urban context where associations are based on criteria different from 
the rural settings. Various legally mandated units of participation in urban areas and 
their ability to influence developmental activities and extension of social safety nets at 
the local level also need further exploration. 
 
The research tries to establish the linkages between physical, social, economic 
and political aspects of recovery. However, there is need for longitudinal studies that 
examine the impact of policies and plans for physical restructuring or infrastructure 
                                                 
378
 Physical planning exercises are often embedded in larger narratives of reinforcing identity (cultural, 
national), furthering economic development, and progress through modernizing ways of life. For 
analyses of specific examples of physical planning interventions and their impacts on populations, see 
Peattie, 1987; Holston, 1989; Kalia, 1987, 1994, 2004; Marris, 1961. Planning also takes the form of a 
political project, as an instrument of state control, a technocratic form which often depoliticizes the 
structures of power that shape these processes (Scott, 1998; Ferguson, 1994; Mitchell, 2002; Flyvbjerg, 
1998, etc.) 
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development on economic, political, and sociocultural lives and well being of 
households as well as the city as a whole. There is also need to analyze environmental 
impacts of large-scale urban planning and reconstruction initiatives that undertake 
massive construction projects. 
 
The study recommends more interdisciplinary research in disaster studies that 
draws from various disciplines such as urban planning, civil engineering, 
environmental studies, sociology, economics, and public policy. Disaster rehabilitation 
programs largely deal with all these aspects to varying degrees. The particular ways in 
which these aspects interact with each other to shape the recovery and vulnerability 
reduction of those for whom the programs are designed and implemented need to be 
systematically analyzed. Understanding their mutual interactions is crucial not only for 
recovery and rehabilitation of disaster-affected populations but also to for develop 
initiatives and programs that intend to reduce their vulnerabilities. 
 
While rehabilitation and reconstruction associated with larger-scale disasters are 
often funded by multilateral organizations, recovery from smaller, recurring disasters 
are dealt with by governments using their own funds (and in the absence of that, 
households use their own resources). These smaller disasters significantly erode the 
assets of households, especially the socioeconomically marginalized, and often 
accentuate their slide into poverty. While the rehabilitation of towns of Kachchh under 
GERRP used existing town planning mechanisms, the massive infrastructure 
development projects (including development of relocation sites) were funded by 
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multilaterals. Possibilities of designing disaster recovery and rehabilitation programs 
that use existing programs for shelter construction, employment and livelihood 
creation, and extension of social and physical infrastructure to vulnerable populations 
should be explored. We also need to explore how government could work with civil 
society organizations, private sector, and the people to implement such programs. 
Similarly, additional measures required to ensure disaster risk reduction and the 
participation of the ―beneficiaries‖ in the processes also need to be explored. 
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APPENDIX A 
Earthquake Damage Statistics: Details of Affected Districts 
 
 
District 
No. of 
Affected 
Talukas 
No. of 
Affected 
Villages 
Total 
Population 
Affected 
Population 
Human 
Deaths 
No. of 
Injured 
Percentage 
of 
Population 
Affected 
Kachchh 10 949 1,262,507 1,262,507 12,221 136,048 100.00 
Ahmedabad 11 392 4,687,491 3,894,000 752 4,040 83.07 
Rajkot 14 686 2,514,122 1,594,000 429 11,951 63.40 
Jamnagar 11 685 1,563,558 1,563,000 119 4,930 99.96 
Surat 8 94 3,397,900 397,989 46 190 11.71 
Surendranagar 10 661 1,208,872 1,154,000 110 2,909 95.46 
Banaskantha 8 452 2,013,519 719,000 32 2,770 35.71 
Kheda 10 350 1,793,138 35,121 0 28 1.96 
Bharuch 8 248 1,148,052 460,000 9 44 40.07 
Gandhi Nagar 4 210 1,026,728 35,000 8 241 3.41 
Patan 8 349 935,203 664,000 38 1,695 71.00 
Junagadh 14 554 2,018,446 597,787 8 89 29.62 
Navsari 5 331 1,085,692 87,783 17 52 8.09 
Porbandar 3 157 376,113 376,113 10 90 100.00 
Vadodara 6 85 3,039,127 186,092 1 270 6.12 
Bhavnagar 11 535 2,060,315 445,226 4 45 21.61 
Anand 8 124 1,647,759 4,687 1 20 0.28 
Mehsana 9 611 1,648,251 1,648,251 0 1339 100.00 
Sabarkantha 8 68 1,761,086 128,000 0 56 7.27 
Amreli 11 273 1,484,300 599,000 0 5 40.36 
Valsad 5 108 1,087,680 5,985 0 0 0.55 
 
Total 182 7922 37,759,859 15,857,541 13,805 166,812 42.00 
 
 
 
(Source: Table 20-1, Jain et al., 2002, p. 391)  
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APPENDIX B 
Indian Seismic Zones Classifications and the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kachchh district is classified predominately as zone V in the Seismic Zoning Map 
of India, 1998. This is the highest risk zone and areas so classified are at very high 
damage risk. Ahmedabad lies in zone III (moderate damage risk). Zones III, IV, and V 
correspond to VII, VIII, and IX (out of XII) on the Modified Mercalli (MM) intensity 
scale 
 
(Source: WB/ADB, 2001, p. 23) 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Categorization of RC-Framed Buildings Damaged in Cities of Gujarat during 
Earthquake on January 26, 2001 
 
 
 
(Source: Murty et al., 2005) 
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APPENDIX D 
Sector-wise Estimates of Asset Losses and Reconstruction Costs 
 
 
 
(Source: WB/ADB, 2001)   
 312 
APPENDIX E 
Rehabilitation Costs Estimate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: WB/ADB, 2001) 
  
 313 
APPENDIX F 
Components of Gujarat Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Program 
 
 
GERRP comprised five key components: 1) Housing Recovery 2) Livelihood 
Support Programs 3) Infrastructure 4) Social and Community Development, and 5) 
Disaster Management.
379
 
 
1) Housing Recovery 
 
Housing component of the rehabilitation program involved monetary assistance 
for the purposes of reconstruction, repair and strengthening (retrofitting) of buildings. 
The policy clearly stated that ―individual grant for reconstruction is by way of 
assistance and not compensation.‖ The housing component consisted of five packages 
of financial assistance which prioritized the provision of minimum shelter for all the 
affected households (and equity in the distribution of assistance). A second priority 
was to provide houses for living. Hence in cases were residential buildings had been 
used for non-residential purposes, the owner or occupants of such houses were not 
entitled to any assistance. Beneficiaries were to be identified ―strictly on the basis of 
‗house replacement‘ needs.‖ (GSDMA 2001: 12-13) The package was financed 
through a loan from the World Bank and was based on the damage category of 
individual buildings, G1 to G5. It comprised of four packages for: 
 
1. Demand based grant assistance for relocation of 256 villages where more than 
70 percent of the housing stock was destroyed, at an estimated cost of Rs. 30 
million per village, including grants for land and housing as well as public 
facilities;  
2. in situ reconstruction or repairs of housing in villages and towns located in 
areas declared as the worst affected in the earthquake zones IV and V;  
3. in situ construction for destroyed or damaged housing in the less affected zone 
III, and  
4. A package of grant based compensation in urban areas. 
 
A special fifth package was developed with an emphasis on urban planning for 
the rehabilitation of four badly affected towns of Kachchh district, namely, Anjar, 
Bhachau, Bhuj, and Rapar. Separate compensation schemes were offered based on the 
damage category, the type as well as the built area of the structures. Financial 
assistance was also provided for the repair of multi-storied and non-multistoried 
buildings as well as huts that were completely destroyed. Details of the housing 
assistance package are given in appendix H. 
 
                                                 
379
 Also known as Gujarat Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction Program (GEERP) 
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The initial package for earthquake affected was directed to property owners, 
though many were absentee owners. In Bhuj where 40% of its residents were tenants 
such a compensation scheme raised the ethical question as to who should be 
compensated, the absentee owner or the tenant who invested in the property and 
suffered material losses.
380
 A new assistance package for tenants was therefore later 
created by the state government.
381
 
 
Within agreed general standards of disaster resistance, the recovery strategy 
encouraged an owner driven approach with varied designs and materials.
382
 House 
designs (by households) were expected to help incorporate concerns related to the 
―house as a workplace‖, which is common in rural Kachchh and use of local materials. 
GERRP envisaged cost sharing in three different ways: (a) in those villages where 
―partners‖ will be involved, 50 percent of total costs will be shared by corporate 
houses, large NGOs, other agencies including state governments or any other donors; 
(b) the households may bring in their own savings or labor to share the costs of 
reconstruction; and (c) wherever possible, households may also seek to mobilize 
financing, though the government support for this is envisaged only in terms of 
facilitating information. (WB/ADB 2001: 46) To promote risk sharing/transfer and 
protecting investments (sharing the costs), GoG expressed its intent to insure every 
newly reconstructed house against natural disasters. Since the very poor typically lack 
access to traditional insurance mechanisms, Self Employed Women‘s Association 
(SEWA) developed micro-insurance mechanisms for its members, in several areas, 
including natural disasters. 
 
 2) Livelihood Support & Economic Rehabilitation 
 
In addition to housing recovery, there was also an immediate need to revive and 
restore livelihoods in the affected regions. GERRP extended short-term economic 
schemes and benefit packages to self-employed people, service and cottage industries 
through commercial banks and financial institutions (loans upto Rs. 2 lakhs with 60% 
government subsidy, popularly known as 60:40 Schemes). Assistance was provided 
for the purchase of tool-kits, temporary construction of work shed for cottage industry 
owners, handicrafts artisans etc. in addition to material assistance.  
 
Long-term economic assistance consisted of permanent work sheds to artisans 
whose house/work shed had been destroyed, formation of Rural Industries 
Development Centers to provide infrastructural assistance, formation of Handloom-
Handicraft parks with 50% government assistance, creation of a revolving fund for 
                                                 
380
 N. Upadhyay (personal communication, Bhuj, February 4, 2008). 
381
 GRs in the GSDMA Document; For Bhuj and Anjar only, according to the municipal records 
Bhachau town didn’t have any tenants 
382 The World Bank-ADB joint assessment recommended that ―an owner-driven, in situ housing 
reconstruction process is likely to lead to fast reconstruction and genuine acceptance by beneficiaries‖ 
(WB/ADB, 2001, p. 44). 
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rehabilitation of self-employed in village and cottage industries. For reviving 
agriculture, immediate assistance for inputs and implements, assistance for damaged 
and destroyed farm structures, irrigation assets etc. were also proposed. 
 
Assistance for industries consisted of compensation up to Rs.5000 for salt 
farmers; repair and reconstruction assistance for all tiny, small, medium and large-
scale industries in seismic zones IV and V; contribution towards meeting interest 
liability of existing loans from financial institutions; levy of electricity charges from 
affected industrial units based on actual usage and not minimum charges; exemption 
of stamp duty on financial transactions associated with the various disaster assistance 
schemes; exemption of lease rent and royalty on salt production; exemption of royalty 
for all materials produced and utilized in Kachchh for 1 year etc. Subsidies were 
offered to encourage shop owners, traders, businessmen and professionals to invest in 
commercial activities as well as health and medical services in the seismic zones IV 
and V.  
 
A significant measure for the creation of long term employment opportunities and 
over all industrial development of Kachchh was the Special Incentive Scheme which 
came into effect 6 months after the earthquake and remained operational till October 
2004. Popularly known as Tax Holiday for industries, this scheme granted new 
industrial units Sales Tax Exemption or deferment based on the unit‘s preference, 
duration of exemption based on the total amount of investment. This was 
supplemented by Excise Exemption by the central government.  
 
Continued livelihood support would allow households to engage in shelter 
construction which in turn would allow the beneficiaries to resume their home-based 
activities. The extensive reconstruction program would also generate employment 
opportunities. 
 
3) Infrastructure Restoration and Development 
 
The infrastructure component of GERRP included repair and reconstruction of 
transportation (primarily road network), water supply, irrigation, and power systems in 
the earthquake-affected areas. In case of public buildings, the Roads and Buildings 
(R&B) Department was responsible for the repair and rebuilding of administrative 
buildings and residential quarters. The short-term program included provision of 
temporary office space (temporary residential accommodations to be provided through 
regular provision of temporary housing); minor and major repairs and strengthening to 
damaged buildings, and preparation of designs for buildings to be reconstructed in the 
following two to three years.  
  
A key aspect of the policy was the improved town planning that would provide 
the framework for an improved infrastructure in the four affected towns of Kachchh. 
The Urban Development Department (UDD) of the state government and the newly 
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formed Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA) developed a strategy 
for restoration of basic services in larger urban areas, with a three phase approach: (a) 
immediate needs to restore essential services such as water supply, power, sanitation, 
and roads to a level that will sustain both the people still  remaining in their homes and 
the large displaced population; (b) medium-term, for the first two to three years, to 
rehabilitate and reconstruct the urban infrastructure and civic facilities; and (c) long-
term to develop improved capacity at the local level enabling them to properly operate 
and maintain their local systems for which they have become responsible for under the 
74th Constitutional Amendment (WB/ADB 2001: 50)
383
. 
 
 4) Social and Community Development 
 
Social and Community Development component addressed rehabilitation needs in 
the areas of health, education, social justice and empowerment, and women‘s 
empowerment. It provided assistance for the reconstruction of district hospitals, 
community health centers, primary health centers and sub-centers, Ayurvedic and 
homeopathic hospital and dispensaries/clinics; reconstruction of Aanganwadi Centers 
and Integrated Child Development Scheme godowns; reconstruction and repair of 
primary and secondary schools, higher and technical education institutions with 
improved infrastructure; social protection for orphans, widows, handicapped and 
marginal groups; and rehabilitation of protected and private monuments and heritage 
buildings (GSDMA, GERR Policy, 2001). One of the highlights of the reconstruction 
effort was the district hospital at Bhuj, GK General Hospital, which was rebuilt with 
Prime Minister‘s fund using modern earthquake resistant technology384 
 
The policy document stated that ―the Government of Gujarat will implement a 
number of programs for rebuilding social and community services and regenerating 
social capital in the earthquake-affected areas…the restoration of these services is 
critical for developing a sense of well-being among the communities‖ (GSDMA 2001: 
24). However, educational buildings, healthcare facilities as well as community 
centers that were owned and operated by community organizations or other groups 
would be reconstructed by the respective organizations. The central government 
through its various agencies announced support for livelihood and education of 
scheduled castes, minorities, safai kamdars (scavengers), and backward classes. 
 
 5) Disaster Management 
 
A significant step toward addressing issues of disaster response and 
reconstruction was the formation of the GSDMA to manage and coordinate the 
implementation of the reconstruction program. Recognizing the high level of exposure 
                                                 
383
 Under the 74th Amendment to the Indian Constitution 
384
 Built using ―Base isolation technology‖ for seismic safety, from The Netherlands, one of its kind in 
India 
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of Gujarat to a number of natural and technological hazards, soon after its 
establishment, the mandate of the GSDMA was broadened to include issues of long-
term disaster risk reduction for all hazards faced by the state. The agency‘s immediate 
focus, however, was on the earthquake recovery efforts. Its primary functions included 
coordination of all relevant line agencies and stakeholders involved in reconstruction, 
financial management of the Gujarat Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction 
Fund (GERRF), and monitoring progress of the overall program. 
 
To ensure sustainable reconstruction, GSDMA undertook efforts to quickly 
develop and disseminate appropriate and affordable anti-seismic designs using local 
materials and construction techniques, to builders at the state, district and local levels 
along with programs to train workers in the construction industry in their use. 
Furthermore, GSDMA would monitor construction and code enforcement throughout 
the building process, and inspection of completed works; retrofitting of critical 
structures that were not destroyed in the earthquake, such as schools, hospitals, 
essential infrastructure, congregation areas, administrative buildings, monuments and 
hazardous industries to conform to hazard-resistant standards. 
 
For the reconstruction efforts of Gujarat to be truly sustainable, the state 
government emphasized the need to develop long-term disaster risk management 
capacity, with an active participation of the public as well as private sectors, NGOs, 
and local communities. For long-term disaster risk reduction, it incorporated three 
main components to a comprehensive disaster risk management strategy: (a) 
identifying the hazards one is exposed to and the vulnerability to those hazards; (b) 
reducing the risks by taking steps to prevent or prepare for potential impacts; and 
finally (c) transferring or sharing the portion of risk that cannot be reduced. 
 
There was also an immediate need to develop a comprehensive and sustainable 
disaster risk management program, capitalizing on the strong public awareness and 
expectations for improved disaster management following the earthquake. The 
favorable environment at the national level through the work of the Government of 
India High Powered Committee set up in August 1999 to draw up national and state-
level disaster management plans and earlier/ongoing work undertaken in other 
states
385
 supported such an endeavor. Though hazard distributions of Gujarat were 
described in the Vulnerability Atlas of India for Gujarat, 1997, under GERRP, 
GSDMA would extend its mandate to support and monitor further research to estimate 
probabilities of future earthquakes; undertake micro-zoning for land use planning 
purposes; and a comprehensive vulnerability assessment for each hazard (hydro-
meteorological as well as industrial/technological hazards) throughout the state to 
design and target appropriate risk reduction and transfer measures. 
 
In addition to addressing the need for scientific and technical knowledge required 
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 Such as Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Uttaranchal, and Uttar Pradesh 
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to ensure safe structures that can withstand the effects of extreme events, earthquake 
reconstruction projects under GERRP would also consider ways to overcome the 
socioeconomic, institutional and political barriers to the adoption of effective risk 
reduction strategies and measures. Since awareness and knowledge play an important 
role in risk reduction, the policy stated support for workshops and conferences aimed 
at heightening the awareness of stakeholders to the threat of natural disasters and what 
can be done about it, and educational and training activities that increase the 
understanding of policy makers, decision makers and practitioners about disaster 
management. 
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APPENDIX G 
Details of the Earthquake Housing Assistance Package 
 
Government of Gujarat announced five special packages of assistance for 
reconstruction, retrofitting, and repairs of approximately a million houses destroyed 
and damaged in the earthquake. The benefits enunciated through these packages form 
the basis of the housing recovery program. 
 
Package 1 addresses the reconstruction and rehabilitation of villages in zone IV and V 
where more than 50 per cent of the houses have collapsed. At the rate of nearly Rs. 3 
crore per village of 200 households, it envisages Rs. 30 lakhs for land acquisition, Rs. 
70 lakhs for infrastructure, and Rs. 1.8 crore for constructing 200 pucca, quake and 
cyclone-resistant houses, and Rs. 20 lakhs for other emergency facilities. 
 
Package 2 is for villages in seismic zones IV and V, which have opted for in-situ 
reconstruction. Here, the families below the poverty line whose houses have been 
destroyed would get Rs. 40,000. Others will get assistance up to Rs. 90,000 for 
reconstruction @ Rs.2000 per m
2
 of built up area with a ceiling of 45 square meters. 
 
Package 3 is for the villages situated in areas other than Zone IV and V, where 
individual houses have been destroyed or partially damaged. The assistance ranges 
from Rs. 7,000 for totally destroyed huts to Rs. 40,000 for fully destroyed houses 
depending on extent of damage. For the repair of damages, the assistance varies from 
Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 20,000, depending upon the extent of damages. 
 
Package 4-A declared by the Government relates to the RCC (Reinforced Cement 
Concrete) frame structure, (low rise & high rise) in urban areas, which include 
Municipal Corporation, Urban Development Authority areas, and other municipalities, 
in the state (excluding Bhuj, Bhachau, Rapar and Anjar in the Kutch District). The 
package provides reconstruction assistance to owner of RCC frame structure buildings 
at the rate of Rs. 3,500 per m
2 
up to a maximum built-up area of 50 m
2
. It also offers 
assistance for repairs and structural strengthening of low rise and high rise structures, 
depending upon the degree of damages varying from Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 800,000. 
 
Package 4-B declared by the Government relates to the Load Bearing Structures in 
Corporation areas, Urban Development Authority areas, and municipalities in the state 
(except Bhuj, Bhachau, Rapar and Anjar in the Kutch District). The Government will 
provide assistance for reconstruction of collapsed or demolished houses at the rate of 
Rs. 2,800 per square meter up to a maximum built up area of 50 m
2
, subject to an 
upper limit of Rs. 1.40 lakhs. For the repairs of damages, the assistance varies from 
Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 20,000 depending upon the nature of damages. 
 
Package 5 relates to rehabilitation in the four worst affected municipal towns of Bhuj, 
Anjar, Bhachau and Rapar in the district of Kutch with a stress on urban town 
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planning. The financial assistance for reconstruction will be made available at the rate 
of Rs. 3,500 per m
2
, subject to an upper limit of Rs. 1.75 lakhs for a maximum of 50 
m
2
. The assistance for repair of multi-storey houses will vary from Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 
8,00,000 depending upon the category of damages. The assistance for repair of non-
multi-storeyed houses will vary from Rs. 8,000 to Rs. 45,000 depending upon the 
category of damages. The assistance of Rs. 7,000 will be made available for 
completely destroyed huts. 
 
(Source: GSDMA, 2001) 
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APPENDIX H 
Line Departments Responsible for Implementation of Projects in GERRP 
 
 
Sector Government Department  
 
Housing Panchayat and Rural Housing, 
Urban Development and Urban Housing, 
Revenue and 
Roads & Buildings 
Livelihood Industry, 
Agriculture, 
Social Justice and Empowerment  
Health Health and Family Welfare, 
Roads and Buildings (R & B) 
Education Primary Education, 
Higher Education and 
Technical Education 
Dam Safety and Irrigation Irrigation and Water Supply 
Public Buildings Roads & Buildings, 
Panchayat, 
Home, 
Sports, 
Youth & Cultural Affairs, 
Police  
State Roads and Bridges Roads and Buildings (R & B) 
Power Gujarat Electricity Board, 
Energy & Petrochemicals 
Rural Water Supply Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board 
(GWSSB), 
Water Supply 
Urban Infrastructure Urban Development, 
Gujarat Urban Development Corporation 
(GUDC) 
Community Participation 
and Community 
Development 
Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority 
(GSDMA) 
Disaster Management and 
Capacity Building 
Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority 
(GSDMA) 
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APPENDIX I 
Town Planning Scheme Process 
 
 
Preparation and implementation of Town Planning Schemes are the responsibility 
of Area Development Authority and are overseen by the Urban Development 
Department of state governments. The process begins with the local authority (ADA 
or the Town Planning and Valuation Department‘s local office) declaring its intention 
to undertake a TPS. The ownership of all properties (land parcels) within the proposed 
scheme area would be automatically assumed by the authority. Also property owners 
are not allowed to engage in any development activity till the ownership is transferred 
back to them. Town Planning Scheme process involves three main phases. 
 
In Phase One, ADA prepares and publishes a Draft TP Scheme, seeks objections 
and suggestions from plot owners, revises the plan in response to their comments and 
concerns and then submits the Draft Scheme to the Urban Development Department 
for approval. In Phase Two, Town Planning Officers (TPO) from Town Planning and 
Valuation Department (TP&VD) are appointed, who in their quasi judicial capacity, 
give three rounds of individual hearings to all the property owners. Based on the 
hearings, the physical layout, known as the Preliminary Scheme is finalized. Based on 
the preliminary scheme or the physical plan the local authority (ADA) demarcates the 
final plots and initiates the infrastructure work. Individual owners assume possession 
of their plots and permission to undertake building activity is reinstated. In this phase, 
financial transactions with owners are undertaken to compensate owners for any 
changes in property value as well as to levy betterment charges.  
 
In the third and final phase, financial details such as compensation to be paid to 
owners and the betterment charges to be levied are finalized. The Final Scheme is 
submitted to the state government for approval. Once the final scheme is published, 
resolution of further financial grievances can only be done by an Appeal committee. 
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